Accident Cessna 208B Supervan 900 PH-FST,
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Date:Friday 25 June 2021
Type:Silhouette image of generic C208 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Cessna 208B Supervan 900
Owner/operator:Skydive Teuge
Registration: PH-FST
MSN: 208B0823
Year of manufacture:2000
Total airframe hrs:9251 hours
Engine model:Honeywell TPE331-12JR
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 18
Aircraft damage: Substantial, written off
Location:2 km W of Teuge Airport -   Netherlands
Phase: Initial climb
Departure airport:Teuge Airport (EHTE)
Destination airport:Teuge Airport (EHTE)
Investigating agency: Dutch Safety Board
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
A Cessna 208B Supervan 900 skydiving aircraft suffered a loss of engine power shortly after takeoff from Teuge Airport, the Netherlands. The pilot performed a forced landing in a field 2 km west of Teuge Airport next to the A50 motorway.
The right wing impacted a billboard and the aircraft swung while coming to a stop against a crash barrier next to the highway.

On the morning of the accident, the aircraft was parked inside the hangar of a maintenance organisation for a maintenance task before the planned flights that day. When the aircraft was on ground with the engine off, erratic and high engine Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) readings were reported. The maintenance organisation suspected a faulty magnetic pick-up in the engine’s propeller governor to be the cause of these erratic EGT readings. A mechanic under supervision of a licenced engineer was tasked to replace the magnetic pick-up. After removal of the old magnetic pick-up, the mechanic followed steps one through four of the maintenance manual to install the new magnetic pick-up. Steps five through eight, a system voltage test to check correct installation, were not noticed by the mechanic and as a result not carried out. After connecting the wiring and tightening the lock nut, the mechanic, together with the pilot, did a static engine test run and performed the Single Red Line (SRL) check to verify the system and EGT readings.
After the system was found to be functioning correctly, the mechanic left the aircraft and the pilot taxied to the skydive organisation’s building to pick up parachutists. Following the boarding of seventeen parachutists, the pilot taxied to runway 26 and commenced the takeoff roll. Shortly after takeoff, without any warning, the engine lost power at approximately 400 feet above field level. The pilot made an emergency landing in a field whereby the aircraft sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, wings, landing gear and propeller. One parachutist suffered minor injuries.

During the initial climb after takeoff, the aircraft suffered a complete loss of engine power as a result of the uncommanded feathering of the propeller. This feathering was the result of damage that occurred within the propeller governor. Most probably, the incorrect installation of the magnetic pick-up in the propeller governor prior to the accident flight led to contact damage between the pick-up and the rotating toothed gear. Debris restricted the free movement of the ball head assembly in the governor housing, allowing all oil to drain from the propeller dome and causing the propeller to continuously move to the feather position and eventually cease rotation. The increasing pitch of the propeller led to a power reduction of the engine which reinforced itself. The distorted output signal of the damaged magnetic pick-up did not cause the engine flame out.
The design of the propeller governor’s toothed gear makes it possible to position the magnetic pick-up in between its teeth. The maintenance procedure for the replacement of the magnetic pick-up did not specifically mention or address this. The final steps of this procedure, a voltage check to verify the correct placement of the pick-up, were not performed by the maintenance staff. The design of the toothed gear in combination with the procedure in the maintenance manual allowed for the incorrect installation.

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: Dutch Safety Board
Report number: final report
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year and 9 months
Download report: Final report



Revision history:


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