Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | Saturday 29 July 2017 |
Time: | 09:07 |
Type: |  Antonov An-74TK-100 |
Operator: | Cavok Air |
Registration: | UR-CKC |
MSN: | 36547095905 |
First flight: | 1992 |
Total airframe hrs: | 5104 |
Engines: | 2 Lotarev D-36-2A |
Crew: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 6 |
Passengers: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 0 |
Total: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 6 |
Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
Aircraft fate: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Location: | São Tomé Island Airport (TMS) ( São Tomé and Príncipe)
|
Phase: | Takeoff (TOF) |
Nature: | Ferry/positioning |
Departure airport: | São Tomé Island Airport (TMS/FPST), São Tomé and Príncipe |
Destination airport: | Accra-Kotoka Airport (ACC/DGAA), Ghana |
Flightnumber: | CVK7087 |
Narrative:An Antonov 74TK-100 cargo plane, operated by Cavok Air, was damaged beyond repair in a runway excursion accident at São Tomé Island Airport (TMS), São Tomé and Príncipe.
The aircraft had arrived on July 28, 2017 at 02:25 on a cargo flight from Stavanger (Norway), via Luxemburg and Ghardaia (Algeria). The following morning the aircraft was prepared for a repositioning flight to Accra, Ghana.
Sao Tome Tower initially cleared Cavok Air flight 7087 to taxi on runway 11 as favoured by the prevailing wind. However, the crew requested runway 29 for departure. This request was approved by the controller and the aircraft was re-cleared to taxi to runway 29 for departure. Sao Tome Tower did not provide the flight crew with the information about possible presence of birds at the airport, in particular, on the runway.
At 09:05, the aircraft began the take-off roll. The first officer was the Pilot Flying (PF) while the captain was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). The engines and systems parameters were reported to be normal.
In the first half of the take-off run the captain noted five to six eagles getting off the ground and flying dangerously close to the aircraft. He then requested the flight engineer to check if the flood lights were ON and to monitor the engine parameters. The crew asserted that they observed a rising and narrowing runway as the aircraft accelerated to a speed of 180 km/hr. At that time the crew noticed a flock of eagles ahead. The captain took control of the aircraft and decided, after assessing the situation within 4 seconds that the best option for the crew was to discontinue the take-off.
At that moment, the crew heard a bang, which they suggested could be a bird strike. This was followed by aural and visual indications on the annunciator panel such as "Left Engine Failure", "Dangerous Vibration", and "Take-off is prohibited" and the captain immediately initiated a rejected take-off and instructed the flight engineer to deploy thrust reversers. The rejected take-off was initiated about 5 seconds after sighting the birds, at a speed of 220km/h. According to the captain, his decision was necessitated by the consideration of losing multiple engines due to bird strike if the take-off continued.
The captain said he pressed the brake pedals completely immediately after initiating the rejected take-off, subsequently he assessed the braking action as not effective and he used the emergency braking at a speed of about 130 km/h. On realizing that the aircraft would not stop within the remaining available runway length coupled with the presence of a ravine at the end, the captain intentionally veered to the right in order to extend the runway stopping distance and also avoid the ravine. The aircraft exited the runway at a speed of approximately 76 km/h. As the aircrafts speed decayed to 60 km/h and just before the aircraft exited the runway, the captain instructed the flight engineer to close the fuel emergency shutoff cock. The aircraft travelled a distance of about 95m from the exit point before plunging into the ravine. In the process, the forward fuselage separated from the bulkhead located immediately after the cockpit section.
The aircraft was destroyed but only one of the six crew members suffered minor injuries.
An investigation showed fragments of bird feathers in the engines, belonging to the Common Honey Buzzard.
Probable Cause:
Causal Factor:
The investigation determines that the cause of this accident as:
Due to the presence of birds on the runway, the take-off was rejected at a speed above decision speed V1, which is inconsistent with CAVOKs Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).
Contributory factors:
The contributory factors to this accident include but are not limited to the following:
i. Failure of the crew to deploy interceptors (speed brakes/spoilers).
ii. Inadequate flight crew training on details of rejected take-off procedure scenarios.
iii. The omission of the take-off briefing in CAVOKs Normal Operations checklist.
iv. Poor Crew Resource Management (CRM), especially in a multi-crew flight operation.
Accident investigation:
|
Investigating agency: | AIB Nigeria  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 1 year and 4 months | Accident number: | CVK/2017/07/29/F | Download report: | Final report
|
|
Classification:
Rejected takeoff
Bird strike
Runway excursion (veer-off)
Sources:
» NBAAI Ukraine
METAR Weather report:
08:00 UTC / 08:00 local time:
FPST 290800Z 17004KT 9999 SCT025 25/20 Q1016 NOSIG10:00 UTC / 10:00 local time:
FPST 291000Z 14013KT 9999 FEW025 SCT040 27/21 Q1015 NOSIG
Follow-up / safety actions
AIB Nigeria issued 9 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 05-DEC-2018 | To: INAC STP | UR-CKC(1) |
Should improve the habitat management programme (including reduction or elimination of trees, shrubs and other plants which provide food, shelter or roosting sites for birds) |
Issued: 05-DEC-2018 | To: INAC STP | UR-CKC(2) |
Should enhance its aerodrome grass management appropriate to the prevalent species and the degree of risk that they pose. |
Issued: 05-DEC-2018 | To: INAC STP | UR-CKC(3) |
Should liaise with local inhabitants to limit the attraction of birds to fields (in the vicinity of the airport). |
Issued: 05-DEC-2018 | To: INAC STP | UR-CKC(4) |
Should install specialized ground-based radar equipment used for tactical detection of large flocking birds. |
Issued: 05-DEC-2018 | To: INAC STP | UR-CKC(5) |
Should adopt and extend Runway End Safety Area to conform to ICAO standards. |
Issued: 05-DEC-2018 | To: INAC STP | UR-CKC(6) |
Should include the information about the ravine at the end of RWY 29 into the AIP and Send it as Notice To Airmen (NOTAM). |
Issued: 05-DEC-2018 | To: Ukraine CAA | UR-CKC(7) |
Should enhance its oversight functions by reviewing all safety related items pertinent to operators checklists and manuals. |
Issued: 05-DEC-2018 | To: CAVOK Air | UR-CKC(8) |
Should review its Rejected Take Off (RTO) training syllabus to incorporate robust RTO training plan for both initial and recurrent aircraft type simulator training and assessment to include unexpected scenarios and stop-and-go decision making. |
Issued: 05-DEC-2018 | To: CAVOK Air | UR-CKC(9) |
Should review its Normal Operations checklist in order to include take-off briefing as an item for each flight. |
Show all...
Photos

accident date:
29-07-2017type: Antonov An-74TK-100
registration: UR-CKC

accident date:
29-07-2017type: Antonov An-74TK-100
registration: UR-CKC

accident date:
29-07-2017type: Antonov An-74TK-100
registration: UR-CKC

accident date:
29-07-2017type: Antonov An-74TK-100
registration: UR-CKC

accident date:
29-07-2017type: Antonov An-74TK-100
registration: UR-CKC

accident date:
29-07-2017type: Antonov An-74TK-100
registration: UR-CKC

accident date:
29-07-2017type: Antonov An-74TK-100
registration: UR-CKC

accident date:
29-07-2017type: Antonov An-74TK-100
registration: UR-CKC

accident date:
29-07-2017type: Antonov An-74TK-100
registration: UR-CKC

accident date:
29-07-2017type: Antonov An-74TK-100
registration: UR-CKC

accident date:
29-07-2017type: Antonov An-74TK-100
registration: UR-CKC
Video, social media
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from São Tomé Island Airport to Accra-Kotoka Airport as the crow flies is 955 km (597 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.