| Issued: -- | To: FAA | NTSB Safety Recommendation A-09-21 |
| Evaluate the history of uncommanded air turbine starter valve (ATSV) open events in the MD-80 fleet and the effectiveness of coupling the ATSV-Open light to the Master Caution system to determine whether all MD-80 airplanes need to be modified to couple the ATSV-Open light to the Master Caution system. Once the evaluation is completed, require any necessary modifications. |
| Issued: -- | To: FAA | NTSB Safety Recommendation A-09-22 |
| Require principal operations inspectors to review their operators’ pilot guidance and training on task allocation and workload management during emergency situations to verify that they state that, to the extent practicable, the pilot running the checklists should not engage in nonessential operational tasks, such as radio communications. |
| Issued: -- | To: FAA | NTSB Safety Recommendation A-09-23 |
| Require MD-80 series airplane operators to incorporate information about the relationship between the pneumatic crossfeed valve and the engine fire handle into their training programs and written guidance. |
| Issued: -- | To: FAA | NTSB Safety Recommendation A-09-24 |
| Establish best practices for conducting both single and multiple emergency and abnormal situations training. |
| Issued: -- | To: FAA | NTSB Safety Recommendation A-09-25 |
| Once the best practices for both single and multiple emergency and abnormal situations training asked for in Safety Recommendation A-09-24 have been established, require that these best practices be incorporated into all operators’ approved training programs. |
| Issued: -- | To: FAA | NTSB Safety Recommendation A-09-26 |
| Require that operators provide pilots with guidance requiring that pilots and flight attendants actively monitor exit availability and configure the airplane and cabin for an evacuation when the airplane is stopped away from the gate after a significant event to help expedite an emergency evacuation if one becomes necessary. |
| Issued: -- | To: FAA | NTSB Safety Recommendation A-09-27 |
| Revise Advisory Circular 120-48, “Communication and Coordination Between Flight Crewmembers and Flight Attendants,” to update guidance and training provided to flight and cabin crews regarding communications during emergency and unusual situations to reflect current industry knowledge based on research and lessons learned from relevant accidents and incidents over the last 20 years. |
| Issued: -- | To: FAA | NTSB Safety Recommendation A-09-28 |
| Require Boeing to establish an appropriate replacement interval for air turbine starter valve-air filters installed on all MD-80 series aircraft. |
| Issued: -- | To: American Airlines | NTSB Safety Recommendation A-09-29 |
| Evaluate your Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System program to determine why it failed to (1) identify deficiencies in its maintenance program associated with the MD-80 engine no-start failure and (2) discover the lack of compliance with company procedures. Then, make necessary modifications to the program to correct these shortcomings. |
| Issued: 19-MAY-2009 | To: FAA | A-09-021 |
| Evaluate the history of uncommanded air turbine starter valve (ATSV)-Open events in the MD-80 fleet and the effectiveness of coupling the ATSV-Open light to the Master Caution system to determine whether all MD-80 airplanes need to be modified to couple the ATSV-Open light to the Master Caution system. Once the evaluation is completed, require any necessary modifications. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 19-MAY-2009 | To: FAA | A-09-022 |
| Require principal operations inspectors to review their operators’ pilot guidance and training on task allocation and workload management during emergency situations to verify that they state that, to the extent practicable, the pilot running the checklists should not engage in additional nonessential operational tasks, such as radio communications. (Open - Unacceptable Response) |
| Issued: 19-MAY-2009 | To: FAA | A-09-023 |
| Require MD-80 series airplane operators to incorporate information about the relationship between the pneumatic crossfeed valve and the engine fire handle into their training programs and written guidance. (Open Acceptable Alternate Response) |
| Issued: 19-MAY-2009 | To: FAA | A-09-024 |
| Establish best practices for conducting both single and multiple emergency and abnormal situations training. (Open - Acceptable Response) |
| Issued: 19-MAY-2009 | To: FAA | A-09-025 |
| Once the best practices for both single and multiple emergency and abnormal situations training asked for in Safety Recommendation A-09-24 have been established, require that these best practices be incorporated into all operators’ approved training programs. (Open - Acceptable Response) |
| Issued: 19-MAY-2009 | To: FAA | A-09-026 |
| Require that operators provide pilots with guidance requiring that pilots and flight attendants actively monitor exit availability and configure the airplane and cabin for an evacuation when the airplane is stopped away from the gate after a significant event to help expedite an emergency evacuation if one becomes necessary. (Open - Acceptable Response) |
| Issued: 19-MAY-2009 | To: FAA | A-09-027 |
| Revise Advisory Circular 120-48, Communication and Coordination Between Flight Crewmembers and Flight Attendants, to update guidance and training provided to flight and cabin crews regarding communications during emergency and unusual situations to reflect current industry knowledge based on research and lessons learned from relevant accidents and incidents over the last 20 years. (Open - Acceptable Response) |
| Issued: 19-MAY-2009 | To: FAA | A-09-028 |
| Require Boeing to establish an appropriate replacement interval for air turbine starter valve air filters installed on all MD-80 series aircraft. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
| Issued: 19-MAY-2009 | To: American Airlines | A-09-029 |
| Evaluate your Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System program to determine why it failed to (1) identify deficiencies in its maintenance program associated with the MD-80 engine no-start failure and (2) discover the lack of compliance with company procedures. Then, make necessary modifications to the program to correct these shortcomings. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
