ASN logo
Last updated: 21 June 2018
Statuts:Enquête Officielle
Date:lundi 25 janvier 2010
Heure:ca 14:30
Type/Sous-type:Silhouette image of generic E110 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Embraer EMB-110C Bandeirante
Compagnie:Piquiatuba Táxi Aéreo
Immatriculation: PT-TAF
Numéro de série: 110103
Année de Fabrication: 1976
Moteurs: 2 Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-27
Equipage:victimes: 1 / à bord: 2
Passagers:victimes: 1 / à bord: 8
Total:victimes: 2 / à bord: 10
Dégats de l'appareil: Substantiels
Conséquences: Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Lieu de l'accident:4 km (2.5 milles) E of Senador José Porfírio-Wilma Rebelo Airfield, PA (   Brésil)
Phase de vol: En approche (APR)
Nature:Charter National
Aéroport de départ:Belém/Val-de-Cans International Airport, PA (BEL/SBBE), Brésil
Aéroport de destination:Senador José Porfírio-Wilma Rebelo Airfield, PA (SNWR), Brésil
An Embraer EMB-110C Bandeirante passenger plane, registered PT-TAF and operated by Piquiatuba Táxi Aéreo, sustained substantial damage during a forced landing. The captain and one of the passengers were killed. The co-pilot and seven passengers survived.
The aircraft was en route from Belém/Val-de-Cães International Airport in Brazil to Senador José Porfírio at an altitude of 2500 feet when the no.1 engine showed an increase in TIT (Turbine Inlet Temperature). The captain throttled back the engine, but the aircraft was not able to maintain altitude. The crew attempted to locate their destination airport but were unable.
A forced landing was carried out 4 km from the airport.

Probable Cause:

Contributing Factors:
1 Human Factor
1.1 Medical Aspect
Not contributing.
1.2 Psychological Aspect
1.2.1 Individual Information
A) Attitude - contributed
There was disregard for the procedures, since the pilots did not use the checklist for the emergency situation.
1.2.2 Psychosocial Information
A) Culture of the working group - undetermined
It is possible that the informal rules, shared by some pilots, regarding the use of the checklist, have influenced the behavior of the pilot to decline its use.
1.2.3 Organizational Information
A) Organizational culture - contributed
The company evidenced to have an organizational culture based on the informality of the adopted procedures, from the planning to the maintenance of the aircraft, which compromised the safe accomplishment of the operation.
B) Organizational processes - contributed
The company did not have an effective supervision system, allowing the aircraft to be used under inadequate conditions.
1.3 Operational Aspect
1.3.1 Concerning the operation of the aircraft
A) Adverse weather conditions - contributed
The meteorological conditions at the time of the occurrence made it difficult for the crew to locate the aerodrome, causing the aircraft to move away from the approach path to the runway which, added to the drag produced by the unfeathered propeller, aggravated the flight situation, contributing to the forced landing.
B) Coordination of cabin - contributed
The fact that the crew had been searching for the aerodrome, now turning their attention to the passenger who went to the cabin of the aircraft, or turning the attention to the engine failure, caused inattention as to the use of the checklist, resulting in non-compliance and failure to perform prescribed procedures, such as not feathering the left propeller by the propeller lever. This made it difficult to maintain the flight, because the windmilling propeller caused drag, culminating in the forced landing.
C) Pilot trial - contributed
The fact that the commander of the aircraft did not follow the procedures foreseen in the checklist, as suggested by the co-pilot after the engine failure, was decisive for the maintenance of the windmilling propeller, causing a drag that made it difficult to maintain the flight, contributing to forced landing.
D) Maintenance of the aircraft - contributed
The fact that the aircraft operator did not comply with the ANAC guidance related to the left engine condition with the overdue TBO, as well as not having identified the maintenance services performed and defined as not recommended by the manufacturer, contributed that the left engine was operated with the inappropriate governor connection, which resulted in loss of power in flight.
E) Management oversight - contributed
Supervision of aircraft maintenance activities was not adequate, allowing the aircraft to operate with nonconformities and culminating in in-flight engine failure.
1.3.2 Concerning ATS organs
Not contributing.
2 Material Factor
2.1 Concerning the aircraft
Not contributing.
2.2 Concerning equipment and technology systems for ATS
Not contributing.

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: CENIPA
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 2 years and 10 months
Accident number: A-122/CENIPA/2012
Download report: Final report

» Piquiatuba Táxi Aéreo

Opérations de secours

CENIPA issued 6 Safety Recommendations
SERIPA issued 14 Safety Recommendations

Show all AD's and Safety Recommendations


Add your photo of this accident or aircraft

Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Belém/Val-de-Cans International Airport, PA et Senador José Porfírio-Wilma Rebelo Airfield, PA est de 396 km (247 miles).
Accident location: Approximate; accuracy within a few kilometers.

Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.
languages: languages