Narrative:
Austral Airlines flight 2255 suffered a runway excursion upon landing at Buenos Aires/Ezeiza International Airport, BA (EZE/SAEZ), Argentina.
Conclusions of the analysis (translated from original Spanish language report):
On an international scheduled commercial air transport flight, during the landing phase, the runway excursion took place at the opposite end of the runway, the aircraft impacting with the ILS system antenna installations. This was, as a triggering factor, due to a significant change in operating weather conditions within a very short period of time, at one of the most critical moments in the operation of an aircraft, and without the crew receiving any information from the ATC about the change or becoming aware of it.
The combination of the following factors contributed to the track excursion.
- Tailwind component of 27 kt, greater than the limitation prescribed by the manufacturer (15 kt on dry runway); rain with reduced visibility, and runway contaminated with water.
- The ATC did not update the weather information to the crew, who were unaware of the sudden and significant change in conditions.
- The Ezeiza flight control tower does not have an alarm system in the event of a sudden change in surface wind conditions.
- Destabilized approach from the disconnection of the AP and the transition to visual flight.
- Monitoring and call outs by the PM in the event of FP deviations that did not comply with the operator's SOPs.
- Failure to consider the approach procedure to be aborted in the event of a non-stabilised approach situation after acquiring visual flight conditions and disconnecting the AP.
- Long touch down and wet runway and tailwind conditions, with no possibility of stopping the plane in remaining runway distance.
- The aircraft was correctly configured for uncontaminated runway operation. This configuration did not fully correspond to the operator's SOP recommendations for the runway conditions encountered at the time of landing.
Runway excursion (overrun)
SAEZ 150800Z 11002KT 9000 -RA SCT010 BKN070 19/18 Q1002
08:46 UTC / 05:46 local time:
SAEZ 150846Z 25020G34KT 3000 RA SCT004 BKN010 OVC060 19/18 Q1005
09:00 UTC / 06:00 local time:
SAEZ 150900Z 19014KT 160V240 3000 RA FEW010 SCT020 OVC050 16/16 Q1004
| Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
| Date: | Friday 15 November 2013 |
| Time: | 05:45 |
| Type: |  Embraer ERJ 190-100 IGW (ERJ-190AR) |
| Operator: | Austral Lineas Aéreas |
| Registration: | LV-CKZ |
| MSN: | 19000439 |
| First flight: | 2011 |
| Total airframe hrs: | 6342 |
| Cycles: | 4469 |
| Engines: | 2 General Electric CF34-10E5A1 |
| Crew: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 5 |
| Passengers: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 96 |
| Total: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 101 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
| Aircraft fate: | Repaired |
| Location: | Buenos Aires/Ezeiza-Ministro Pistarini Airport, BA (EZE) ( Argentina)
|
| Phase: | Landing (LDG) |
| Nature: | International Scheduled Passenger |
| Departure airport: | Rio de Janeiro-Galeão International Airport, RJ (GIG/SBGL), Brazil |
| Buenos Aires/Ezeiza-Ministro Pistarini Airport, BA (EZE/SAEZ), Argentina | |
| Flightnumber: | AU2255 |
Austral Airlines flight 2255 suffered a runway excursion upon landing at Buenos Aires/Ezeiza International Airport, BA (EZE/SAEZ), Argentina.
Probable Cause:
Conclusions of the analysis (translated from original Spanish language report):
On an international scheduled commercial air transport flight, during the landing phase, the runway excursion took place at the opposite end of the runway, the aircraft impacting with the ILS system antenna installations. This was, as a triggering factor, due to a significant change in operating weather conditions within a very short period of time, at one of the most critical moments in the operation of an aircraft, and without the crew receiving any information from the ATC about the change or becoming aware of it.
The combination of the following factors contributed to the track excursion.
- Tailwind component of 27 kt, greater than the limitation prescribed by the manufacturer (15 kt on dry runway); rain with reduced visibility, and runway contaminated with water.
- The ATC did not update the weather information to the crew, who were unaware of the sudden and significant change in conditions.
- The Ezeiza flight control tower does not have an alarm system in the event of a sudden change in surface wind conditions.
- Destabilized approach from the disconnection of the AP and the transition to visual flight.
- Monitoring and call outs by the PM in the event of FP deviations that did not comply with the operator's SOPs.
- Failure to consider the approach procedure to be aborted in the event of a non-stabilised approach situation after acquiring visual flight conditions and disconnecting the AP.
- Long touch down and wet runway and tailwind conditions, with no possibility of stopping the plane in remaining runway distance.
- The aircraft was correctly configured for uncontaminated runway operation. This configuration did not fully correspond to the operator's SOP recommendations for the runway conditions encountered at the time of landing.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Classification:
Landing after unstabilized approachRunway excursion (overrun)
METAR Weather report:
08:00 UTC / 05:00 local time:SAEZ 150800Z 11002KT 9000 -RA SCT010 BKN070 19/18 Q1002
08:46 UTC / 05:46 local time:
SAEZ 150846Z 25020G34KT 3000 RA SCT004 BKN010 OVC060 19/18 Q1005
09:00 UTC / 06:00 local time:
SAEZ 150900Z 19014KT 160V240 3000 RA FEW010 SCT020 OVC050 16/16 Q1004
Photos
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Rio de Janeiro-Galeão International Airport, RJ to Buenos Aires/Ezeiza-Ministro Pistarini Airport, BA as the crow flies is 1989 km (1243 miles).
Distance from Rio de Janeiro-Galeão International Airport, RJ to Buenos Aires/Ezeiza-Ministro Pistarini Airport, BA as the crow flies is 1989 km (1243 miles).
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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