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Accident description
Last updated: 13 December 2017
Status:Final
Date:Saturday 5 May 2007
Time:08:45 UTC
Type:Silhouette image of generic E110 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Embraer EMB-110 Bandeirante
Operator:NHR Tįxi-Aéreo
Registration: PT-WAW
C/n / msn: 110122
First flight: 1976
Crew:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2
Passengers:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 0
Total:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2
Airplane damage: Minor
Location:Rio de Janeiro-Galećo International Airport, RJ (GIG) (   Brazil)
Phase: Taxi (TXI)
Nature:Cargo
Departure airport:Rio de Janeiro-Galećo International Airport, RJ (GIG/SBGL), Brazil
Destination airport:?
Narrative:
The EMB-110 cargo plane was parked at Stand 13 at the Air Cargo Terminal (TPS-5). At 05:45 the flight was cleared to start the engine and taxi to runway 10 for departure via taxiway J.
The pilot started the taxi to taxiway J but the aircraft ran off the side of the platform, crossing a drainage ditch.

Probable Cause:

FACTORS (translated from Portuguese):
Medical aspect
a) Visual illusions - Contributed
The pilots misinterpreted the taxiway J due to false sensory impressions caused by taxi in nighttime with low light, improper painting of the taxiway, hiding of the lateral limit of the platform by bushes, mist, remaining water dew on the windshield and the existence of another taxiway extension in the path of the aircraft.

Operational aspect
a) Airport infrastructure - Contributed
The International Airport of Rio de Janeiro (Antonio Carlos Jobim) did not have the Operating Certificate RBHA 139 (Brazilian Aeronautical Certification Regulations), thus not having an Airport Operations Manual (AOM) approved by the regulator, with operational safety procedures for the aircraft platform that could provide constant monitoring of the movement area, to take immediate corrective action on discrepancies that pose unacceptable risks to aircraft.
The absence of an approved AOM, including operational safety procedures and maintenance of airport infrastructure in the movement area, contributed to the failure to identify existing latent risks on the TPS-5 platform, such as wear of guide lines, hue difference in taxi tread; growth of vegetation between the concrete blocks damaging the display of the platform edge indicator; and the existence of large quantities of failed spotlight lamps on the lampposts.

Accident investigation:
cover
Investigating agency: CENIPA
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year and 12 months
Accident number: A-029/CENIPA/2009
Download report: Final report


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This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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