Statuts: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | vendredi 11 juillet 1975 |
Heure: | 04:31 |
Type/Sous-type: |  de Havilland DH-114 Prinair Heron 2 |
Compagnie: | Prinair |
Immatriculation: | N570PR |
Numéro de série: | 14074 |
Année de Fabrication: | 1954 |
Heures de vol: | 14859 |
Moteurs: | 4 Continental IO-520E |
Equipage: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 2 |
Passagers: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 9 |
Total: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 11 |
Dégats de l'appareil: | Substantiels |
Conséquences: | Repaired |
Lieu de l'accident: | San Juan-Isla Verde International Airport (SJU) ( Porto Rico)
|
Phase de vol: | Au décollage (TOF) |
Nature: | Transport de Passagers Nat. |
Aéroport de départ: | San Juan-Isla Verde International Airport (SJU/TJSJ), Porto Rico |
Aéroport de destination: | Mayaguez-Eugenio M. de Hostos Airport (MAZ/TJMZ), Porto Rico |
Numéro de vol: | 303 |
Détails:Prinair Flight-303, a de Havilland DH-114, was a scheduled air taxi flight from San Juan to Mayaguez, Puerto Rico. There were nine passengers and two crewmembers aboard when the airplane was taxied to the runway at San Juan International Airport for takeoff.
After the aircraft was taxied out, the flightcrew completed the routine engine runup and checklist. They noted roughness when the Nos. 2 and 3 engines were checked; both engines were rechecked, and the takeoff clearance was requested and received.
Takeoff power was applied slowly and by the time full throttle power was set, the airplane had accelerated to between 30 and 40 knots. At this time, the flightcrew heard a loud explosive sound, and the airplane veered to the right. Power was reduced immediately, but directional control was difficult to maintain. The captain, however, was able to keep the airplane on the runway.
The first officer notified San Juan Tower that the takeoff was being aborted; the tower was also advised that an emergency existed and equipment was requested. The airplane was brought to a complete stop and the flightcrew initiated the emergency evacuation of the passengers.
Although all emergency shutdown procedures were completed for the four engines, including the closing of all four mixture controls, and fuel shutoff valves and the turning of magneto switches to the "off" position, the Nos. 1 and 2 engines continued to run. The feathering controls were partially jammed, but after several attempts the No. 1 engine propeller was feathered and stopped. Attempts to shut down No. 2 engine in this manner were unsuccessful, and attempts to change the fuel system cross-feed configuration to terminate the fuel supply also were unsuccessful. The No. 2 engine continued to run for about 10 minutes after the takeoff was discontinued.
Because of concern that an engine fire might develop, the four fire extinguishing systems were discharged, after which the No. 2 engine stopped. The captain then also evacuated the airplane.
Probable Cause:
Probable Cause: "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the separation of the No. 1 propeller blade of the No. 2 propeller assembly. The blade separated as a result of vibratory stresses which induced fatigue cracks not readily detectable during routine preflight inspections.
Contributing to the accident were inadequate overhaul inspection procedures at a certificated repair station and inadequate dissemination and enforcement of recommended maintenance practices by the Federal Aviation Administration."
Accident investigation:
|
Investigating agency: | NTSB  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 278 days (9 months) | Accident number: | NTSB-AAR-76-13 | Download report: | Final report
|
|
Sources:
» NTSB
Opérations de secours
NTSB issued 2 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 14-APR-1976 | To: | A-76-71 |
REVIEW IMMEDIATELY ITS PROGRAMS FOR SURVEILLANCE OF CERTIFICATED REPAIR STATIONS AND ITS PROCEDURES WHICH GOVERN THE GRANTING OF SUPPLEMENTAL TYPE CERTIFICATES. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 14-APR-1976 | To: | A-76-72 |
REVIEW ITS POLICIES RELATIVE TO USERS\' COMPLIANCE WITH MANUFACTURERS SERVICE BULLETINS WHICH MAY HAVE SAFETY OF FLIGHT IMPLICATIONS, AND,WHERE APPROPRIATE, ISSUE AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER SERVICE DIFFICULTIES ARE DISCOVERED. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Show all...
Photos
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre San Juan-Isla Verde International Airport et Mayaguez-Eugenio M. de Hostos Airport est de 122 km (76 miles).
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.