Descripción del Accidente ASN 10 JAN 2020 Airbus A321-231 (WL) VQ-BRS - Antalya Airport (AYT)
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Estado:Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Fecha:viernes 10 enero 2020
Tipo:Silhouette image of generic A321 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Airbus A321-231 (WL)
Operador:Nordwind Airlines
Registración: VQ-BRS
Numéro de série: 7686
Año de Construcción: 2017-05-09 (2 years 8 months)
Horas Totales de la Célula:9320
Motores: 2 IAE V2533-A5
Tripulación:Fatalidades: 0 / Ocupantes: 7
Pasajeros:Fatalidades: 0 / Ocupantes: 0
Total:Fatalidades: 0 / Ocupantes: 7
Daños en la Aeronave: Considerable
Consecuencias: Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Ubicación:Antalya Airport (AYT) (   Turquía)
Fase: Aterrizaje (LDG)
Aeropuerto de Salida:Moskva-Sheremetyevo Airport (SVO/UUEE), Rusia
Aeropuerto de Llegada:Antalya Airport (AYT/LTAI), Turquía
Número de Vuelo:N41801
Nordwind Airlines flight 1801, an Airbus A321-200, made a hard landing on runway 36C at Antalya Airport, Turkey.
The aircraft operated on a service from Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport, Russia. The flight was cleared for an approach to runway 36C at Antalya Airport. During the base leg of the approach, the autopilot and autothrottle were disengaged. The aircraft was further configured for landing and the approach was stabled at 1035 feet altitude, 3 nm and from the runway.
When descending below 270 feet (about 100ft agl) the airspeed decreased below the approach speed of 122 kt to a value to 109 at 20 feet above the runway. The pitch was 5.5° nose-up and idle thrust was selected.
Then the captain abruptly moved the sidestick fully forward, holding it there for 1.5 seconds and causing the nose to drop. Full power was added and its nose-gear struck the runway with a 2.64g impact. The Airbus bounced and the captain pulled the sidestick to execute a go-around. The aircraft’s flight-control system switched to direct law, two inertial reference systems failed, and attitude indications disappeared from the captain’s instruments. Although the flaps were partially retracted during the go-around, the undercarriage could not be retracted.
Smoke entered the cockpit and the flight declared a Mayday. Subsequently a low pass was made over runway 36C so the Tower could assess the damage to the aircraft. Then a dual hydraulic failure occurred, and the fight again declared a Mayday. A left-hand visual approach was flown to runway 36C and the aircraft landed. The runway was vacated and the aircraft was then shut down.

The airline only notified the Russian Interstate Aviation Committee on January 14, four days after the accident. Investigators believes that after the accident both the voice recorder (CVR) as well as the flight data recorder (FDR) were removed by RMS Technic in Antalya. The voice recorder was fitted to a second Airbus A321 (VP-BHN) flying the return service to Moscow. After arrival in Moscow, it was removed by another maintenance firm and transported back to RMS Technic in Antalya where the recorder was refitted to the original damaged A321, before the inquiry team arrived.
The investigation is ongoing.

Probable Cause:


The accident involving the AIRBUS A321-231 with registration VQ-BRS occurred in the early twilight hours, under visual meteorological conditions, as a result of erroneous actions by the Captain involving full backward movement of the control stick while attempting to correct deviations during the alignment phase (shallow flare), which involved establishing the aircraft's pitch attitude for landing at a significant altitude without reducing the vertical descent rate. This led to an intensive nose-up rotation, followed by a hard landing with the nose landing gear ahead of the main landing gear.

The most probable contributing factors are as follows:
- Delayed execution of the flight crew's procedure for going around (or a discontinued landing), as specified in the operational documentation (QRH, FCOM, FCTM), during instrument speed reduction significantly below the specified values and non-compliance of the current flight parameters with the stabilized approach criteria at altitudes lower than the stabilization height (1000 ft), including right before the alignment phase.
- The absence of stable skills in the Commander for executing the alignment procedure as outlined in the operational documentation, as well as the failure of the airline's instructor staff, including during the introduction program, to identify this factor.
- Insufficient theoretical knowledge of the Commander about the peculiarities of performing the approach and landing with a reduced level of automation (autopilot and autothrust disengaged), using the specified "MANAGED" speed mode and "GROUND SPEED MINI" function.
- Overestimation by the Commander of their professional skills and unwarranted reduction of the level of automation during the approach and landing phase under conditions of rapidly changing headwind component values with altitude.
- Lack of specific instructions in the airline's operational documentation regarding the possibility and conditions of reducing the level of automation for training of flight crew members undergoing the introduction program (approaches without AP and A/THR).
- Increased psychoemotional tension for the Commander during the final phase of the flight and, consequently, loss of situational awareness, resulting in dominance of glide path control without comprehensive evaluation of all flight parameters, primarily instrument speed.
- Imperfections in the preparation system related to human factors and crew resource management (CRM), as the Commander was unable to adequately assess the impact of automation disengagement on cognitive functions (perception, attention, memory, thinking), manage their emotions, and establish optimal crew interaction.
- Lack of a positive flight safety culture in the airline and, as a result, the low personal flight safety culture of the Commander, evident in:
* Creating an overly relaxed (non-professional) atmosphere during the flight and violating the principle of a sterile cockpit and cockpit and cabin crew interaction when performing the approach and landing.
* Prioritizing landing on the first attempt (at the expense of safe flight completion) and, consequently, failing to execute a timely go-around.
- Individual psychological characteristics of the pilots (for the Commander - excessive and unstable self-assessment, high need for dominance and recognition; for the First Officer - excitable and unstable response type with high activity and ambition, a strong need for dominance and self-assertion) that, in a stressful situation without adequate CRM, could hinder proper crew interaction.

The investigation revealed systemic shortcomings in identifying danger factors and controlling risk level, as well as the ineffectiveness of the flight safety management system within the airline, and the absence of control over the preparedness level of crew members from the management of the airline.

Accident investigation:

Investigating agency: MAK Russia
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 3 years and 8 months
Accident number: final report
Download report: Final report

» @AshedShadow

METAR Weather report:
04:04 UTC / 07:04 local time:
LTAI 100404Z 36018G29KT CAVOK 07/M06 Q1018 NOSIG RMK RWY18C 36021KT RWY36R 35018G29KT RWY18L 35018G30KT

04:20 UTC / 07:20 local time:
LTAI 100420Z 01014KT CAVOK 07/M06 Q1019 NOSIG RMK RWY18C 01016G27KT RWY36R 36014G26KT RWY18L 36016KT

04:50 UTC / 07:50 local time:
LTAI 100450Z 02016G26KT CAVOK 07/M06 Q1019 NOSIG RMK RWY18C 03012KT RWY36R 36016KT RWY18L 02012KT


photo of Airbus-A321-231-VQ-BRS
accident date: 10-01-2020
type: Airbus A321-231 (WL)
registration: VQ-BRS
photo of Airbus-A321-231-VQ-BRS
accident date: 10-01-2020
type: Airbus A321-231 (WL)
registration: VQ-BRS
photo of Airbus-A321-231-VQ-BRS
accident date: 10-01-2020
type: Airbus A321-231 (WL)
registration: VQ-BRS
photo of Airbus-A321-231-VQ-BRS
accident date: 10-01-2020
type: Airbus A321-231 (WL)
registration: VQ-BRS

This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Moskva-Sheremetyevo Airport to Antalya Airport as the crow flies is 2162 km (1351 miles).
Accident location: Approximate; accuracy within a few kilometers.

This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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Airbus A321

  • 1760+ built
  • 9th loss
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  • 57th worst accident (a la hora)
  • 60th worst accident (actualmente)
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