ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 243158
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| Date: | Wednesday 27 February 2008 |
| Time: | |
| Type: |  Cessna 560XL Citation |
| Owner/operator: | |
| Registration: | OO-AIE |
| MSN: | 560-5733 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport, Noord-Holland -
 Netherlands
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Unknown |
| Departure airport: | |
| Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS/EHAM) | |
| Investigating agency: | Dutch Safety Board |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The aircraft was approaching Runway 22 and had clearance from Air Traffic Control to land. At that time, maintenance technicians accompanied by an attendant were working on the approach lights just before the runway threshold of runway 22. When the attendant noticed that an aircraft was about to land, he alerted the technicians and they were all able to get to safety. The aircraft landed without any problems.
CONCLUSION
The runway incursion was able to occur because the Airside Operations Manager ultimately had an incorrect picture of where the maintenance work was taking place and granted permission on that basis. This also gave the LVNL supervisor an incorrect picture.
Confusion of concepts and differences in interpretations by the airport, ATC and the supervisor regarding the terms 'runway', 'strip' and 'clear of runway' then made the runway incursion possible.
Contributing factors:
- The BWA form did not specify the exact location and the form did not include a condition as to whether or not the runway should be taken out of service.
- No visual observation from the control tower that work was taking place near the runway threshold of runway 22 in combination with the assumption by:
- LVNL that the supervisor was aware that 'remaining clear of the runway' meant that a minimum separation of 50 metres would be observed;
- AAS that the supervisor knew that 'clear of the runway' means that a minimum distance of 60 metres from the runway threshold would be observed.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
Dutch Safety Board
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 25-Sep-2020 14:04 | ASN Update Bot | Added |
| 18-Apr-2022 06:46 | harro | Updated [Total fatalities, Other fatalities, Location, Phase, Destination airport, Source, Damage, Narrative] |
| 14-Jun-2022 02:40 | Ron Averes | Updated [Location] |
| 08-Oct-2023 19:59 | Ron Averes | Updated [[Location]] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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