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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 163122
Last updated: 27 August 2019
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Date:10-JAN-2014
Time:01:44 LT
Type:Silhouette image of generic F50 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Fokker 50
Owner/operator:Amapola Flyg AB
Registration: SE-LIS
C/n / msn: 20152
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: None
Category:Serious incident
Location:Malmö-Sturup Airport (MMX/ESMS) -   Sweden
Phase: Landing
Nature:Cargo
Departure airport:Sundsvall Airport (SDL/ESNN)
Destination airport:Malmö-Sturup Airport (MMX/ESMS)
Investigating agency: SHK Sweden
Narrative:
The flight took off at 23:47 hrs local time. Take-off and climb to Flight Level 250 was performed according to normal procedures.
During the flight, the crew requested information regarding weather conditions at the destination airport, partly via air traffic control and partly via the crew of a sister aircraft. According to the CVR, the crew received information on the latest current weather according to METAR at 00:56 hrs. The wind was stated to be 270 degrees, 25 knots and 39 knots in the gusts, and visibility to be 5000 metres in moderate rain.
Shortly thereafter, when the aircraft was abeam Jönköping, the warning for cabin pressure altitude was activated. The crew made an emergency descent to Flight Level 80 and performed the measures according to the checklist for emergency descent and cabin decompression. According to the CVR, both the crew members had begun to use oxygen masks within two minutes of the warning being triggered.
At the crew's request to descend to Flight Level 80 or 90, air traffic control gave the clearance "descend to flight level 80" without any further information. Two and a half minutes later, air traffic control communicated "no traffic reported flight level 80".
After this, the crew conducted an internal dialogue for just over ten minutes on the reduction of cabin pressure, which included reading the aircraft's operating manuals and performing an inspection of the cabin space.
At 01:23 hrs, the crew noted an ATIS broadcast with the time stamp 00:20 (UTC time) which, among other things, contained information that runway 17 was in use, wet runway, wind 280 degrees 21 max 33 knots and visibility 9 km in light rain and mist. The captain has explained that the detail of the wet runway was not understood because of simultaneous communication on another frequency. After consultation with the co-pilot, the captain made the decision to use runway 35.
The crew carried out a briefing and subsequently commenced the approach and implemented the associated checklist. At 01:41 hrs, clearance was received to land on runway 35 with the wind stated to be 280 degrees 26 knots max 34. The landing clearance was acknowledged by the crew. The sound recordings also show that the crew received the wind data.
According to the crew, the approach and touchdown were performed without problems. Shortly after touchdown, the engines were reversed. When the speed reduced, the aircraft began to yaw to the left. The captain explained that he used the nose wheel steering to compensate the yawing tendency but that the nose wheel "probably went across". Furthermore, he was unsure whether the brakes had been used.
The yaw continued towards the left, and the aircraft left the runway and stopped with the nose wheel and left main gear in the grass, with the right main gear on the asphalted runway shoulder. In connection with the excursion, the nose gear and left main gear each ploughed a furrow in the ground on the grass area with a depth corresponding to just under half the diameter of the wheels.

Factors as to Cause and Contributing Factors:
The incident was caused by the aircraft being suddenly subjected to a severe gust of wind during roll-out while maintaining thrust reversal.
Contributing factors were probably the crew's lack of sleep, which probably affected decision-making and attention, which in turn led to the landing being performed under conditions that exceeded the operator's crosswind limitations for the aircraft.

Sources:

http://www.expressen.se/kvp/plan-gled-av-bana-vid-landning-pa-sturup/
http://www.skd.se/article/20140110/TTINRIKES/301109987/1163/-/plan-gled-av-landningsbanan_/

https://www.flightradar24.com//data/airplanes/se-lis

Safety recommendations:

Safety recommendation RL 2014:19 (R1) issued 16 December 2014 by SHK to Swedish Transport Agency

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: SHK Sweden
Status: Investigation completed
Duration:
Download report: Final report


Images:


Photo: SHK

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
10-Jan-2014 06:32 Masen63 Added
10-Jan-2014 09:18 TB Updated [Registration, Cn]
10-Jan-2014 10:29 whiteshark Updated [Departure airport, Source, Narrative]
10-Jan-2014 11:37 Masen63 Updated [Departure airport]
16-Dec-2014 20:18 harro Updated [Time, Location, Departure airport, Destination airport, Damage, Narrative]
16-Dec-2014 20:20 harro Updated [Photo, ]

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