ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 112
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| Date: | Saturday 29 December 2007 |
| Time: | 15:35 LT |
| Type: |  Bell 206L-1 LongRanger II |
| Owner/operator: | Air Logisitics, LLC |
| Registration: | N211EL |
| MSN: | 45251 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1979 |
| Total airframe hrs: | 23767 hours |
| Engine model: | Allison 250-C-28 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 4 |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | South Pass 38, Gulf of Mexico -
 United States of America
|
| Phase: | Approach |
| Nature: | Offshore |
| Departure airport: | Chandeleur 63, GOM |
| South Pass 38, GOM | |
| Investigating agency: | NTSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities |
According to an interview with the pilot, while en route to an unmanned offshore platform South Pass 38 in the Gulf of Mexico, the cloud ceilings were about 500 feet and the visibility was about 5 miles. However, as the helicopter neared the destination platform, the flight entered deteriorating weather. The pilot estimated that the cloud ceiling was about 300 feet and that the visibility was about 1 mile when he began circling to land on the platform. Although the weather conditions did not meet Air Logistics’ operating minimums, which required a 500 foot cloud ceiling and 3 miles of visibility, the pilot decided to continue to the destination platform, despite having the option to divert to another station.
About 1 mile from the platform, as the pilot was maneuvering in an attempt to reduce the airspeed, the helicopter began an inadvertent descent and then entered an aerodynamic buffet that hindered the pilot’s ability to maintain straight and level flight. The buffet was most likely caused by the helicopter entering transverse flow effect (unequal lift vectors between the front and rear portions of the rotor disc) and by a reduction in lift vectors, which resulted from the tailwind that was present. After encountering the buffet, the pilot was unable to maintain control of the helicopter or to stop the helicopter’s descent before it impacted the water.
The accident helicopter was equipped with externally mounted floats, which could have been deployed by actuating a trigger mounted on the cyclic. The helicopter was also equipped with two externally mounted liferafts that could have been deployed either by pulling an interior T-handle near the pilot’s left leg or by pulling one of the two externally mounted T-handles on the helicopter’s skid cross bar. According to a supplemental type certificate for the helicopter, a placard was only mounted near the interior T-handle.
According to a pilot interview and a written statement obtained by Air Logistics, the pilot did not attempt to activate the helicopter’s flotation system or liferafts before water impact because he was preoccupied with recovering from the buffet. The accident pilot provided no indication why he did not deploy the external liferafts using the internal T-handle when the helicopter entered the water, even though he had received training on external liferaft deployments. Air Logistics’ training program and operating manual expected company pilots to deploy the floats before water impact but did not address pilot expectations in the event of water impact without floats deployed. Lacking additional guidance, the pilot reverted to his water survival training and immediately exited the helicopter.
All of the occupants survived the impact, exited the helicopter, and inflated their lifejackets. The pilot was unable to reach the external liferaft T-handles on the skids and attempted to direct the passengers to deploy the liferafts. However, because the pilot had not conducted a passenger briefing (including instructions on how to deploy the liferaft system), the passengers did not know that liferafts were available externally and did not understand how to deploy the liferafts using the external T-handles before the helicopter sank. Under 14 CFR 135.117, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires pilots to ensure that, before flight, all passengers on flights involving extended overwater operations are orally briefed on ditching procedures and the use of required flotation equipment; however, the accident flight did not meet the 14 CFR 1.1 definition of an extended overwater operation because it was operating within 50 nautical miles of the shoreline.
Per the Air Logistics flight operations manual (FOM), a passenger briefing was required that would have included the location of emergency equipment, such as seat belts, exits, lifejackets, and fire extinguishers.
Probable Cause: The pilot’s decision to continue to the destination landing platform in weather conditions below the company’s weather minimums and his failure to maintain aircraft control during the approach. Contributing to the passenger fatality and the severity of the occupant injuries were the lack of a passenger briefing on how to deploy the liferaft, which was required by the company but not by the Federal Aviation Administration because this flight was not an extended overwater operation; the pilot’s failure to deploy the liferafts; and the company radio operator’s misreporting of the helicopter’s “landed” status, which delayed the rescue response.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
NTSB: https://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/brief.aspx?ev_id=20071231X02014&key=1
Location
Media:
#OTD 2007 B206 N211EL fatal accident GOM: DVE, LOC-I, external life rafts not deployed, delayed SAR response https://t.co/6hhUA1Kitz #helicopter #accident #flightsafety #aviationsafety pic.twitter.com/TwOvWlwInl
— Aerossurance (@Aerossurance) December 29, 2022
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 21-Jan-2008 04:28 | JINX | Added |
| 26-Oct-2008 22:06 | Anon. | Updated |
| 03-Aug-2009 20:59 | Anon. | Updated |
| 03-Aug-2014 07:24 | Aerossurance | Updated [Source, Narrative] |
| 21-Dec-2016 19:13 | ASN Update Bot | Updated [Time, Damage, Category, Investigating agency] |
| 21-Dec-2016 19:14 | ASN Update Bot | Updated [Time, Damage, Category, Investigating agency] |
| 21-Dec-2016 19:16 | ASN Update Bot | Updated [Time, Damage, Category, Investigating agency] |
| 21-Dec-2016 19:20 | ASN Update Bot | Updated [Time, Damage, Category, Investigating agency] |
| 04-Dec-2017 19:03 | ASN Update Bot | Updated [Operator, Other fatalities, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Narrative] |
| 27-Dec-2018 10:54 | Aerossurance | Updated [Time, Location, Departure airport, Destination airport, Narrative] |
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