Accident Antonov An-26B SP-FDP,
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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 321252
 

Date:Wednesday 25 August 2010
Time:19:47
Type:Silhouette image of generic AN26 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Antonov An-26B
Owner/operator:EXIN
Registration: SP-FDP
MSN: 11903
Year of manufacture:1982
Total airframe hrs:21510 hours
Engine model:Ivchenko AI-24VT
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 4
Aircraft damage: Substantial, written off
Category:Accident
Location:Tallinn-Ülemiste Airport (TLL) -   Estonia
Phase: Take off
Nature:Cargo
Departure airport:Tallinn-Ülemiste Airport (TLL/EETN)
Destination airport:Helsinki-Vantaa Airport (HEL/EFHK)
Investigating agency: ESIB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
An Antonov An-26 cargo plane, registered SP-FDP, suffered a takeoff accident at Tallinn-Ülemiste Airport (TLL), Estonia. None of the four crew members were injured.
Flight EXN3788 was a scheduled cargo service to Helsinki-Vantaa Airport, Finland. The first officer was pilot flying.
The aircraft entered runway 08 from taxiway B on the West end of the runway and lined up for takeoff. The calculated V1 was 182 and Vr was 201 km/h. Ten seconds after commencing takeoff, the pilot flying started rotation without the Vr callout at 123 km/h. The aircraft pitch angle increased to 4.6° two seconds later. Sixteen seconds into the takeoff, the navigator made the V1 call-out at 160.5 km/h. One second later the flight engineer called "Retracting" in Polish. The aircraft started to pitch down and 3 seconds later it contacted the runway and continued on its belly for 1,228 m before coming to its rest position 3 m right from the runway centerline.

Cause:
1. The investigation determined the inadequate action of the flight engineer, consisting in early and uncommanded landing gear retraction, as a cause of the accident.

Contributing factors to the accident were:
1. Inadequate crew recourse management and insufficient experience in cooperation and coordination between crewmembers.
2. Start of aircraft rotation at low speed and with fast elevator movement to 17°, which resulted in:
- Lifting the aircraft sufficiently to close the WOW switch and allow the retraction of the landing gear at the speed not sufficient for the climb.
- Providing misleading information to FE about the aerodynamic status of the aircraft.
3. Inadequate adjustment of the WOW switch, which allowed the gear retraction to be activated before the aircraft was airborne.

The position of the landing gear selector on the central console is not considered as a contributing factor to the accident. However, investigation finds necessary to point it out as a safety concern, specifically in situations, where crewmembers are trained and/or used to operate the aircrafts with gear selector location according to the EASA Certification Standards CS-25. Positioning of the gear lever to the location which is compliant to EASA document CS-25, would create additional safety barrier to avoid similar occurrences, specifically in aircrafts where landing gear is operated by FE.

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: ESIB
Report number: EE170/250810
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year and 5 months
Download report: Final report

Sources:

Scramble 385
Reporter.ee

Location

Revision history:

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