Accident Boeing 737-8GP (WL) PK-LBS,
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Date:Monday 4 April 2016
Type:Silhouette image of generic B738 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Boeing 737-8GP (WL)
Owner/operator:Batik Air
Registration: PK-LBS
MSN: 39827/5157
Year of manufacture:2014
Total airframe hrs:3113 hours
Cycles:1907 flights
Engine model:CFMI CFM56-7B24E
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 56
Aircraft damage: Substantial, repaired
Location:Jakarta-Halim Perdana Kusuma Airport (HLP) -   Indonesia
Phase: Take off
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Jakarta-Halim Perdana Kusuma Airport (HLP/WIHH)
Destination airport:Ujung Pandang-Hasanudin Airport (UPG/WAAA)
Investigating agency: NTSC
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Batik Air flight ID7703, operated by a Boeing 737-800 with registration PK-LBS, collided with an ATR-42-600 aircraft on takeoff from runway 24 at Jakarta-Halim Perdana Kusuma Airport (HLP), Indonesia. Dark, night time conditions existed at the time of the accident.
The ATR-42-600, operated by TransNusa Aviation Mandiri and registered PK-TNJ, was parked at stand B-1 on the north apron of Halim Airport and was to be moved from the north to the south apron. For this the aircraft had to cross the active runway.
A towing car was used with a driver and one supporting personnel. Two engineers occupied the pilot seats in the aircraft. The engineers were assigned to apply aircraft brakes if required during the towing process.
The towed aircraft was towed without aircraft electrical power fed to the system and the navigation light, strobe light and the aircraft radio communications were off. The communication between the towing car driver and Halim Tower was performed by a handheld radio communication on frequency 152.7 MHz.
At 19:45 local time flight ID7703 requested pushback clearance to the Halim Tower controller on frequency 118.6 MHz. The aircraft was parked on parking stand B-2 and was approved to push back.
After the ID7703 completed the pushback, the towing car driver of the towed aircraft requested clearance to Halim Tower Control Unit to reposition from parking stand B-1 to the south apron. The towing car driver was instructed to follow ID7703 and to report when on taxiway C. The communication between the towing car driver and Halim Tower was handled by the assistant controller.
The controller heard the communication between the assistant and towing car driver, he recognized the position of the towed aircraft was on the parking stand B-1.
The ID7703 flight crew did not know that there was a towing aircraft behind as communications with the car were on a different frequency. At 19:48, ID7703 received taxi clearance to runway 24 via taxiway C.
At 19:50, the controller instructed ID7703 to hold on taxiway C due to an arriving aircraft. The assistant stated that when ID7703 was holding on short taxiway C, the towing car began moving the ATR-42.
At 19:53, ID7703 received clearance from controller to enter runway 24 to back track for departure. The aircraft that had just arrived would use parking stand B-1. Therefore, the assistant controller instructed the towing car driver to expedite the tow and report when on taxiway C. The controller was not observing the ATR at that time. The towing car was about to enter taxiway C at that time.
At 19:56, ID7703 reported ready for takeoff. The controller did not see any vehicle or object on the runway then issued clearance for takeoff. The pilot stated that during line up, the lights surrounding the turn pad were very bright and affected his forward vision for a short time. It was common practice in Halim to lineup at the turn pad beyond the threshold runway 24.
After receiving the takeoff clearance, the Second in Command (SIC) as pilot flying (PF) opened the power and pressed the Take Off / Go Around (TOGA) button.
The towing car driver stated that, when he saw ID7703 was lining up for takeoff, he asked Halim Tower whether ID7703 was initiating the takeoff. There was no reply from Halim Tower. The towing car driver then sped up the towing and turned to the right side of the runway.
When ID7703 was accelerating through approximate 80 knots, the SIC saw an object warned the captain. The pilots could not identify the object but later on when the object became closer, the SIC realized that there was an aircraft.
The captain took over control and applied the right rudder towards the right side of runway centerline and maintained a course between the runway centerline and the runway edge. The PIC intended to reject the takeoff shortly after they felt an impact. The impact occurred at a ground speed of about 130 knots, after passing V1. The pilot rejected takeoff and the aircraft stopped at approximately 400 meter from the towed aircraft which stopped at the left of the runway 24 centerline at approximately 100 meters from taxiway G.
The captain noticed fire on the left wing tip and immediately shut down both engines, activated the fire extinguishers of both engines and Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) and commanded to the flight attendant "evacuation from the right".
The flight attendants opened all aircraft passenger doors and the escape slides deployed. Most of passengers were evacuated from the left forward door (L1).
Both aircraft sustained substantial damage. There were no reported injuries to the accident.
The outer portion of the left wing of the Boeing 737, about 5,75 m, was severed. The ATR-42s left hand wing, outboard of the no.1 engine, was severed, along with the entire empennage.

Contributing Factors:
- Handling of two movements in the same area with different controllers on separate frequencies without proper coordination resulted in the lack of awareness to the controllers, pilots and towing car driver.
- The communication misunderstanding of the instruction to follow ID 7703 most likely contributed the towed aircraft enter the runway.
- The lighting environments in the tower cab and turning pad area of runway 24 might have diminished the capability to the controllers and pilots to recognize the towed aircraft that was installed with insufficient lightings.


12:00 UTC / 19:00 local time:
WIHH 041200Z 04006KT 5000 HZ FEW017CB SCT018 30/25 Q1010 RMK CB TO SW

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: NTSC
Report number: KNKT.
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year
Download report: Final report


Batik Air statement



photo (c) NTSC; Jakarta-Halim Perdana Kusuma Airport (HLP); 04 April 2016

photo (c) NTSC; Jakarta-Halim Perdana Kusuma Airport (HLP); 04 April 2016

photo (c) NTSC; Jakarta-Halim Perdana Kusuma Airport (HLP); 04 April 2016

photo (c) NTSC; Jakarta-Halim Perdana Kusuma Airport (HLP); 04 April 2016

photo (c) NTSC; Jakarta-Halim Perdana Kusuma Airport (HLP); 04 April 2016

photo (c) NTSC; Jakarta-Halim Perdana Kusuma Airport (HLP); 04 April 2016

photo (c) Leslie Snelleman; Ujung Pandang-Hasanudin Airport (UPG/WAAA); 10 November 2015

Revision history:


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