Descripción del Accidente ASN 28 APR 2016 Embraer ERJ 190-100 IGW (ERJ-190AR) HC-COX - Cuenca-Mariscal Lamar International Airport (CUE)
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Estado:Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Fecha:jueves 28 abril 2016
Tipo:Silhouette image of generic E190 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Embraer ERJ 190-100 IGW (ERJ-190AR)
Operador:TAME Ecuador
Registración: HC-COX
Numéro de série: 19000372
Año de Construcción: 2010
Horas Totales de la Célula:11569
Motores: 2 General Electric CF34-10E6
Tripulación:Fatalidades: 0 / Ocupantes: 6
Pasajeros:Fatalidades: 0 / Ocupantes: 87
Total:Fatalidades: 0 / Ocupantes: 93
Daños en la Aeronave: Considerable
Consecuencias: Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Ubicación:Cuenca-Mariscal Lamar International Airport (CUE) (   Ecuador)
Fase: Aterrizaje (LDG)
Naturaleza:Vuelo Doméstico Programado
Aeropuerto de Salida:Quito-Mariscal Sucre Airport (UIO/SEQU), Ecuador
Aeropuerto de Llegada:Cuenca-Mariscal Lamar International Airport (CUE/SECU), Ecuador
Número de Vuelo:EQ173
An Embraer ERJ-190, registration HC-COX, operated by TAME as Flight EQ173 from Quito's Mariscal Sucre International Airport experienced an apparent intentional emergency ground-loop during a runway overrun in light rain weather conditions at Mariscal Lamar International Airport (SECU), in Cuenca, Ecuador. The airplane sustained substantial damage and there were no reported injuries among the 6 crew and 87 passengers onboard.
The aircraft departed Quito at 06:51 hours local time.
During the landing preparation briefing, at 07:34, the pilot indicated that they would hold the glide slope until they had a runway in sight, inhibit the glide slope alarm, and continue visual. Four minutes later the flight was cleared for the VOR ILS ZULU approach for runway 23. The runway was wet due to drizzle and the braking efficiency reported by an Airbus A319 was good to average. The A319 had landed on the runway in Cuenca 36 minutes before flight 173.
At 07:46, the flight radioed that they were ten miles out and established on the localizer. They were cleared to the ILS approach for runway 23. Three minutes later the controller reported that they had flight 173 in sight and informed that the wind was calm, and cleared the flight to land on runway 23. T
At 07:50, the pilot indicated that he had three red and one white lights on the PAPI system. The aircraft crossed the runway threshold at 37 feet high instead of 50 feet, which meant the aircraft approached below the normal glidepath. It touched down 277 m past the threshold at an airspeed of 127 knots. Spoilers were deployed 585 meters from the threshold, followed by reverses at 643 m.
The pilot, not feeling an effective braking of the aircraft, tried to activate the autobrake system but this did not work. The aircraft was hydroplaning and could not be brought to a halt on the runway. The pilot groundlooped the aircraft on the grass.

Runway 23 is a 1900 m long runway with an upslope of 15 m (+0.78%). Distance from the centre of the end of the paved runway to the boundary fence and an active road is 31 m. The Operational Landing Distance calculations with manual braking for the weight of the aircraft with wind on touchdown, indicate that a runway length of 2,122 meters was necessary.

Probable Cause:

La Junta Investigadora de Accidentes determina que las causas probables de este accidente fueron:
1. Las condiciones de la pista del aeropuerto de Cuenca que al momento del aterrizaje del avión se encontraba contaminada con agua y resbalosa.
2. El aterrizaje se realizó luego de una aproximación no estabilizada y con viento de cola.
3. La no aplicación del procedimiento Maximun Performance Landing recomendado por el fabricante de la aeronave para aterrizar en pistas contaminadas.
Los siguientes factores contribuyeron a este suceso:
1. El despacho del vuelo con 1.500 kg más de combustible sobre la cantidad con la que usualmente se realizaba este vuelo.
2. La omisión del cálculo de la longitud de pista necesaria para realizar el aterrizaje usando la información de eficacia de frenado.
3. La decisión de la tripulación de realizar la aproximación final con tres luces rojas y una blanca, utilizando el sistema PAPI, inducida por la información del documento Terminal Information emitido por la compañía, que autorizaba este procedimiento.
4. La utilización de terminología confusa en el documento Terminal Information, que usaba términos aplicables a la flota Airbus, en lugar de la de Embraer.
5. La decisión de la tripulación de no efectuar la maniobra de aproximación frustrada luego de que se excedió la máxima velocidad vertical permitida y de que aparentemente la visibilidad era limitada luego de que se pasaron los mínimos.
6. La utilización incorrecta de las ayudas para frenado de la aeronave, en este caso las reversas
7. La aplicación del freno de emergencia que inhibe el sistema antiskid.
8. La falta de aplicación de un adecuado gerenciamiento de recursos de tripulación, particularmente dentro de la cabina de mando.
9. La falta de entrenamiento en el uso de las tablas para cálculo de distancias de pista.

Accident investigation:

Investigating agency: JIA Ecuador
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year and 3 months
Accident number: Final report
Download report: Final report

» Cuenca Airport statement

METAR Weather report:
12:00 UTC / 07:00 local time:
SECU 281200Z 35003KT 9999 -RA FEW010 OVC030 13/12 Q1027

13:00 UTC / 08:00 local time:
SECU 281300Z 33003KT 8000 -RA FEW010 OVC030 13/12 Q1028
Wind: 330 degrees at 3 knots; visibility 8000 m in light rain; few clouds at 1000 feet, overcast at 3000 feet; Temperature 13°C; Dew point 12°C; QNH 1028 mb

Subsiguiente / acciones de seguridad

JIA Ecuador issued 41 Safety Recommendations

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This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Quito-Mariscal Sucre Airport to Cuenca-Mariscal Lamar International Airport as the crow flies is 309 km (193 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.

This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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