Détails:A BA CityFlyer Avro RJ100 was substantially damaged during a landing accident at London City Airport (LCY). The 71 occupants evacuated the aircraft using emergency slides.
|Date:||13 FEV 2009|
|Numéro de série:|| E3298|
|Année de Fabrication:|| 1997|
|Moteurs:|| 4 Lycoming LF507-1F|
|Equipage:||victimes: 0 / à bord: 5|
|Passagers:||victimes: 0 / à bord: 67|
|Total:||victimes: 0 / à bord: 72 |
|Dégats de l'appareil:|| Perte Totale|
|Conséquences:|| Written off (damaged beyond repair)|
|Lieu de l'accident:||London City Airport (LCY) (Royaume Uni)
|Phase de vol:|| A l'atterrissage (LDG)|
|Nature:||Transport de Passagers Intern.|
|Aéroport de départ:||Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS/EHAM), Pays-Bas|
|Aéroport de destination:||London City Airport (LCY/EGLC), Royaume Uni|
|Numéro de vol:||8456|
The nose landing gear of flight BA8456 collapsed after touchdown at London City Airport (LCY) runway 28.
BBC News reported on May 25, 2009 that British Airways had written off the airplane.
Following a normal touchdown, the fracture of the nose landing gear main fitting allowed the nose gear to collapse rearwards and penetrate the lower fuselage, causing significant damage to the equipment bay and the battery to become disconnected. The penetration of the fuselage allowed smoke and fumes produced by the consequent release of hydraulic fluid to enter the cockpit and passenger cabin. With the battery disconnected and after the engines were shut down, all power to the aircraft PA systems was lost and the remote cockpit door release mechanism became inoperative. No pre-accident defects were identified with the manual cockpit door release mechanism or the PA system.
The nose landing gear main fitting failed following the formation of multiple fatigue cracks within the upper section of the inner bore, originating at the base of machining grooves in the bore surface. These had formed because the improved surface finish, introduced by SB 146-32-150, had not been properly embodied at previous overhaul by Messier Services Inc, despite their overhaul records showing its incorporation. The operator had been in full compliance with the Service Bulletin relating to regular inspection of the main fitting, and embodiment of SB 146-32-150 at overhaul removed the requirement for these inspections by the operator.
» BA jobs go after plane write-off (BBC, 25 May 2009)
» BA jet in airport 'hard landing' (BBC, 14 February 2009)
Opérations de secours
BAE Systems Alert Service Bulletin A32-180, issued on 25 February 2009, reintroduced the repetitive in-service inspection requirements of Messier Dowty SB 146-32-149 on nose landing gear main fittings that had SB 146-32-150 embodiment claimed by Messier Services Inc. EASA Airworthiness Directive 2009-043-E, also issued in February 2009, mandated this Service Bulletin.
Messier Dowty published Service Bulletin SB 146-32-174 on 26 August 2009, which introduced an improved ultrasonic inspection technique and a shorter re-inspection interval for the affected nose landing gear main fittings, which superseded SB 146-32-149.
BAE Systems subsequently re-issued Alert Service Bulletin A32-180 (Revision 1), which introduced Messier Dowty SB 146-32-174 and canceled the requirements of Messier Dowty SB 146-32-149.
Messier Dowty issued Service Bulletin SB 146-32 173 on 30 September 2009, which required borescope inspection of nose landing gear main fittings overhauled by Messier Services, Sterling, Virginia, to verify the proper incorporation of Messier Dowty SB 146-32-150.
EASA Airworthiness Directive 2009-0197-E, published on 7 September 2009, mandated the requirements of BAE Systems Alert Service Bulletin A32-180 Revision 1, and Messier.
EASA issued 3 Emergency Airworthiness Directives
Show all AD's and Safety Recommendations
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposé destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport et London City Airport est de 333 km (208 miles).
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tels qui sont connus à ce jour.