ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 190908
This information is added by users of ASN. Neither ASN nor the Flight Safety Foundation are responsible for the completeness or correctness of this information.
If you feel this information is incomplete or incorrect, you can submit corrected information.
| Date: | Wednesday 18 January 2012 |
| Time: | 10:38 UTC |
| Type: |  Airbus A340-642 |
| Owner/operator: | Etihad Airways |
| Registration: | A6-EHH |
| MSN: | 870 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2007 |
| Engine model: | Rolls-Royce Trent 556-61 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | near TANEM, 907 km NW of Karratha -
 Australia
|
| Phase: | En route |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Singapore-Changi International Airport (SIN/WSSS) |
| Perth Airport, WA (PER/YPPH) | |
| Investigating agency: | ATSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
An Airbus A320, registered 9V-TAZ, and an Airbus A340, registered A6-EHH, were involved in a loss of separation (LOS) incident 907 km NW of Karratha, Western Australia.
The aircraft were under the air traffic control of Airservices Australia. The A320 was southbound at FL 350 and the A340 was heading west and cleared to operate in a ‘block’ level, anywhere between FL 340 and FL 360. The aircraft were estimated to cross waypoint TANEM within 2 minutes of each other. The relevant separation standards were 1,000 ft vertical separation or 15 minutes lateral separation at the same position. Controller 1, who approved the block level clearance, did not detect the traffic confliction prior to handing over to controller 2. After a short break, controller 2 handed back to controller 1, and the confliction was detected by controller 2 during the handover. Compromised separation recovery techniques were applied to re-establish vertical separation.
Contributing factors
• The traffic confliction between the two aircraft existed for about 50 minutes but was not identified by either of the controllers on duty on the relevant sectors during this period.
• Both controllers were experiencing a high workload due to a range of factors, including traffic levels, weather diversions and the airspace configuration.
• The air traffic services provider’s processes for monitoring and managing controller workloads did not ensure that newly-endorsed controllers had sufficient skills and techniques to manage the high workload situations to which they were exposed. [Safety
issue]
• Controller 1 had limited opportunity to consolidate their training and skills before being rostered onto more complex sectors and situations.
• The air traffic services provider had limited formal guidance regarding how to determine appropriate consolidation periods for en route controllers on one sector before they were transitioned to commence training on another sector. [Safety issue]
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2012/aair/ao-2012-012/
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
Quick Links:
| ASN Home | Send Correction / Feedback |
| FSF Home | Disclaimer | Copyright |
| Contact Us | Privacy Policy |
| Press / Media |
CONNECT WITH US:
©2024 Flight Safety Foundation