ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 220921
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| Date: | Friday 18 January 2019 |
| Time: | 17:17 LT |
| Type: |  Boeing 737 MAX 8 |
| Owner/operator: | Norwegian Air International |
| Registration: | EI-FYA |
| MSN: | 42830/6360 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2017 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Helsinki-Vantaa Airport (HEL/EFHK) -
 Finland
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Kraków-J. Paul II Balice International Airport (KRK/EPKK) |
| Helsinki-Vantaa Airport (HEL/EFHK) | |
| Investigating agency: | SIAF |
| Confidence Rating: |  Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities |
Turkish Airlines flight TK1763, a Boeing 737-9F2ER (TC-JYH) had landed on runway 22L at Helsinki-Vantaa Airport, Finland and had not yet vacated the runway when the following aircraft touched down.
This aircraft was a Boeing 737 MAX 8, operating Norwegian Air International flight 351 from Krakow, Poland.
SIAF is investigating the incident.
CONCLUSIONS
1. ATC cleared a transport category airplane to land although the preceding transport category airplane had not vacated the runway. The controller issued the landing clearance since there was reasonable assurance that prescribed separation would exist when the airplane arrived at the threshold.
2. After issuing the clearance, the controller focused on two airplanes that were crossing the runway and therefore paid little attention to the airplane that was vacating the runway.
3. The controller noted that the preceding landed airplane had slowed down significantly and could even be stationary on the taxiway.
4. The controller delayed the go-around instruction until the airplane had crossed the threshold. The automated callout system was calling radio altimeter heights. The goaround instruction, delivered in a normal tone and comprising a single message, was masked by the 50, 40, and 30 ft callouts.
5. The ATCOH guidelines and definitions pertaining to runway vacation after landing are interpreted inconsistently among the Finnish controller community.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10604357
https://www.flightradar24.com/2019-01-18/15:19/12x/THY1XE/1f37f1e6
https://turvallisuustutkinta.fi/en/index/ajankohtaista/aloitetuttutkinnattiedotteet/l2019-02tutkintapaatosvakavavaaratilannehelsinki-vantaanlentoasemalla18.1.2019.html
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 18-Jan-2019 20:29 | penu | Added |
| 18-Jan-2019 20:46 | harro | Updated [Aircraft type, Registration, Cn, Operator, Departure airport, Source, Narrative] |
| 18-Jan-2019 20:46 | harro | Updated [Time] |
| 05-Feb-2019 20:48 | harro | Updated [Source] |
| 23-Dec-2019 20:41 | harro | Updated [Cn, Narrative, Accident report, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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