Accident Druine D.31 Turbulent G-ARZM,
ASN logo
ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 62908
 
This information is added by users of ASN. Neither ASN nor the Flight Safety Foundation are responsible for the completeness or correctness of this information. If you feel this information is incomplete or incorrect, you can submit corrected information.

Date:Sunday 23 June 1991
Time:17:45 LT
Type:Silhouette image of generic D31 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Druine D.31 Turbulent
Owner/operator:The Tiger Club (1990) Ltd
Registration: G-ARZM
MSN: PFA/581
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 1
Aircraft damage: Destroyed
Category:Accident
Location:Boughton Monchelsea, near Maidstone, Kent -   United Kingdom
Phase: Approach
Nature:Private
Departure airport:RAF Henlow, Bedfordshire (EGWE)
Destination airport:Headcorn Airfield, Kent (EGKH)
Investigating agency: AAIB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
Written off (damaged beyond repair) 23.6.91; crashed on approach to Headcorn Airfield, Kent when lost VFR orientation due to deteriorating weather conditions. G-ARZM was the lead aircraft of three Druine D.31 Turbulents from The Tiger Club (the other two being G-APNZ and G-ASAM) that were returning to Headcorn after giving a formation flying display at RAF Henlow, Bedfordshire. All three crashed: G-ARZM and G-ASAM were written off, G-APNZ was substantially damaged

According to the official AAIB report into the incident:

"The aircraft had been at RAF Henlow where, during the day, they had carried out three 10 minute flying displays. On the last display, which had finished at 1530 hrs, the leader had noted that the cloudbase was 800 feet. The aircraft were refuelled and the pilots self-briefed for the return flight to Headcorn aerodrome in Kent.

An aftercast, prepared by the Meteorological Office in Bracknell, indicated that, at 1600 hrs on Sunday, a warm front was lying from Chichester to Devizes. It was associated with an area of low pressure, centred in the Bristol Channel, which was moving north-east at about 80 kt. There was moderate to heavy rain with broken to open stratus type cloud, base 800 to 1000 feet.These rapidly deteriorating conditions were moving across Surrey, Sussex and Kent. The Office had issued the following TAFs at about 1500 hrs UTC:

- EGKB (Biggin Hill) 1619 16016/26 KT 8000 6ST010 INTER 1619 5000 62RA
PROB10 95TS 6ST003

- EGMD (Lydd) 1619 16018/30 KT 5000 6ST005 INTER 1619 1500 62RA
PROB10 95TS 6ST002

A report from RAF Henlow indicated that a full list of both civil and military terminal forecasts, a local area forecast and a South of England forecast were available to pilots.

Departure from Henlow was at 1545 hrs and the three aircraft flew in loose formation, about 400 yds apart, with NZ in the lead, ZM on the left and AM on the right. The visibility was about 7 to 8 km and the cloud base about 700 feet agl; this reduced to about 3000 metres and 400 feet agl in showers. They flew from Ware, down the Lee Valley at about 500-700 feet agl and the followed the M25 motorway. In the vicinity of Brentford, ZM closed in and, by use of signals, the mutual decision was made to carry on. AM was, at this time, about 200 yds on the right. The aircraft then repositioned to about 400 yards lateral separation and then continued south. The River Thames was crossed about 1 nm east of Gravesend; at this point it was noted that the visibility was better than 15 km and the cloud base was well clear of the two 560 foot agl chimneys to the north-east of Gravesend. Although the ridge of higher ground which stretches south-east from Rochester was in cloud, the valley to the west, through which the River medway passes, was clear. The formation continued down the valley towards Maidstone.

Just west of Maidstone, the visibility deteriorated rapidly and the leader, in NZ, found himself in cloud.The aircraft instrumentation was limited and so he turned onto north and began a slow descent at 70 kt, from an altitude of 550 feet, in order to regain visual contact. He regained contact at 400 feet, which he estimated to be about 100-200 feet agl, however, the visibility was only about 120 metres and he was uncertain of his position. Seeing no way out of the area, the pilot decided to carry out a precautionary landing. He found a field, the diagonal of which gave a suitable distance into the easterly wind. An overflight, in the landing direction, revealed no significant obstructions. There were some horses sheltering in the north-east corner and the field was lined with houses on the west and north sides. Apart from minor damage caused by snagging a two strand wire fence at 15 to 20 kt, the landing was successful and the pilot vacated the aircraft uninjured. The pilot estimated that he had landed at about 1715 hrs.

When the pilot of ZM encountered the adverse weather, his first action was to start a level left turn to clear the formation. Once on a reciprocal heading he entered a slow descent until, at about 100-200 ft agl, he gained visual contact with the ground. He was uncertain of his position and his forward visibility was almost zero. He realised that he was heading towards the built up area around Maidstone and so decided to land as soon as possible. He saw an area which, although surrounded by tall trees, looked suitable. Having flown round the field, just above the tree tops, he carried out an approach and landing. Unfortunately the ground was soft, due to recent rain, and the aircraft nosed over. The pilot was seriously injured and rendered unconscious by the impact. However the accident had been observed by a passer-by who informed the emergency services and remained with the pilot until they arrived.

The pilot of AM, when he lost sight of the formation, turned right onto about north; he planned to head toward the M20 motorway and follow it west, along the M26, until he reached the junction with the M25 near Sevenoaks. He recalled that he flew over the field, in which he eventually landed, shortly after he had taken up the northerly heading. When he reached the M25 junction he orbited the area but could find no way out and was aware that the weather was closing in rapidly. He turned eastwards and followed the railway line, hoping to see West Malling airfield. As he approached Maidstone he turned south and saw a field with a helicopter in it. As he got closer, he noticed that NZ was also in the field and that it was the one he had overflown initially. A circuit was flown at about 25-30 feet agl, and he saw the pilot of NZ standing in the field indicating a recommended landing direction. AM was then positioned downwind; the pilot recalled that, due to the extremely poor visibility he flew at a slightly lower speed than normal. On final approach the aircraft started to sink; the pilot's recollection of the final stage of the landing was limited but he thought that he had applied power and seemed to get no response from the engine; conditions at the time were conducive to carburettor icing. The aircraft continued to sink and struck the ground in a steeply banked, nose down attitude. The aircraft was severely damaged and the pilot, who was seriously injured and unconscious, was assisted from the wreckage by personnel attending the scene of the first accident.

The pilot of NZ, who observed the landing, reported that, at about 1740 hrs, AM overflew the field from west to east. At the eastern edge, he turned left and flew down wind along the northern edge. The approach appeared slow and, at about 30 feet agl, AM banked steeply, the nose dropped and the aircraft struck the ground in a steep nose-down attitude.

The helicopter seen by the pilot of AM was the air ambulance which attended the scene when NZ had landed. All three pilots wore full upper torso restraint, which withheld on impact. The pilot of AM wore a protective flying helmet"

Registration G-ARZM belatedly cancelled 4.2.99 as "Permanently withdrawn from use"

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: AAIB
Report number: 
Status: Investigation completed
Duration:
Download report: Final report

Sources:

1. http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Rollason%20Druine%20D31%20Turbulents%20G-APNZ,%20G-ARZM%20and%20G-ASAM%2009-91.pdf
2. https://cwsprduksumbraco.blob.core.windows.net/g-info/HistoricalLedger/G-ARZM.pdf
3. http://www.laa-archive.org.uk/results.php?q=Druine+D.31+Turbulent&fields=model
4. http://sussexhistoryforum.co.uk/index.php?topic=14896.0
5. https://www.key.aero/forum/historic-aviation/81823-rollason-turbulent

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
22-May-2009 12:58 XLerate Added
30-May-2014 22:40 Dr. John Smith Updated [Date, Registration, Cn, Operator, Total fatalities, Total occupants, Other fatalities, Location, Country, Phase, Nature, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Damage, Narrative]
14-Nov-2014 23:48 Dr. John Smith Updated [Time, Departure airport, Embed code]
26-Feb-2020 22:00 Dr. John Smith Updated [Source, Narrative]

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description

The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
Quick Links:

CONNECT WITH US: FSF on social media FSF Facebook FSF Twitter FSF Youtube FSF LinkedIn FSF Instagram

©2024 Flight Safety Foundation

1920 Ballenger Av, 4th Fl.
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
www.FlightSafety.org