Détails:A British Aerospace BAe-125-800B executive jet, registered RA-02807, was destroyed when it crashed in a forest while on approach to Minsk-2 International Airport (MSQ), Belarus. The airplane operated on S-Air flight RLS9607 from Moskva-Vnukovo Airport (VKO), Russia to Minsk.
|Date:||lundi 26 octobre 2009|
British Aerospace BAe-125-800B
|Numéro de série:|| 258076|
|Année de Fabrication:|| 1986|
|Heures de vol:||12751|
|Moteurs:|| 2 Garrett TFE731-5R-1H|
|Equipage:||victimes: 3 / à bord: 3|
|Passagers:||victimes: 2 / à bord: 2|
|Total:||victimes: 5 / à bord: 5 |
|Dégats de l'appareil:|| Détruit|
|Conséquences:|| Written off (damaged beyond repair)|
|Lieu de l'accident:||3 km (1.9 milles) SE of Minsk-2 International Airport (MSQ) ( Biélorussie)
|Phase de vol:|| En approche (APR)|
|Aéroport de départ:||Moskva-Vnukovo Airport (VKO/UUWW), Fédération de Russie|
|Aéroport de destination:||Minsk-2 International Airport (MSQ/UMMS), Biélorussie|
|Numéro de vol:||9607|
The en route and descent part of the flight were uneventful. The crew were vectored for an approach and landing on runway 31 in instrument conditions. In preparation for an ILS approach the crew tuned in to the wrong ILS frequency. The captain thought the flight director was causing problems. Descent was continued until the TAWS gave an aural warning "Pull up" at 21:19. The captain decided to initiate a go around. The minimum altitude reached was 110 m agl.
The crew then positioned the plane for another ILS approach to runway 31. At 21:30, at an altitude of about 550 m, the copilot questioned the ILS frequency. It was concluded that the wrong frequency had been set. The flight now continued using the correct frequency. The airplane descended below the glide slope until the TAWS again gave aural warnings "Caution terrain, Caution terrain.. ..Terrain, Terrain". Then the "Pull up" warning sounded for 35 seconds until the airplane began colliding with trees at an altitude of about 30 m. It crashed into a forest and broke up.
The cause of the crash of BAe-125-800B RA-02807 during the ILS approach procedure at night, in weather conditions that met ICAO CAT I, was the failure to take timely action by the crew to carry out a missed approach, or divert to an alternate, when the ground could not be seen while descending below decision height during a transition to visual flight, and the lack of a proper response and action required when the TAWS alarm repeatedly sounded, which led to the collision of the aircraft with obstacles (forest) and land in a controlled flight (CFIT), its destruction and death of people on board.
Contributing factors were:
- Deficiencies in the type of retraining and training of the flight crew, especially in the use of automatic flight modes, and flight director;
- Erroneous actions of the captain, which led to an execution of the approach with the wrong ILS frequency set on the left set;
- Lack of preparation of the commander of the plane for an approach in weather conditions that meet CAT I ICAO.
Values of meteorological conditions in the flight log were in most cases were falsified;
- Poor communication and crew resource management (CRM) of the flightcrew;
- Poor control of the level of training of the crew by the airline's management and lack of organization in the airline's flight operations;
- Psychological characteristics of the pilots, unrecorded in the formation of the crew and, possibly, reduced efficiency of the captain in a stressful situation because of chronic ischemic heart disease with coronary artery problems, which was not detected when passing aviation medical checks.
» RIA Novosti
» Belorusskiye Novosti
» Russian Ministry of Transport
» MAK Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC)
METAR Weather report:
19:30 UTC / 22:30 local time: UMMS 261930Z 17003MPS 120V220 3500-DZ BR OVC002 09/09 Q1016 R31/290060 NOSIG RMK QBB060 =
Wind 170 degrees at 6 knots, variable from 120° to 220°; Visibility 3500 m in light drizzle; Ceiling 200 feet overcast; QNH 1016 MB
Official accident investigation report
|investigating agency: ||Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC / MAK) - Russia |
|report status: ||Final|
|report number: ||Final report|
|report released:||17 July 2012|
|duration of investigation: ||2 years and 9 months|
|download report: ||
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposé destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Moskva-Vnukovo Airport et Minsk-2 International Airport est de 617 km (386 miles).