ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 179786
This information is added by users of ASN. Neither ASN nor the Flight Safety Foundation are responsible for the completeness or correctness of this information.
If you feel this information is incomplete or incorrect, you can submit corrected information.
This accident is missing citations or reference sources. Please help add citations to guard against copyright violations and factual inaccuracies.
| Date: | Sunday 9 September 2012 |
| Time: | 17:49 |
| Type: |  Boeing 747-47UF |
| Owner/operator: | Atlas Air |
| Registration: | N409MC |
| MSN: | 30558/1242 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 4 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Incident |
| Location: | near Melbourne-Tullamarine Airport, VIC (MEL/YMML) -
 Australia
|
| Phase: | Approach |
| Nature: | Cargo |
| Departure airport: | Auckland International Airport (AKL/NZAA) |
| Melbourne-Tullamarine Airport, VIC (MEL/YMML) | |
| Investigating agency: | ATSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities |
On 9 September 2012, a Boeing 747-400F cargo aircraft, operated by Atlas Air and registered N409MC, was approaching runway 34 at Melbourne Airport, Australia following a flight from Auckland, New Zealand.
The flight crew was conducting the LIZZI FIVE VICTOR standard arrival route (STAR) procedure that included a requirement not to descend below 2,500 ft until past the SHEED waypoint. They were issued clearance by air traffic control for a visual approach for runway 34 from the SHEED waypoint, conditional on not descending below 2,500 ft before SHEED. The flight crew read back the clearance without including the minimum altitude before passing SHEED and the controller did not query the incomplete read back. The flight crew initiated the visual approach and descended below the stipulated minimum of 2,500 ft prior to SHEED.
The ATSB found that the United States-based flight crew did not hear the requirement of the clearance to not descend until after passing the SHEED waypoint. Instead they read back what they believed to be a clearance for an immediate visual approach from their present position. This is a normal instruction during operations in United States airspace. The crew continued their approach to Melbourne Airport based on this understanding. There was no loss of separation with any aircraft.
The lack of detection by the controller of the crew’s incomplete read back represented a missed opportunity to alert the flight crew to not descend below 2,500 ft until after the SHEED waypoint.
Visual approaches from STARs are available elsewhere in Australia, but are not available for use by international operators of large jet aircraft. The approaches via SHEED to runway 34 at Melbourne are the only exception to this rule and are implemented with few additional defences to address the increased risk associated with this type of approach. In addition, the flight profile required from the SHEED waypoint to runway 34 is steeper than other approaches of this type in Australia, requiring a higher rate of descent. This increases the likelihood of an unstable approach.
As a result of this occurrence, Airservices Australia is removing the provision in the Manual of Air Traffic Services for international Heavy and Super Heavy aircraft to use the SHEED visual segment. This permanent change to the Manual of Air Traffic Services is planned for November 2015, with a temporary local instruction to that effect to be issued by Airservices in the interim. In respect of the descent profile of the LIZZI FIVE RWY 34 VICTOR ARRIVAL, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority will engage with Airservices to ensure that the procedure meets all relevant instrument procedure design and ‘flyability’ standards.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 22-Sep-2015 18:16 | harro | Added |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
Quick Links:
| ASN Home | Send Correction / Feedback |
| FSF Home | Disclaimer | Copyright |
| Contact Us | Privacy Policy |
| Press / Media |
CONNECT WITH US:
©2024 Flight Safety Foundation