Issued: -- | To: | ZS-SAS (1) |
The Combi type of configuration, with passengers and cargo on the same deck and provision for fire fighting on the cargo deck based on, inter alia, crew access to the seat of the fire and hand fire extinguishers to fight the fire, should be prohibited as creating an unacceptable risk to life and property, at least until such time as adequate provision is made to overcome the present shortcomings in fire detection, fire fightingequipment and fire fighting procedures. |
Issued: -- | To: | ZS-SAS (2) |
For as long as Combi operations are permitted, effective fire detection and fire fighting systems, as laid down in the FAA AD No 89-18-12 R1 of August 10th 1989, should be strictly enforced. The recommendations are designed to eliminate any risk to life and property emanating from a main deck cargo fire, whatever the source, whereas the purpose of the FAA AD, though a step in the same direction, is, as stated therein, "To minimize the hazard associated with a main deck Class B cargo compartment fire...". |
Issued: -- | To: | ZS-SAS (3) |
Since it has by no means been established that the aircraft was carrying dangerous goods, it is not for the Board to comment on the various ICAO and lATA documents on the subject. See for example Annex 18, ICAO Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air - Doc. 9284 - AN/905; ICAO Dangerous Goods Training Programmes - Doc. 9375 - AN/913 Books 1 - 6; and lATA Dangerous Goods Regulations; and see also RSA Regulations for the Carriage in Aircraft of Dangerous Goods, 1986. Nevertheless, in the Board\'s view continuing vigilance and research are required to eliminate all possible sources of packaging and car go ignition, whether from dangerous goods or otherwise.
Moreover, if Combi operations are to be permitted to continue, consideration should be given to revising the categories of dangerous goods to distinguish between those made up into pallets and those loaded in approved flame penetration-resistant containers. |
Issued: -- | To: | ZS-SAS (4) |
Cockpit Voice Recorders
(a) should retain flight deck communications and sounds for the last hour, and not be limited to 30 minutes only;
(b) should be fitted with a "hot micn system, i.e. a system in which the microphones are connected to a recorder in a manner that ensures the recording of all cockpit sounds within the range of the microphones regardless of audio control panel selections;
(c) should be equipped with additional area microphones at the flight engineer\'s and supernumerary crew\'s station. |
Issued: -- | To: | ZS-SAS (5) |
At least one pilot and the flight engineer should at all times use head-sets and boom microphones. |
Issued: -- | To: | ZS-SAS (6) |
Both CVRs and DFDRs
(a) should be fire-protected in the aircraft, as should the wiring to the units;
(b) should where practicable have a back-up system of battery power in the event of fallure of the primary power source;
(c) should be fitted with a pinger system in which a first pinger operates for 30 days and a second 30-day pinger only commences operating after the first pinger ceases to function; |
Issued: -- | To: | ZS-SAS (7) |
The Boeing 747 emergency check lists for "Upper and Main Deck Smoke Evacuation - Mixed Passengers and Cargo" and for "Main Deck Cargo Fire/Smoke - Mixed Passengers and Cargo" respectively require to be integrated. No provision appears to be made for the situation in which there is an uncontrolled fire in the main deck cargo hold and a smoke problem in the passenger cabin and/or cockpit.
The matter to be cleared up is whether the crew should follow the smoke evacuation check list if the fire is
still burning. |
Issued: -- | To: | ZS-SAS (8) |
Means should be established by ICAO by which assistance in respect of underwater location searches for DFDRs and CVRs can be accelerated. The existence of standard procedures and agreements in respect of necessary actions and the funding thereof could be of great benefit and should be encouraged. |
Issued: 16-MAY-1988 | To: FAA | A-88-61 |
UNTIL FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS FOR CLASS B CARGO COMPARTMENT FIRES ARE EVALUATED AND REVISED, AS NECESSARY, REQUIRE THAT ALL CARGO CARRIED IN CLASS B CARGO COMPARTMENTS OF UNITED STATES REGISTERED TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES BE CARRIED IN FIRE RESISTANT CONTAINERS. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
Issued: 16-MAY-1988 | To: FAA | A-88-62 |
CONDUCT RESEARCH TO ESTABLISH THE FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS NEEDED TO PROTECT TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES FROM CATASTROPHIC FIRES IN CLASS B COMPARTMENTS. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 16-MAY-1988 | To: FAA | A-88-63 |
ESTABLISH FIRE RESISTANT REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CEILING AND SIDEWALL LINERS IN CLASS B CARGO COMPARTMENTS OF TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES THAT EQUAL OR EXCEED THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS C AND D COMPARTMENTS AS SET FORTH IN 14 CFR PART 25, APPENDIX F, PART III. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 25-SEP-1989 | To: B707, 727, 737, 747, 757, DC-8, DC-9, DC-10 | AD 89-18-12 |
Directive for aircraft with a main deck Class B cargo compartment with regards to fire extinguishing systems, breathing equipment and the presence on board of an individual capable of fighting cargo fires. (Superseded) |
Issued: 25-SEP-1989 | To: | AD 89-18-12 R1 |
Revised directive for aircraft with a main deck Class B cargo compartment with regards to fire extinguishing systems, breathing equipment and the presence on board of an individual capable of fighting cargo fires. (Superseded) |