Crash-aerien 09 JUL 1982 d'un Boeing 727-235 N4737 - New Orleans International Airport, LA (MSY)

Home » Database » 1982

Statuts:	Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Date:	vendredi 9 juillet 1982
Heure:	16:09
Type/Sous-type:	Boeing 727-235
Compagnie:	Pan American World Airways (Pan Am)
Immatriculation:	N4737
Numéro de série:	19457/518
Année de Fabrication:	1968-01-24 (14 years 6 months)
Heures de vol:	39253
Moteurs:	3 Pratt & Whitney JT8D-7B
Equipage:	victimes: 7 / à bord: 7
Passagers:	victimes: 138 / à bord: 138
Total:	victimes: 145 / à bord: 145
Victimes au sol:	victimes: 8
Dégats de l'appareil:	Détruit
Conséquences:	Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Lieu de l'accident:	1,4 km (0.9 milles) E of New Orleans International Airport, LA (MSY) ( Etats-Unis d'Amérique)
Phase de vol:	En montée initiale (ICL)
Nature:	Transport de Passagers Nat.
Aéroport de départ:	New Orleans International Airport, LA (MSY/KMSY), Etats-Unis d'Amérique
Aéroport de destination:	Las Vegas-McCarran International Airport, NV (LAS/KLAS), Etats-Unis d'Amérique
Numéro de vol:	PA759

Détails:
Pan Am Flight 759 was a scheduled flight from Miami (MIA) to Las Vegas (LAS), with an en route stop at New Or1eans (MSY). At 15:58:48 Boeing 727 "Clipper Defiance" taxied from its gate at the New Orleans International Airport. Before leaving the gate, the flightcrew had received ATIS message Foxtrot which read in part "....time one eight five five Zulu, weather, two thousand five hundred scattered, two five thousand thin broken, visibility six miles in haze, temperature niner zero, wind two four zero at two, winds are calm altimeter three zero zero one..."
The flightcrew requested runway 10 for the takeoff and ground control cleared the flight to taxi to runway 10. At 15:59:03, the first officer requested a wind check. Winds were 040 degrees at 8 knots. At 16:02:34, while Flight 759 was taxiing to runway 10, the crew heard a transmission from ground control, advising another airplane of low level wind shear alerts in the northeast quadrants of the airport.
At 16:03:33, the first officer requested another wind check. Ground control replied, "Wind now zero seven zero degrees at one seven... peak gusts two three, and we have low level wind shear alerts all quadrants, appears to be a frontal passing overhead right now, we're right in the middle of everything." The captain then advised the first officer to "...let your airspeed build up on takeoff..." and said that they would turn off the air conditioning packs for the takeoff, which would enable them to increase the EPR's on engines Nos. 1 and 3 to 1.92.
The flightcrew completed the takeoff and departure briefings and turned onto the active runway for takeoff. At l6:06:22, Flight 759 informed the tower that it was ready for takeoff. The local rontroller cleared the flight for takeoff, and the first officer acknowledged the clearance.
About 16:07:57, the Boeing 727 began its takeoff. According to witnesses, the airplane lifted off about 7,000 feet down runway 10, climbed in a wings-level attitude, reached an altitude of about 100 feet to 150 feet above the ground (AGL), and then began to descend towards trees. The airplane crashed into a residential area and was destroyed during the impact, explosion, and subsequent ground fire. Eight persons on the ground were killed.

Probable Cause:

PROBABLE CAUSE: "The airplane's encounter during the lift-off and initial climb phase of flight with a micro-burst induced windshear which imposed a downdraft and a decreasing headwind, the effects of which the pilot would have had difficulty recognizing and reacting to in time for the airplane's descent to be arrested before its impact with trees. Contributing to the accident was the limited capability of current ground based low level windshear detection technology to provide definitive guidance for controllers and pilots for use in avoiding low level wind shear encounters."

Accident investigation:

Investigating agency:	NTSB
Status:	Investigation completed
Duration:	255 days (9 months)
Accident number:	NTSB/AAR-83-02
Download report:	Final report

Sources:

» NTSB-AAR-83/02

Opérations de secours

NTSB issued 20 Safety Recommendations

Issued: 13-JUL-1982	To: FAA	A-82-62
INITIATE A PROGRAM INVOLVING ALL U.S. OPERATORS USING UNITED CONTROL CORPORATION (SUNDSTRAND) V-557 COCKPIT VOICE RECORDERS TO RANDOMLY CHECK A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF THESE RECORDERS IN OPERATIONAL USE TO ASSURE THAT THEY ARE OPERATING WITHIN DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS. IF THIS INSPECTION REVEALS SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS WITH ACCEPTABILITY OF RECORDED DATA, REQUIRE THE NECESSARY CHANGES IN THE CARRIER\'S MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS TO ASSURE CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS OF THESE RECORDERS. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 13-JUL-1982	To: FAA	A-82-63
AFTER A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF NOT MORE THAN 2 YEARS, REQUIRE THE REMOVAL OF ALL UNITED CONTROL CORPORATION (SUNDSTRAND) V-557 COCKPIT VOICE RECORDERS AND INSTALLATION OF SUITABLE REPLACEMENTS. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 13-JUL-1982	To: FAA	A-82-64
Amend 14 CFR 121.343 so that, after a specified date, all turbojet aircraft manufactured before that date and type-certificated before September 30, 1969, be required to have installed a suitable digital recorder system capable of recording data from which the minimum following information may be determined as a function of time within the ranges, accuracies, and recording intervals specified in table I [see greensheet]--altitude, airspeed, heading, radio transmitter keying, pitch attitude, roll attitude, vertical acceleration, longitudinal acceleration, stabilizer trim position, engine thrust, and pitch control position. (Superseded by A-87-77 through -89) (Closed - Superseded)
Issued: 13-JUL-1982	To: FAA	A-82-65
At an early date and pending the effective date of the recommended amendment of 14 CFR 121.343 to require installation of digital flight data recorder systems capable of recording more extensive parameters, require that operators of all aircraft equipped with foil flight data recorders be required to replace the foil recorder with a compatible digital recorder. (Superseded by A-87-77 through -89) (Closed - Superseded)
Issued: 13-JUL-1982	To: FAA	A-82-66
Amend 14 CFR 121.343 so that, after a specified date, all aircraft manufactured after that date, regardless of the date of original type certificate, be equipped with one or more approved flight recorders that record data from which the information listed in table I [see greensheet] can be determined as a function of time. For newly type-certificated aircraft, any dedicated parameter which may be necessary because of unique features of the specific aircraft configuration and the type design should also be required. (Superseded by A-87-77 through -89) (Closed - Superseded)
Issued: 13-JUL-1982	To: FAA	A-82-67
Amend 14 CFR 127.subpart H, to require that all rotorcraft manufactured after a specified date, regardless of the date of original type certificate, be equipped with one or more approved flight recorders that record data from which the information listed in table II [see greensheet] can be determined as a function of time. For newly type certificated rotorcraft, any dedicated parameter which may be necessary because of unique features of the specific configuration and type design should also be required. (Superseded by A-87-77 through -89) (Closed - Superseded)
Issued: 25-MAR-1983	To: FAA	A-83-13
REVIEW ALL LOW LEVEL WIND SHEAR ALERT SYSTEM INSTALLATIONS TO IDENTIFY POSSIBLE DEFICIENCIES IN COVERAGE SIMILAR TO THE ONE RESULTING FROM THE INOPERABLE WEST SENSOR AT NEW ORLEANS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND CORRECT SUCH DEFICIENCIES WITHOUT DELAY. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
Issued: 25-MAR-1983	To: FAA	A-83-14
MAKE APPROPRIATE DISTRIBUTION TO THE AVIATION COMUNITY OF INFORMATION REGARDING (1) THE LOCATION AND DESIGNATION OF REMOTE SENSORS OF THE LOW LEVEL WIND SHEAR ALERT SYSTEM (LLWSAS) AT EQUIPPED AIRPORTS, (2) THE CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE LLWSAS, AND (3) THE AVAILABILITY OF CURRENT LLWSAS REMOTE SENSOR INFORMATION IF REQUESTED FROM TOWER CONTROLLERS. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 25-MAR-1983	To: FAA	A-83-15
RECORD OUTPUT DATA FROM ALL INSTALLED LOW LEVEL WIND SHEAR ALERT SYSTEM SENSORS AND RETAIN SUCH DATA FOR AN APPROPRIATE PERIOD FOR USE IN RECONSTRUCTING PERTINENT WIND SHEAR EVENTS AND AS A BASIS FOR STUDIES TO EFFECT SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 25-MAR-1983	To: FAA	A-83-16
EMPHASIZE TO PILOTS ON A CONTINUING BASIS THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING PROMPT REPORTS OF WIND SHEAR IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRESCRIBED REPORTING GUIDELINES, AND ASSURE THAT AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL PERSONNEL TRANSMIT SUCH REPORTS TO PILOTS PROMPTLY. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 25-MAR-1983	To: FAA	A-83-17
REQUIRE THAT AUTOMATIC TERMINAL INFORMATION SERVICE ADVISORIES BE AMENDED PROMPTLY TO PROVIDE CURRENT WIND SHEAR INFORMATION AND OTHER INFORMATION PERTINENT TO HAZARDOUS METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS IN THE TERMINAL AREA AS PROVIDED BY CENTER WEATHER SERVICE UNIT METEOROLOGISTS, AND THAT ALL AIRCRAFT OPERATING IN THE TERMINAL AREA BE ADVISED BY BLIND BROADCAST WHEN A NEW AUTOMATIC TERMINAL INFORMATION SERVICE ADVISORY HAS BEEN ISSUED. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 25-MAR-1983	To: FAA	A-83-18
EVALUATE METHODS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE USE OF CURRENT WEATHER INFORMATION FROM SOURCES SUCH AS RADAR, LOW LEVEL WIND SHEAR ALERT SYSTEMS, AND PILOT REPORTS AS CRITERIA FOR DELAYING APPROACH AND DEPARTURE OPERATIONS WHICH WOULD EXPOSE THE FLIGHT TO LOW ALTITUDE PENETRATION OF SEVERE CONVECTIVE WEATHER. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
Issued: 25-MAR-1983	To: FAA	A-83-19
STUDY THE FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AIRCRAFT OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS BASED ON THE DATA AVAILABLE FROM THE LOW LEVEL WIND SHEAR ALERT SYSTEM. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 25-MAR-1983	To: FAA	A-83-20
MAKE THE NECESSARY CHANGES TO DISPLAY LOW LEVEL WIND SHEAR ALERT SYSTEM WIND OUTPUT DATA AS LONGITUDINAL AND LATERAL COMPONENTS TO THE RUNWAY CENTERLINE. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 25-MAR-1983	To: FAA	A-83-21
USE THE DATA OBTAINED FROM THE JOINT AIRPORT WEATHER STUDIES (JAWS) PROJECT AND OTHER RELEVANT DATA AS A BASIS TO (1) QUANTIFY THE LOW-LEVEL WIND SHEAR HAZARD IN TERMS OF EFFECT ON AIRPLANE PERFORMANCE, (2) EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LOW LEVEL WIND SHEAR ALERT SYSTEM AND IMPROVEMENTS WHICH ARE NEEDED TO ENHANCE PERFORMANCE AS A WIND SHEAR DETECTION AND WARNING SYSTEM, AND (3) EVALUATE THE AERODYNAMIC PENALTIES OF PRECIPITATION ON AIRPLANE PERFORMANCE. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 25-MAR-1983	To: FAA	A-83-22
AS THE DATA OBTAINED FROM THE JOINT AIRPORT WEATHER STUDIES (JAWS) PROJECT BECOME AVAILABLE (1) DEVELOP TRAINING AIDS FOR PILOTS AND CONTROLLERS TO EMPHASIZE THE HAZARDS TO FLIGHT FROM CONVECTIVE WEATHER ACTIVITY, (2) DEVELOLP REALISTIC MICROBURST WIND MODELS FOR INCORPORATION INTO PILOT FLIGHT SIMULATOR TRAINING PROGRAMS, AND (3) PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIRBORNE WIND SHEAR DETECTION DEVICES. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 25-MAR-1983	To: FAA	A-83-23
EXPEDITE THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, AND INSTALLATION OF ADVANCED DOPPLER WEATHER RADAR TO DETECT HAZARDOUS WIND SHEARS IN AIRPORT TERMINAL AREAS AND EXPEDITE THE INSTALLATION OF MORE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT SUCH AS ADD-ON DOPPLER TO PROVIDE FOR DETECTION AND QUANTIFICATION OF WIND SHEAR IN HIGH RISK AIRPORT TERMINAL AREAS. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 25-MAR-1983	To: FAA	A-83-24
ENCOURAGE INDUSTRY TO EXPEDITE THE DEVELOPMENT OF FLIGHT DIRECTOR SYSTEMS SUCH AS MFD-DELTA-A AND HEAD-UP TYPE DISPLAYS WHICH PROVIDE ENHANCED PITCH GUIDANCE LOGIC WHICH RESPONDS TO INERTIAL SPEED/AIRSPEED CHANGES AND GROUND PROXIMITY AND ENCOURAGE OPERATORS TO INSTALL THESE SYSTEMS. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 25-MAR-1983	To: FAA	A-83-25
RECOMMEND TO AIR CARRIERS THAT THEY MODIFY PILOT TRAINING ON SIMULATORS CAPABLE OF REPRODUCING WIND SHEAR MODELS SO AS TO INCLUDE MICROBURST PENETRATION DEMONSTRATIONS DURING TAKEOFF, APPROACH, AND OTHER CRITICAL PHASES OF FLIGHT. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 25-MAR-1983	To: FAA	A-83-26
ADVISE AIR CARRIERS TO INCREASE THE EMPHASIS IN THEIR TRAINING PROGRAMS ON THE EFFECTIVE USE OF ALL AVAILABLE SOURCES OF WEATHER INFORMATION, SUCH AS PREFLIGHT METEOROLOGICAL BRIEFINGS, ATIS BROADCASTS, CONTROLLER-PROVIDED INFORMATION, PIREPS, AIRBORNE WEATHER RADAR, AND VISUAL OBSERVATIONS, AND PROVIDE ADDED GUIDANCE TO PILOTS REGARDING OPERATIONAL (I.E., "GO/NO GO") DECISIONS INVOLVING TAKEOFF AND LANDING OPERATIONS WHICH COULD EXPOSE A FLIGHT TO WEATHER CONDITIONS WHICH COULD BE HAZARDOUS. (Closed - Acceptable Action)

Show all...

Photos

accident date: 09-07-1982
type: Boeing 727-235
registration: N4737

Plan

Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre New Orleans International Airport, LA et Las Vegas-McCarran International Airport, NV est de 2394 km (1496 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.

Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.

languages:

Boeing 727

1832 built
38^ème loss
32^ème accident fatal
le accident 3^ème le plus grave (à ce moment là)
le accident 5^ème le plus grave (en ce moment)

» safety profile

Etats-Unis d'Amérique

le accident 2^ème le plus grave (à ce moment là)
le accident 8^ème le plus grave (en ce moment)

» safety profile

The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:

Quick Links:

ASN Home	Send Correction / Feedback
FSF Home	Disclaimer
Copyright
Contact Us	Privacy Policy
Press / Media

CONNECT WITH US: FSF on social media

1920 Ballenger Av, 4th Fl.
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
www.FlightSafety.org