ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 178107
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| Date: | Friday 24 July 2015 |
| Time: | c. 20:10 UTC |
| Type: |  Airbus A319-131 |
| Owner/operator: | British Airways |
| Registration: | G-EUPJ |
| MSN: | 1232 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2000 |
| Engine model: | IAE V2522-A5 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 131 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | NW of Zurich Airport -
 Switzerland
|
| Phase: | En route |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | London-Heathrow Airport (LHR) |
| Zürich-Kloten Airport (ZRH/LSZH) | |
| Investigating agency: | SUST |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
At 18:55 UTC on 24th July 2015, the crew of the Airbus A319 took off on the scheduled flight from London Heathrow to Zurich with flight number BA718. At 19:55:44 UTC, BA718 contacted Swiss radar. Due to storms in the Zurich area, the air traffic controller instructed BA718 to reduce its speed and fly a holding pattern above the Basel (BLM) VHF omnidirectional radio beacon (VOR), and informed the pilots that they should expect a delay of around 15 minutes.
The flight attendant working at the rear of the aircraft cabin was, according to her statement, in the third-last row of seats approx. 15-20 minutes before landing when she noticed a strong odour, comparable to the smell of evaporated oil. She subsequently checked the situation in the rear galley, where the smell was even stronger. She then made her way to the front of the aircraft to find out where the odour was coming from. She was able to detect the smell until she reached the middle area of the cabin. Once in the front galley, she informed the purser and the cabin crew manager. At 20:05:22 UTC, when BA718 was on the outbound leg of the holding pattern, the manager immediately reported this via interphone to the first officer, who was the pilot monitoring at the time. She told him that there was a strong odour at the rear of the cabin, comparable to the smell of evaporated oil. At the same time, the pilots also noticed the odour at the front in the cockpit. After a brief discussion about the situation and further action to be taken, the first officer informed air traffic control of the problem at 20:07:30 UTC and declared an urgency condition (PAN PAN). He requested permission for immediate continuation of the flight and approach to Zurich, or, should that not be possible, a diversion landing in Basel. The air traffic controller made it possible for BA718 to immediately continue flying to the Trasadingen (TRA) VOR, which is located 14.6 NM north-north-west of Zurich airport.
The cabin crew was instructed to prepare the cabin for landing, to wear smoke hoods if necessary and, if possible, not to inform the passengers of the situation to avoid distress. The remaining flight time until landing was estimated to be 10 minutes. With the exception of the purser, all of the flight attendants used smoke hoods. According to the statement made by the cabin crew, the odour was becoming even stronger and, in the cabin, very fine smoke was visible. The passengers did not notice anything, except for the two rearmost passengers who were fanning their hands in front of their noses.
On the way to TRA, the flight crew first of all prepared for the instrument approach to runway 14 in Zurich. At 20:10:09 UTC, they were given clearance by Swiss radar to descend from flight level (FL) 180 to FL 140, which was however cancelled 15 seconds later because another aircraft was flying at FL 170. As the descent to FL 140 had already been initiated, BA718 was already at FL 177 and immediately had to climb back to FL 180. For a short time, this led to a somewhat higher workload.
According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), at 20:11:24 UTC, the captain stated that he felt the need to use an oxygen mask and that the smoke drill should be completed in accordance with the ‘Smoke, Fumes and Avionics Smoke Checklist’. Shortly afterwards, at 20:11:50 UTC, BA718 was directed to the Zurich Final frequency of 125.225 MHz. However, this frequency had been incorrectly communicated, meaning that no radio contact was achieved. Returning to the original frequency, they were only told the correct frequency after the air traffic controller had made further enquiries by telephone. At 20:13:14 UTC, the first contact with Zurich Final was made on the correct frequency of 125.325 MHz. At that time, BA718 was flying at FL 140 and was instructed to descend to FL 80. The air traffic controller offered the pilots a direct approach to runway 14 and asked whether the remaining 27 NM would be sufficient, or whether they would need more time to be able to approach directly from that altitude. The first officer answered the question by saying, “Okay, stand by, Speedbird Seven One Eight”.
Subsequently, the speed was reduced, the flaps were extended to level 2, and the landing gear was deployed so that it was possible to descend more steeply to enable a direct approach to Zurich. Immediately afterwards, at 20:13:44 UTC, the smoke drill was carried out. This involved the first five points on the ‘Smoke, Fumes and Avionics Smoke Checklist’ – the most important actions to be taken straight away, should smoke, fumes or avionics smoke occur.
This minimises further spreading of the smoke or fumes, cuts the power supply to the galleys, and ensures communication with the cabin crew.
At 20:14:37 UTC, BA718 was instructed to descend to an altitude of 6,000 ft above mean sea level (AMSL), whereupon the crew reduced the speed further and extended the flaps to position 3. Approximately two seconds after the flaps had been extended further, the air traffic controller made contact again to inform the pilots that they were nearing the localiser, and to ask whether they would like to approach directly or fly on the current heading through the extended approach axis. The pilots decided to remain on the current heading for a further 5 NM and then turn back again to make the approach to runway 14. The first officer, who was still the pilot monitoring at the time, completed the approach checks and approach briefing.
At 20:15:57 UTC, the captain put on his oxygen mask. Three seconds later, clearance was given to descend to 5,000 ft AMSL and at 20:16:21 UTC, the first officer reported that they were ready for the approach and would therefore like to turn back again in the direction of the approach. The air traffic controller authorised this and gave the instruction, “Speedbird Seven One Eight, roger. Turn right, heading one seven zero, cleared ILS approach runway One Four, report established, descend to four thousand feet.” The first officer then also put on his oxygen mask.
At 20:17:32 UTC, BA718 was aligned to the localizer of runway 14’s instrument landing system (ILS). The flight crew subsequentlystarted the APU in order to have another source of electricity available, should the fire service require the engines to be shut down after landing. When asked about their intentions after landing, the crew advised the air traffic controller that they would taxi as normal to the parking position and open the windows in the cockpit. The approach was uneventful and BA718 landed in Zurich at 20:23:00 UTC. After landing, the pilots opened both cockpit windows, took off their oxygen masks and taxied the aircraft to the parking position accompanied by the fire service.
Conclusions
The serious incident can most probably be attributed to the air conditioning packs being contaminated with engine oil from the APU, which was dripping from the APU generator drain plug onto the APU air inlet duct in small quantities. From the air inlet duct, the oil was drained to the outside via a drain mast, which is located directly behind the APU air inlet. It is therefore probable that the leaked oil reached the APU air inlet when the APU was in operation on the ground, potentially assisted by the effect of tailwind.
Accident investigation:
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Sources:
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 28-Jul-2015 18:38 | harro | Added |
| 24-Oct-2018 19:18 | harro | Updated [Total occupants, Source, Narrative, Accident report, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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