Accident McDonnell Douglas MD-83 5N-SRI,
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Date:Tuesday 20 February 2018
Time:18:52
Type:Silhouette image of generic MD83 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
McDonnell Douglas MD-83
Owner/operator:Dana Air
Registration: 5N-SRI
MSN: 53020/1789
Year of manufacture:1990
Total airframe hrs:66109 hours
Cycles:41794 flights
Engine model:Pratt & Whitney JT8D-217C
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 49
Aircraft damage: Substantial, repaired
Category:Accident
Location:Port Harcourt Airport (PHC) -   Nigeria
Phase: Landing
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Abuja International Airport (ABV/DNAA)
Destination airport:Port Harcourt Airport (PHC/DNPO)
Investigating agency: AIB Nigeria
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
Dana Air flight 363 departed Abuja for Port Harcourt, Nigeria at 18:06 hours local time. The first officer was the Pilot Flying (PF) while the captain was the Pilot Monitoring (PM).
Following an uneventful en route part of the flight, the aircraft was issued descent clearances to FL220 and then further down to FL80.
During descent, the PF briefed for the localizer approach to runway 21.
Port Harcourt Approach then reported the presence of cumulonimbus (Cb) clouds along the approach path of runway 21, and requested flight 363 to report intentions. Dana 363 responded "I will like to come closer then we take our decision I will advise". Meanwhile, the Tower controller informed the Approach controller that the intensity of rain had increased to heavy rain.
At 18:43 Arik Air 766 peformed a go around on the approach to runway 03 due to windshear.
At 18:45, Dana 363 was cleared for the LOC approach to runway 21. Shortly afterwards the captain took over control after realizing the Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) 2 was unserviceable.
When the aircraft was 12 miles to touch down, the Approach controller instructed the flight to contact Tower. The crew was engaged in changing the frequencies on the navigation radio receivers since the VOR DME was not showing.
An initial attempt by the PM to contact the Tower was not on the correct frequency, during which both Tower and Approach were trying to contact the aircraft. Approximately 1.5 minutes after the first attempt, contact with the Tower was established on the correct frequency.
The captain then instructed the first officer to watch out for the runway. A few seconds after, the captain was heard yelling for wipers. After a while, the captain sighted the runway and instructed the first officer to report this to the Tower controller. Thirty-two seconds later, an aural warning "Sink rate"! "Sink rate"!! "Sink rate"!!! "Sink rate"!!!! came on.
The aircraft descended through approach minimums (460 feet AGL), crossed the threshold and did a smooth touchdown on the runway at 7972 feet from the threshold in high winds of 360°/22 kt. The aircraft landed without obtaining landing clearance from the Tower controller.
Landing Distance Available (LDA) for runway 21 was 9843 feet which left a remaining length of 1871 feet for the aircraft to stop.
According to the captain, during landing roll, the brakes were applied while simultaneously deploying thrust reversers to maximum; all spoilers automatically deployed after the nose wheel touched the ground. The crew continued to apply brakes until maximum braking was commanded. The aircraft could not be stopped during brake application and the captain continued applying the brake pedals to maximum.
The aircraft was on the centreline until it veered off left approximately 200 feet from the end of the runway, exited the paved surface and came to a stop 978 feet from the end of the runway After the aircraft came to a complete stop, engines were shut down and emergency power switch was turned ON. The emergency light came ON, all other lights were OFF and the Public Address System was not working, the lead crew had to open the cockpit door to obtain emergency evacuation instructions from the captain.
Emergency evacuation was carried out using only the left forward main door and the escape slide on this door did not deploy. All persons on board were evacuated unhurt.

Causal factor:
The accident was caused by an underestimation of the degradation of weather conditions (heavy rain, visibility and strong wind on short final and landing) and the failure by the crew to initiate a missed approach which was not consistent with the company’s SOP.
Contributory Factors:
Other contributing factors to this accident were:
- Non-compliance to company’s SOP in meeting crew competency and complement requirements.
- Ineffective two-way communication between the ATC and DAN0363 during final approach prevented the flow of technical information on runway surface condition and other relevant meteorological information essential to safety.
- Failure of the crew to crosscheck the prevailing wind and also to obtain landing clearance from the ATC during final approach after contact with ATC was restored.

METAR:

19:00 UTC / 20:00 local time:
METAR DNPO 201900Z 24013KT 1500 TSRA BKN006 FEW018CB 22/21 Q1006 NOSIG

Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: AIB Nigeria
Report number: DANA/2018/02/20/F
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year and 2 months
Download report: Final report

Sources:

AIB Nigeria

Location

Images:


photo (c) AIB Nigeria; Port Harcourt Airport (PHC); 21 February 2018


photo (c) AIB Nigeria; Port Harcourt Airport (PHC); 21 February 2018

Revision history:

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