Statuts: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | vendredi 19 février 1988 |
Heure: | 21:27 |
Type/Sous-type: |  Fairchild SA227-AC Metro III |
Operated by: | AVAir |
On behalf of: | American Eagle |
Immatriculation: | N622AV |
Numéro de série: | AC-622 |
Année de Fabrication: | 1985 |
Heures de vol: | 4222 |
Moteurs: | 2 Garrett TPE331-11U-611G |
Equipage: | victimes: 2 / Ã bord: 2 |
Passagers: | victimes: 10 / Ã bord: 10 |
Total: | victimes: 12 / Ã bord: 12 |
Dégats de l'appareil: | Détruit |
Conséquences: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Lieu de l'accident: | 1,5 km (0.9 milles) W of Raleigh/Durham Airport, NC (RDU) ( Etats-Unis d'Amérique)
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Phase de vol: | En montée initiale (ICL) |
Nature: | Transport de Passagers Nat. |
Aéroport de départ: | Raleigh/Durham Airport, NC (RDU/KRDU), Etats-Unis d'Amérique |
Aéroport de destination: | Richmond International Airport (Byrd Field), VA (RIC/KRIC), Etats-Unis d'Amérique |
Numéro de vol: | AA3378 |
Détails:American Eagle flight 3378, operated by AVAir, crashed shortly after it departed runway 23R at Raleigh Durham International Airport (RDU), North Carolina, USA. The airplane Fairchild Metro III struck water within 100 feet of the shoreline of a reservoir, about 5100 feet west of the midpoint of runway 23R. The airplane was destroyed and all 12 persons on board were killed.
Probable Cause:
On December 13, 1988, the Safety Board determined the probable cause of the accident as follows: "The failure of the flight crew to maintain a proper flight path because of the first officer's inappropriate instrument scan, the captain's inadequate monitoring of the flight, and the flight crew's response to a perceived fault in the airplane's stall avoidance system (SAS). Contributing to the accident was the lack of company response to documented indications of difficulties in the first officer's piloting, and inadequate Federal Aviation Administration surveillance of AVAir."
Then-Board Members John K . Lauber and Joseph T. Nall provided concurring and dissenting statements in which they proposed that the probable cause should read as follows: "The failure of the flightcrew to maintain a proper flightpath in response to an actual or perceived fault in the airplane's stall avoidance system. Contributing to the accident were ineffective management and supervision of flightcrew training and flight operations, and ineffective FAA surveillance of AVAir."
On January 28, 1993, the Air Line Pilots Association's (ALPA) filed a petition for reconsideration and modification of the findings and probable cause. The NTSB granted the petition in part. The probable cause and was modified to read as follows:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was a failure of the flight crew to maintain a proper flightpath. Contributing to the accident were the ineffective management and supervision of flight crew training and flight operations, and ineffective FAA surveillance of AVAir."
Accident investigation:

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Investigating agency: | NTSB  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 298 days (10 months) | Accident number: | NTSB/AAR-88-10 | Download report: | Final report
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Sources:
» ICAO Adrep Summary 6/89 (#22)
» NTSB/AAR-88/10
» NTSB Response to Petition for Reconsideration
Opérations de secours
NTSB issued 5 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 28-DEC-1988 | To: FAA | A-88-153 |
REVIEW THE APPROVED FLIGHT MANUAL OF THE FAIRCHILD METRO AIRPLANE WITH REGARD TO FLIGHTCREW RESPONSE TO AN ILLUMINATED STALL AVOIDANCE SYSTEM FAULT, AND REVISE IT, AS APPROPRIATE, TO REFLECT ITS CAUTIONARY NATURE. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
Issued: 28-DEC-1988 | To: FAA | A-88-154 |
CONDUCT A SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS REVIEW OF THE METRO III AIRPLANE, AND DETERMINE THE NECESSITY OF THE STALL AVOIDANCE SYSTEM STICK PUSHER. IF THE TESTS FAIL TO DEMONSTRATE THE NEED FOR THE STICK PUSHER, THEN THE STICK PUSHER SHOULD BE PERMANENTLY DISENGAGED ON ALL METRO III AIRPLANES. (Closed - Reconsidered) |
Issued: 28-DEC-1988 | To: FAA | A-88-155 |
PROVIDE PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTORS OF OPERATORS UNDER 14 CFR PARTS 135 AND 121 WITH SIMILAR INDICATORS OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND RAPID GROWTH WHICH SUGGEST WHEN INCREASED SURVEILLANCE OF THOSE OPERATORS IS WARRANTED. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 14-APR-1989 | To: FAA | A-89-16 |
CONVENE A GOVERNMENT/INDUSTRY GROUP TO EXAMINE ISSUES RELATED TO AIR CARRIER OPERATOR SICK LEAVE POLICIES FOR PILOTS AND TO MAKE APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS ON SUCH SICK LEAVE POLICIES THAT THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION CAN INCORPORATE INTO AN ADVISORY CIRCULAR FOR AIR CARRIER OPERATORS\' GUIDANCE AND USE. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
Issued: 14-APR-1989 | To: FAA | A-89-17 |
AMEND 14 CFR PARTS 121 AND 135 TO PRECLUDE AIR CARRIER OPERATORS FROM USING A PILOT AS A REQUIRED PILOT FLIGHT CREWMEMBER WHILE THE PILOT HAS A KNOWN MEDICAL DEFICIENCY, OR INCREASE IN A KNOWN MEDICAL DEFICIENCY, THAT WOULD MAKE THE PILOT UNABLE TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF HIS OR HER MEDICAL CERTIFICATE. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
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Photos
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Raleigh/Durham Airport, NC et Richmond International Airport (Byrd Field), VA est de 222 km (139 miles).
Accident location: Approximate; accuracy within a few kilometers.
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.