Accident Robinson R22 Beta G-PUDD,
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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 187615
 
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Date:Wednesday 8 June 1994
Time:11:39
Type:Silhouette image of generic R22 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Robinson R22 Beta
Owner/operator:Bizzi-B Helicopters
Registration: G-PUDD
MSN: 0863
Year of manufacture:1988
Fatalities:Fatalities: 2 / Occupants: 2
Aircraft damage: Destroyed
Category:Accident
Location:Near Martin Drove End, 7 miles NW of Fordingbridge, Hampshire -   United Kingdom
Phase: En route
Nature:Training
Departure airport:Bournemouth Airport, Hurn (EGHH)
Destination airport:Bournemouth Airport, Hurn (EGHH)
Investigating agency: AAIB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
On June 8, 1994, about 1139 local time, a Robinson R22 helicopter, registered as G-PUDD and operated by Bizzi-B Helicopters, broke apart during an instructional flight about 1,500 feet agl near Martin Drove End, New Forest, 7 miles North West of Fordingbridge, Hampshire (at approximate Coordinates: 50.9759°N 1.9041°W)

A witness about 1 1/4 mile from the accident site reported that he saw the helicopter flying normally and then heard a loud noise and observed the helicopter falling vertically to the ground with the main rotor assembly separated from the helicopter. The instructor pilot and student were killed, and the helicopter was destroyed. The instructor had accumulated 8,257 pilot flight hours, 7,170 of which were in helicopters and 5,200 in the R22.

The helicopter student held an airline transport pilot certificate (airplane) with approximately 4,000 hours of total flight time, including 40 hours in helicopters and 22 in the R22. The AAIB investigation established that the helicopter was cruising at about 80 knots (nautical miles per hour) before the accident. The main wreckage (cockpit, skid assembly, and engine) came to rest inverted on level ground. The tail boom had separated from the fuselage, and pieces were located 300 feet south of the main wreckage. The main rotor mast and rotor assembly had separated at the top of the transmission and were located about 100 feet from the main wreckage.

The Safety Board and the FAA participated in the AAIB's investigation of the accident. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the fourth tail boom bay aft of its fuselage attachment point was struck twice by the main rotor blades.

One of the main rotor blades exhibited red paint transfer 10 inches from its tip that matched the red "DANGER" sign where the tail boom was struck. The blade was fractured 22 inches from the blade horn and was bowed approximately 8 inches downward. The other main rotor blade exhibited severe bending and twisting, and was fractured 14 inches from the blade tip.

Examination of the tail rotor drive assembly showed no indications of pre-impact failure. The main rotor gear box (transmission), main rotor mast, and main rotor assembly were examined, but no evidence of an initiating failure was found. The transmission upper cap and lower mast exhibited multiple overload fractures indicative of the mast rocking in flight. The mating main rotor shaft exhibited an overload bending failure, and the upper portion of the shaft contained a 4 degree bend directly below the main rotor hub. Physical evidence indicates that the bending of the upper main rotor shaft occurred before the fracture of the transmission cap, and secondary to the main rotor blades traveling beyond their normal flapping range.

One side of the upper swash plate was fractured at the outer arm, and the corresponding pitch change link was also fractured. Examination of the recovered pieces indicated overload failures, with the arm of one main rotor blade horn striking the failed pitch change link. An instability of the main rotor, rocking of the mast, and extreme pitch divergence of the main rotor blades appeared to precede all of the fractures of the main rotor flight control system.

The AAIB could find no engineering reason that would account for the apparent main rotor blade divergence that resulted in the strikes of the tail boom".

Damage sustained to airframe: Per the AAIB report "Aircraft destroyed". As a result, the registration G-PUDD was cancelled by the CAA on 21-11-1994 as "destroyed"

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: AAIB
Report number: 
Status: Investigation completed
Duration:
Download report: Final report

Sources:

1. AAIB: https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5422f79b40f0b613460006e1/Robinson_R22_Beta__G-PUDD_10-94.pdf
2. Newcastle Evening Chronicle - Wednesday 8 June 1994
3. Newcastle Journal - Thursday 9 June 1994
4. Aberdeen Press and Journal - Thursday 9 June 1994
5. http://www.griffin-helicopters.co.uk/accidentdetails.aspx?accidentkey=14730
6. https://sussexhistoryforum.co.uk/index.php?topic=17921.0

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
24-May-2016 19:43 Dr.John Smith Added
24-May-2016 19:43 Dr.John Smith Updated [Narrative]
24-May-2016 19:44 Dr.John Smith Updated [Narrative]
04-Aug-2022 17:47 Dr. John Smith Updated [Location, Source, Narrative, Category]

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description

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