ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 208727
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| Date: | Thursday 29 March 2018 |
| Time: | 19:55 LT |
| Type: |  Boeing 737-7K2 (WL) |
| Owner/operator: | KLM Royal Dutch Airlines |
| Registration: | PH-BGK |
| MSN: | 38054/3292 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2010 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS/EHAM) -
 Netherlands
|
| Phase: | Approach |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Manchester International Airport (MAN/EGCC) |
| Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS/EHAM) | |
| Investigating agency: | Dutch Safety Board |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
A KLM Boeing 737-700 (PH-BGK) and a Transavia Boeing 737-800 (PH-HXF) were involved in a serious airprox incident at Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport, the Netherlands.
KLM flight KL1080 was approaching runway 18C for landing when the flight crew radioed that they were executing a go-around.
At that time, the runway controller had already issued clearance to Transvavia flight HV5193 to Paris-Orly, a Boeing 737-800 to start its takeoff from runway 24. The runway controller wanted to instruct this aircraft to abort its takeoff, but because the wrong flight number was used in the instruction to abort the takeoff, the crew did not respond to the instruction and the aircraft took off.
The runway controller recognized the potential conflict and issued instructions to both the Boeing 737-700 and the Boeing 737-800 to perform divergent turns in order to establish a greater separation between the two aircraft. The crews of both aircraft immediately complied with these instructions, also because they had themselves recognized the potentially hazardous situation. The closest separation between the two aircraft was around 960 metres (0.5 NM horizontal and 300 feet vertical).
The Dutch Safety Board has arrived at the following conclusions:
- The runway controller observed the aircraft taking off from runway 24, and was confronted with a potential conflict when the crew of the landing aircraft on runway 18C announced their go-around. Runway 24 and 18C are converging runways.
Attempts to cause the aircraft to abort its takeoff failed, resulting in a potential hazardous situation. Thanks to the almost simultaneous intervention by the runway controller and the response from the two crews, no actual collision hazard occurred.
- Allowing reduced separation during the use of dependent takeoff and landing runways is a procedure which can result in the occurrence of undesirable and potentially hazardous situations. Aside from the uncertainty about the legitimacy of this procedure, the question is whether the advantage gained – namely increased capacity – outweighs the potential hazard that can arise. With that in mind, LVNL should maintain the basic rule that takeoff clearance will only be issued after the landing on the dependent runway has actually been confirmed by the runway controller or if the landing aircraft is still at least 2 NM from the runway threshold.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://onderzoeksraad.nl/nl/onderzoek/2411/separatie-minima-onderschreden-29-maart-2018
https://www.nhnieuws.nl/nieuws/222279/Bijna-botsing-Schiphol-was-tussen-KLM-en-Transavia
Images:
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 03-Apr-2018 15:11 | harro | Added |
| 03-Apr-2018 19:01 | harro | Updated [Photo, ] |
| 03-Apr-2018 19:06 | harro | Updated [Photo, ] |
| 24-Sep-2020 11:42 | harro | Updated [Departure airport, Narrative, Accident report, ] |
| 14-Jun-2022 03:02 | Ron Averes | Updated [Location] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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