Date: | Thursday 2 August 2012 |
Time: | 06:18 |
Type: | Cessna 500 Citation I |
Owner/operator: | Airnor - Aeronaves del Noroeste |
Registration: | EC-IBA |
MSN: | 500-0178 |
Year of manufacture: | 1974 |
Total airframe hrs: | 9460 hours |
Engine model: | Pratt & Whitney Canada JT15D-1 |
Fatalities: | Fatalities: 2 / Occupants: 2 |
Aircraft damage: | Destroyed, written off |
Category: | Accident |
Location: | 1,6 km N of Santiago de Compostela Airport (SCQ) -
Spain
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Phase: | Approach |
Nature: | Ferry/positioning |
Departure airport: | Oviedo/Aviles-Asturias Airport (OVD/LEAS) |
Destination airport: | Santiago de Compostela Airport (SCQ/LEST) |
Investigating agency: | CIAIAC |
Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:A Cessna 500 Citation I corporate jet was destroyed when it crashed near Santiago de Compostela Airport (SCQ), Spain. Both pilots were killed in the accident.
They had flown a transplant organ to Porto that night and were returning to Santiago de Compostela, leaving Oviedo Airport at 05:45.
Ten minutes later, the crew contacted approach control and was then authorized to make the ILS approach to runway 17 at Santiago de Compostela. The visibility at the airport was suitable for landing. At 06:15 hours the crew contacted Tower Control and was cleared to land. Two minutes later the aircraft impacted wooded terrain, 200 meters before the VOR of Santiago, about 1 mile before the threshold of runway 17.
Causes
The ultimate cause of the accident could not be determined. In light of the hypothesis considered in the analysis, the most likely scenario is that the crew made a non-standard precision approach in manual based primarily on distances. The ILS frequency set incorrectly in the first officer's equipment and the faulty position indicated on the DME switch would have resulted in the distance being shown on the captain's HSI as corresponding to the VOR and not to the runway threshold. The crew shortened the approach maneuver and proceeded to a point by which the aircraft should already have been established on the localizer, thus increasing the crew's workload. The crew then probably lost visual contact with the ground when the aircraft entered a fog bank in the valleys near the airport and did not realize they were making an approach to the VOR and not to the runway.
The contributing factors were:
- The lack of operational procedures of an aircraft authorized to be operated by a single pilot operated by a crew with two members.
- The overall condition of the aircraft and the instruments and the crew's mistrust of the onboard instruments.
- The fatigue built up over the course of working at a time when they should have been sleeping after an unplanned duty period.
- The concern with having to divert to the alternate without sufficient fuel combined with the complacency arising from finally reaching their destination.
METAR:
04:30 UTC / 06:30 local time:
LEST 020430Z 00000KT 5000 R17/0450V1700U BR FEW006 13/13 Q1019 NOSIG
04:30 UTC: Winds calm; Visibility: 5000 m; mist, few clouds at 600 feet AGL; Runway Visual Range along Runway 17 is varying between 450 m and 1700 m and is improving; Temperature and Dew point: 13°C; Pressure: 1019 mb
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | CIAIAC |
Report number: | A-029/2012 |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 2 years and 10 months |
Download report: | Final report |
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Sources:
SKYbrary Location
Images:
photo (c) Claudio Guridi; nr Santiago de Compostela Airport (SCQ); 05 August 2012
photo (c) Claudio Guridi; nr Santiago de Compostela Airport (SCQ); 05 August 2012
photo (c) Claudio Guridi; nr Santiago de Compostela Airport (SCQ); 05 August 2012
photo (c) Pedro de la Cruz, via Werner Fischdick; Palma de Mallorca Airport (PMI/LEPA); 20 April 2005
photo (c) Pedro de la Cruz, via Werner Fischdick; Palma de Mallorca Airport (PMI/LEPA); 20 April 2005
Revision history:
Date/time | Contributor | Updates |