Narrative:China Airlines flight CI704, an Airbus A330-302, was damaged in a tail strike occurrence during landing at Taipei-Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport.
The aircraft departed Manila Airport, Philippines at 09:33 UTC (17:33 LT). On board were 124 passengers and 13 crew members. The first officer was undergoing initial operating experience. He was Pilot Flying while the instructor captain was Pilot Monitoring.
The en route part of the flight was uneventful. During descent towards Taipei, the flight was cleared for a SIGANG 1B RNAV STAR2 arrival. During the approach the captain suggested the first officer to use maximum thrust reverser during landing.
At an altitude of 779 feet the first officer disengaged the auto pilot and continued to fly manually, with autothrust engaged.
At 11:28 UTC (19:28 LT) the aircraft touched down on runway 23 at Taoyuan International Airport. The first officer selected thrust reversers while the aircraft was still in a 3.9°nose up attitude.
The instructor pilot was apparently unhappy with the aircraft attitude and decided a go around was necessary. He stated "i have control", and pressed the sidestick priority pushbutton to take over control. He was unaware at that moment that the thrust reversers had been selected. He pushed the TOGA button, after which the ground spoilers were stowed and the automatic brake were released. Also, the thrust reversers returned to the stowed and locked position. The aircraft reached a nose up attitude of 14.4° and the tail struck the runway. The aircraft then became airborne.
Due to changing weather circumstances the airport changed the active runway to 05R. Meanwhile the flight had entered a holding at 4100 feet.
The flight was cleared for an approach to runway 05R and at 19:44 LT the flight crew declared an emergency (PAN PAN PAN).
At 19:59 the aircraft landed on runway 05R. After the aircraft landed the flight operation department of Taoyuan Airport carried out a runway inspection of runway 23, finding strike marks and aircraft debris. It was then decided to close the runway. The belly structure of the aircraft suffered skin damage.
Probable Cause:
Findings related to probable causes:
1. The attention allocation and situational awareness of the Instructor Pilot were probably affected by the training Captains nose-holding tendency after touchdown addressed in the training record, so that he focused too much on the aircrafts attitude but neglected to monitor critical information during landing as a pilot monitoring should do.
For this reason, the Instructor Pilot was neither aware of the "REV" indication on the Engine/Warning Display page nor the position of reverse thrust levers, thus as a result neither held the status of thrust reverser in hand nor used it to make decision on whether to continue or reject the landing while taking over the flight control.
2. In order to get the aircraft airborne promptly, the Instructor Pilot pulled the side stick full back after taking over the flight control and held that position until the aircraft started to rotate. In the mean time, forward thrust was unable to increase at once since thrust reversers were not in stowed and locked position yet, and the air speed continued to drop while deceleration devices kept functioning.
Subsequently under the combination effects of deceleration devices stopped functioning, engine power sharply increased, and the pitch trim position was higher than normal setting, the Instructor Pilots full back side stick input caused the aircraft to pitch up rapidly. Though the Instructor Pilot had released the side stick input accordingly, however it didnt overcome the dramatic pitch up tendency. The excessive rotation rate and high pitch during lift-off then led to the loss of tail section clearance, the tail strike, and the damage to the aircraft.
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | ASC Taiwan  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 1 year and 4 months | Accident number: | ASC-AOR-18-01-002 | Download report: | Final report
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Classification:
Tailstrike
Runway mishap
METAR Weather report:
11:00 UTC / 19:00 local time:
RCTP 011100Z 36004KT 9999 FEW016 BKN030 28/25 Q1010 NOSIG RMK A298412:00 UTC / 20:00 local time:
RCTP 011200Z 03005KT 9999 FEW016 SCT050 27/23 Q1010 NOSIG RMK A2985
Follow-up / safety actions
ASC issued 6 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 31-JAN-2018 | To: China Airlines | ASC-ASR-18-01-001 |
Reinforce education and training to ensure flight crew familiar with and abide by the standard go-around procedures in company and manufactures manuals. Also, ensure flight crew heighten their situational awareness toward air speed, attitude, configuration, deceleration devices, power setting, as well as remaining distance of the runway before making go-around decision, and thoroughly evaluate the adequacy and risk of a go-around prior execution, so that to prevent the tail strike occurrence from happening. |
Issued: 31-JAN-2018 | To: China Airlines | ASC-ASR-18-01-002 |
Reinforce education and training of the Instructor Pilots to prevent the inappropriate maneuvers presented in the occurrence, prevent them from overemphasizing trainees operation with the result that neglect to fill the role of pilot monitoring. Also, ensure their ability to pose effective situational awareness against the dynamic flight training environment, so as to prepare for abnormal situation throughout the flight. |
Issued: 31-JAN-2018 | To: China Airlines | ASC-ASR-18-01-003 |
Take occurrence scenario for example and tailor particular courses in the crew resource management training to strengthen the standardization of flight operations during landing, standard call out, flight crews situational awareness, communication and decision making while exchanging the flight duty. Moreover, especially reemphasize the importance to verify the status of thrust reversers after main gear touchdown, and the strict policy of making a full stop as the thrust reversers have been deployed. |
Issued: 31-JAN-2018 | To: Civil Aeronautics Administration | ASC-ASR-18-01-004 |
Supervise and ensure that China Airlines reinforces education and training to ensure flight crew familiar with and abide by the standard go-around procedures in company and manufactures manuals. Also, ensure flight crew heighten their situational awareness toward air speed, attitude, configuration, deceleration devices, power setting, as well as remaining distance of the runway before making go-around decision, and thoroughly evaluate the adequacy and risk of a go-around prior execution, so that to prevent the tail strike occurrence from happening. |
Issued: 31-JAN-2018 | To: Civil Aeronautics Administration | ASC-ASR-18-01-005 |
Supervise and ensure that China Airlines reinforces education and training of their Instructor Pilots to prevent the inappropriate maneuvers presented in the occurrence, prevent them from overemphasizing trainees operation with the result that neglect to fill the role of pilot monitoring. Also, ensure their ability to pose effective situational awareness against the dynamic flight training environment, so as to prepare for abnormal situation throughout the flight. |
Issued: 31-JAN-2018 | To: Civil Aeronautics Administration | ASC-ASR-18-01-006 |
Supervise and ensure that China Airlines takes occurrence scenario for example and tailor particular courses in their crew resource management training to strengthen the standardization of flight operations during landing, standard call out, flight crews situational awareness, communication and decision making while exchanging the flight duty. Moreover, especially reemphasize the importance to verify the status of thrust reversers after main gear touchdown, and the strict policy of making a full stop as the thrust reversers have been deployed. |
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Photos
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Manila-Ninoy Aquino International Airport to Taipei-Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport as the crow flies is 1169 km (731 miles).
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.