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CVR transcript Tamair VH-NEJ - 16 SEP 1995
Cockpit voice recorder transcript of the September 16, 1995 crash of a Swearingen Metro (VH-NEJ) at Tamworth (Australia).
The following is not a complete transcript of the recording; only those words pertinent to the analysis of the flight have been directly transcribed. Elsewhere, a paraphrase of the recorded conversation has been included. The transcript begins as the aircraft is parked on the taxiway after landing from the initial flight.
Source: Fairchild Aircraft Model SA227-AC VH-NEJ, Tamworth, NSW 16 September 1995 - BASI INVESTIGATION REPORT 9503057 / Department of Transport and Regional Development, Bureau of Air Safety Investigation

The reader of these transcripts is cautioned that the transcription of a CVR tape is not a precise science but is the best possible product from a group investigative effort. The transcript, or parts thereof, if taken out of context can be misleading. Therefore, the CVR transcripts should only be viewed as an investigative tool to be used in conjunction with other evidence. Conclusions or interpretations should not be made using the transcript as the sole source of information.
Furthermore, this transcript is made available for educational purposes, so the reader is encouraged to read the accident description associated with the transcripts for better understanding of the circumstances.

Legenda C&T = Check and training pilot
CP = Co-pilot
TWR = Tamworth Aerodrome Controller
NEJ = VH-NEJ
time from to content
1942.45 The pilot in command informed the co-pilot that they were going to conduct a V 1 cut.
1942.49 - 1943.04 The co-pilot objected and questioned the legality of night V 1 cuts. The pilot in command replied that such a procedure was legal. The operations manual has been amended and there was no impediment to conducting the procedure. The co-pilot made a further objection.
1943.10- 1945.02 The pilot in command then indicated that they would be taking off on runway 12 and would continue for a runway three zero right VOR/DME approach. The crew then briefed for that approach.
1945.04- 1945.17 The co-pilot asked if they would be flying the approach on two engines. The pilot in command responded that after the V 1 cut, when the aircraft had climbed through 1,000 ft above ground level, he would probably return the aircraft to normal two engine operation.
1945.18- 1945.30 The co-pilot, assisted by the pilot in command, then revised the procedure for the VOR/DME approach.
1945.41- 1951.30 Because of other traffic, the runway 30 VOR/DME approach was not available. The crew was then given a clearance for the runway 12 VOR/DME approach and briefed for that approach. They then completed the after start checks and the taxi checks.
1951.32- 1952.45 The pilot in command then asked the co-pilot for a crew briefing. The co-pilot could not remember the complete briefing and was assisted by the pilot in command. The pilot in command repreated that they were going to conduct a V 1 cut procedure, adding that it was for the purpose of demonstration so the co-pilot would know what to expect.
1952.56- 1953.35 The co-pilot then revised the procedure for the V 1 cut - that he would call for maximum power, that the pilot in command would call positive rate of climb, and then the co-pilot would call for the landing gear to be selected up. The co-pilot continued that he would identify the failed engine and that the pilot in command would confirm the identification. He queried whether zero thrust would be set. This was confirmed by the pilot in command. The co-pilot continued that at V 2 plus five kts, flaps would be selected up and the climb speed after that would be Vyse to the acceleration altitude of nineteen hundred feet. This was corrected by the pilot in command to four hundred feet above ground level, that is, eighteen hundred feet.
1953.40- 1956.38 The crew completed the line-up checks. The co-pilot asked the pilot in command which engine he was going to fail. The pilot in command responded that he might not simulate the failure of an engine. He then indicated that they would use eighty-eight percent engine torque and one hundred knots for V 1 .
1956.49- 1956.57 The crew then requested and was issued a takeoff clearance.
1957.00 C&T CP OK we're right to go
1957.03 CP C&T What ah what call do I say here. I have to say set takeoff torque
1957.05 C&T CP Yeah you wait for all my calls and then you say set takeoff torque. OK
1957.13 C&T the annunciators clear
1957.15 C&T CP Ah you have sort of don't fight me on the levers yeah . Everything rise torques and temps
1957.18 CP C&T ah set take
1957.19 C&T CP both airspeeds are alive
1957.20 CP C&T set takeoff torque thanks
1957.22 CP C&T should I be pushing up cause I'm not doing much with those power levers there
1957.25 C&T CP that's right. I should be doing it for you or helping you
1957.29 C&T CP torque set
1957.30 C&T CP vee one. rotate
1957.33 C&T CP just ten degrees edward. yeah
1957.38 C&T CP I think we've got an engine failure
1957.39 CP C&T yep
1957.41 C&T CP set max power eh
1957.41 CP C&T are you gonna
1957.42 CP C&T set oh sorry set max power
1957.43 C&T CP yep you got it
1957.44 CP C&T positive rrr
1957.45 C&T CP yeah positive rate yeah
1957.46 CP C&T gear up thanks
1957.47 C&T CP yeah//sound of gear warning horn starts//
1957.50 CP C&T it's the ah left engine
1957.51 C&T CP vee two thanks
1957.53 CP C&T left engine
1957.54 C&T CP just don't lower the nose too much. don't fight it
1957.55 C&T CP that's it. yair left engine we've got no egt and low fuel flow there
1958.00 CP C&T (arthen) we'll ah feather the left then thanks
1958.02 C&T CP ok vee two thanks hold vee two
1958.05 C&T CP we're descending. feather the left one. ok it's feathered
1958.06 // sound of gear warning horn stops //
1958.07 // non pertinent words // // sounds of impact//
1958.09 Recording ends
Electrical power to the Control Tower and airport was cut at 1958.08 EST.
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