ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 227838
This information is added by users of ASN. Neither ASN nor the Flight Safety Foundation are responsible for the completeness or correctness of this information.
If you feel this information is incomplete or incorrect, you can
submit corrected information.
Date: | Thursday 25 July 2019 |
Time: | 13:05 |
Type: | Airbus A220-300 |
Owner/operator: | Swiss International Air Lines |
Registration: | HB-JCM |
MSN: | 55030 |
Year of manufacture: | 2018 |
Total airframe hrs: | 2954 hours |
Engine model: | Pratt & Whitney PW1524G-3 |
Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 120 |
Aircraft damage: | Minor |
Category: | Serious incident |
Location: | Perrigny-sur-Armançon -
France
|
Phase: | En route |
Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
Departure airport: | Genève-Cointrin Airport (GVA/LSGG) |
Destination airport: | London-Heathrow Airport (LHR/EGLL) |
Investigating agency: | NTSB |
Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:On July 25, 2019, at about 13:05 local time, Swiss International Air Lines flight LX348, an Airbus A220-300, equipped with two Pratt &Whitney (P&W) PW1524G-3 turbofan engines experienced a No. 1 (left) engine failure while climbing through flight level 320. The flight crew followed quick reference handbook procedures and attempted to shutdown the No. 1 engine, but the engine had already been shutdown by the electronic engine control (EEC). The crew diverted to Paris-Charles de Gaulle International Airport (CDG), France and made an uneventful single engine landing. A post flight examination of the engine revealed a hole in the low pressure compressor (LPC) case and the LPC stage 1 integrally bladed rotor (IBR) had separated and was missing. The thrust reverser exhibited impact damage on the outer barrel, most concentrated on the left thrust reverser assembly, but there was no evidence of high energy radial uncontainment through the thrust reverser/nacelle structure. There were no passenger or crew injuries reported.
In accordance with ICAO Annex 13, the NTSB accepted the delegation of this investigation from the French BEA.
There was a total of three PW1524G-3 and one PW1521G-3 LPC stage 1 IBR separations between July 25, 2019 and February 12, 2020. This incident was the first of the four PW1500G series LPC stage 1 IBR failures.
Probable Cause and Findings
A No. 1 (left) engine low pressure compressor (LPC) stage 1 integrally bladed rotor (IBR) separation due to a high cycle fatigue crack (HCF) that originated at the runout of an airfoil leading edge root radius. The HCF crack developed as a result of a mechanically coupled LPC stage 3 and stage 1 IBR mode excitation and blade flutter response. The excitation was driven by an acoustic tone generated by turbulent airflow passing over the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity while the engine was operating at high speeds in specific flight conditions. A primary contributor to the failure mode was an electronic engine control (EEC) software update that changed the LPC vane schedule and increased the likelihood of LPC stage 1 IBR blade flutter onset within the engine operating range.
Accident investigation:
|
| |
Investigating agency: | NTSB |
Report number: | ENG19IA029 |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 1 year and 7 months |
Download report: | Final report |
|
Sources:
NTSB :
https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20190801X04456&AKey=1&RType=Prelim&IType=IA https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=99980 Location
Images:
Figure: NTSB
LPC Module (Photo: NTSB)
Revision history:
Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
02-Aug-2019 21:39 |
Captain Adam |
Added |
08-Feb-2021 17:57 |
Aerossurance |
Updated [Source] |
08-Feb-2021 17:58 |
Aerossurance |
Updated [Location, Departure airport, Destination airport] |
07-Mar-2021 13:22 |
harro |
Updated [Location, Phase, Departure airport, Destination airport, Narrative, Category, Accident report, Photo] |
07-Mar-2021 13:25 |
harro |
Updated [Total occupants, Photo] |
The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
CONNECT WITH US:
©2024 Flight Safety Foundation