Accident Boeing 767-241ER PP-VNN,
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Date:Wednesday 7 June 2000
Type:Silhouette image of generic B762 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Boeing 767-241ER
Registration: PP-VNN
MSN: 23803/161
Year of manufacture:1987
Total airframe hrs:49134 hours
Cycles:20212 flights
Engine model:General Electric CF6-80C2B2
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 191
Aircraft damage: Substantial, repaired
Location:São Paulo-Guarulhos International Airport, SP (GRU) -   Brazil
Phase: Take off
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:São Paulo-Guarulhos International Airport, SP (GRU/SBGR)
Destination airport:Lima-Jorge Chávez International Airport (LIM/SPIM)
Investigating agency: CENIPA
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Varig Flight 886 to Lima, Peru, experienced an uncontained failure of the HPC stage 3-9 spool in the No. 2 (right) General Electric CF6-80C2B2 engine during takeoff. The flight crew reported that at a speed of about 60 knots, they heard a loud bang. They rejected the takeoff and stopped the airplane on the runway. The copilot opened the right-side cockpit window to look out and advised the pilot that there was a fire around the right main landing gear. The flight crew reported that they then attempted to taxi clear of the fire but stopped the airplane on the runway again when they realized it was the engine that was on fire and ordered an evacuation. Although the flight crew discharged both fire bottles into the No. 2 engine nacelle, the fire continued until it was extinguished by airport fire department personnel.

Contributing factors (translated from Portuguese):
Material factor
(1) Design Deficiency - Contributed
The inspection by penetrating liquid, scheduled to be executed on the HPC stage 3-9 spool, failed to ensure the detection of cracks caused by DTF ("Dwell-Time Fatigue"), such as that caused the failure in this accident.
(2) Deficiency manufacturing - Contributed
The HPC stages 3-9 spool failure occurred because the existence of an area of quasi-cleavage, originating from the manufacturing process of the same.

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: CENIPA
Report number: Final report
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 3 years and 6 months
Download report: Final report


NTSB Safety Recommendation A-00-104
FAA Airworthiness Directive 2001-10-07



photo (c) anonymous; São Paulo-Guarulhos International Airport, SP (GRU); June 2000

Revision history:


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