Narrative:SpiceJet flight SG6237, a Boeing 737-800, suffered a runway excursion after landing on runway 27 at Mumbai, India in moderate to heavy rain.
The flight departed Jaipur International Airport with the captain as Pilot Flying.
The pilots had carried out briefing for the approach including the weather and go around actions, if required. The aircraft commenced descent into Mumbai in the late evening hours. As per the reported weather at the time of approach visibility was 2100 metres in rain. Reported winds were 090/12 Knots. Runway was wet and the trend provided was "temporary reduction in visibility to 1500 metres with thunder/ showers of rain".
During descend at an IAS disagree warning was observed, indicating a discrepancy of airspeed between the instrument sources for the flight crew. Although this indication was momentary, the Non-Normal Checklist was carried out. The indication discrepancy did not recur for the remainder of the flight.
The aircraft was radar vectored for an ILS approach for Runway 27 at Mumbai. The approach was stabilized by 38700 feet with landing gear down and flaps 30 and auto brake selected at 3. The autopilot was engaged throughout the descent phase and during approach, the second autopilot was coupled for the ILS approach. At 100 feet, the autopilot and the auto-throttle were disengaged by the PF. The flare manoeuvre consumed approximately 5807 feet of the runway length prior to touchdown with 3881 feet runway remaining. After touchdown, the speed brakes deployed automatically and maximum reverse thrust and wheel brakes were applied. The aircraft exited the paved surface at 65 Knots and came to rest at a distance of 615 feet beyond the end of the runway. The nose landing gear had collapsed.
Once the aircraft came to rest, the flight crew advised cabin crew to be at their stations. The pilots were unable to contact ATC through VHF communication. The PF contacted his airline personnel using mobile phone and informed that the aircraft had overrun the runway and requested for step ladders. The ATC activated fire services and the runway was closed for operation. An assessment of the aircraft structure and occupants was made and the fire services personnel informed the cabin crew that deplaning was to be carried out using fire ladders. There were no injuries during evacuation or otherwise.
Probable Cause:
Probable Cause
The runway excursion occurred because of combination of:
- Disconnection of auto pilot at an altitude 118' RA with the nose up trim bias without adequate compensation.
- Disconnection of auto throttle at 118' RA at a higher thrust setting for that phase of flight.
- Late touchdown of the aircraft on the runway.
- Reduced visual cues due to heavy rain impacting depth perception and ascertaining of actual touchdown position.
- Tailwind conditions at the time of landing resulting In increasing the distance covered during the extended flare (float).
- Approach with lower flaps (30) than recommended (40).
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | AAIB India  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 264 days (9 months) | Accident number: | final report | Download report: | Final report
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Classification:
Late landing
Runway excursion (overrun)
Sources:
»
thehindu.com»
timesofindia.indiatimes.com
METAR Weather report:
18:00 UTC / 23:30 local time:
VABB 011800Z 15005KT 2100 -TSRA SCT010 SCT018 FEW030CB OVC080 25/25 Q1003 TEMPO 1500 +RA18:30 UTC / 00:00 local time:
VABB 011830Z 32010KT 1000 R27/1800 TSRA SCT008 BKN015 FEW030CB OVC080 25/25 Q1003 TEMPO 0600 +TSRA
Follow-up / safety actions
AAIB India issued 7 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 21-MAR-2020 | To: DGCA India | VT-SYK(1) |
DGCA should review all safety critical recommendations given in the earlier accident/ serious incident investigation reports.
Few of the occurrences are as follows:
1. Boeing 737-700 / 2ndJuly 2019 / Landing into Mumbai
2. Q-400/30thJune 2019/ Landing into Surat
3. Boeing 737/ September 2017/ Landing into Mumbai.
It should be ensured that action taken to implement the recommendations even now mitigates the risk for which the recommendations were made and has not lost its effect due complacency or otherwise. |
Issued: 21-MAR-2020 | To: | VT-SYK(2) |
All airlines must ensure that during the period of inclement weather, flight dispatch contacts the aircraft by available means (VHF/HF/ACARS/SATCOM) & relays the latest weather for destination and alternates. Operations Controller must give advice regarding weather trend. However, final decision regarding the flight shall remain with the Commander. |
Issued: 21-MAR-2020 | To: | VT-SYK(3) |
Operators should carry out risk reduction processes in a structured, proactive and systemic manner rather than relying on the crew\'s decision-making abilities when developing or updating procedures. |
Issued: 21-MAR-2020 | To: | VT-SYK(4) |
The airport license holder(s) should develop procedures in association with the aircraft operators, for disabled aircraft removal plan. Synergic and integrated efforts of all stakeholders at airports should be applied to make the closed runway operational ASAP. |
Issued: 21-MAR-2020 | To: | VT-SYK(5) |
All airports should take appropriate steps so as to ensure that the requisite information in desired format mentioned in Doc 9981 is available and provided to flight crew by 5th November 2020. |
Issued: 21-MAR-2020 | To: DGCA India | VT-SYK(6) |
DGCA should ensure that the licensed airports provide the requisite information as mentioned in Doc 9981 to the crew for flight planning purposes by 5th November 2020. |
Issued: 21-MAR-2020 | To: DGCA India | VT-SYK(7) |
DGCA should ensure that the standards and protocols of communication for post-accident duties are followed by all aerodrome and aircraft operators. |
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Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line is connecting ADS-B datapoints from Flightradar24.
Distance from Jaipur International Airport to Mumbai-Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport as the crow flies is 906 km (566 miles).
Accident location: Approximate; accuracy within a few kilometers.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.