Détails:A Hawker Beechcraft 390 Premier IA corporate jet, registered D-IAYL, was destroyed when it crashed during a go around near St. Moritz-Samedan Airport (SMV), Switzerland. Both crew members were killed.
|Date:||dimanche 19 décembre 2010|
Hawker Beechcraft 390 Premier IA
|Compagnie:||Windrose Air Jetcharter|
|Numéro de série:|| RB-249|
|Année de Fabrication:|| 2008|
|Heures de vol:||1047|
|Moteurs:|| 2 Williams International FJ44-2A|
|Equipage:||victimes: 2 / à bord: 2|
|Passagers:||victimes: 0 / à bord: 0|
|Total:||victimes: 2 / à bord: 2 |
|Dégats de l'appareil:|| Détruit|
|Conséquences:|| Written off (damaged beyond repair)|
|Lieu de l'accident:||1 km (0.6 milles) N of St. Moritz-Samedan Airport (SMV) (Suisse)
|Phase de vol:|| A l'atterrissage (LDG)|
|Aéroport de départ:||Zagreb-Pleso Airport (ZAG/LDZA), Croatie|
|Aéroport de destination:||St. Moritz-Samedan Airport (SMV/LSZS), Suisse|
|Numéro de vol:|| 631V|
The airplane took off at 14:01 from Zagreb-Pleso Airport (ZAG), Croatia on a commercial flight to St. Moritz-Samedan Airport (SMV) under callsign QGA 631V, under instrument flight rules (IFR).
After an uneventful flight, the IFR flight plan was cancelled at 14:53:09 and the flight continued under visual flight rules (VFR).
After first contact with Samedan Information, when the crew reported that they were ten miles before the threshold of runway 21, the aircraft was in fact approximately eight miles north-east of the threshold of runway 21.
When at 14:58:40 the crew of a Piaggio 180 asked the flight information service officer (FISO) of Samedan Information about the weather as follows: "(...) and the condition for in bound still ok?", the crew of D-IAYL responded at 14:58:46, before the FISO was able to answer: "Yes, for the moment good condition (...)".
D-IAYL was slightly north-east of Zuoz when the crew asked the FISO about the weather over the aerodrome. D-IAYL was over Madulein when at 14:59:46 the FISO informed the crew that they could land at their own discretion. Immediately afterwards, the crew increased their rate of descent to over 2200 ft/min and maintained this until a final recorded radio altitude (RA) of just under 250 ft, which they reached over the threshold of runway 21.
The crew then initiated a climb to an RA of approximately 600 ft, turned a little to the left and then flew parallel to the runway centre line. The landing gear was extended and the flaps were probably set to 20 degrees. At the end of runway 21 the crew initiated a right turn onto the downwind leg, during which they reached a bank angle of 55 degrees; in the process their speed increased from 110 to 130 knots.
Abeam the threshold of runway 21, the crew turned onto the final approach on runway 21. The bank angle in this turn reached up to 62 degrees, without the speed being noticeably increased. The aircraft then turned upside down and crashed almost vertically. Both pilots suffered fatal injuries on impact. A power line was severed, causing a power failure in the Upper Engadine valley. An explosion-type fire broke out. The aircraft was destroyed.
Weather reported at 14:40 local time:
LSZS 191340Z 20008KT 170V230 3000 -SN BR FEW025 BKN040 M06/M10 Q1002 NOSIG=
[13:40 UTC: Wind 200 degrees at 8 knots direction varying 170-230 degrees; Visibility 3000m; light snow, mist; few clouds at 2,500 feet, broken clouds 4,000 feet;Temperature -6°C, Dew point -10°C, 1002 hPa]
The accident is attributable to the fact that the aircraft collided with the ground, because control of the aircraft was lost due to a stall.
The following causal factors have been identified for the accident:
- The crew continued the approach under weather conditions that no longer permitted safe control of the aircraft.
- The crew performed a risky manoeuvre close to ground instead of a consistent missed approach procedure.
The fact that the flight information service did not consistently communicate to the crew relevant weather information from another aircraft was a contributing factor to the genesis of the accident.
As a systemic factor that contributed to the genesis of the accident, the following point was identified:
- The visibility and cloud bases determined on Samedan airport were not representative for an approach from Zernez, because they did not correspond to the actual conditions in the approach sector.
Official accident investigation report
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposé destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Zagreb-Pleso Airport et St. Moritz-Samedan Airport est de 481 km (301 miles).