ASN Aircraft accident McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30 N136AA Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, TX (DFW)

Home » Database » 1988

Status:	Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Date:	Saturday 21 May 1988
Time:	16:12
Type:	McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30
Operator:	American Airlines
Registration:	N136AA
MSN:	47846/69
First flight:	1973
Total airframe hrs:	61322
Cycles:	12864
Engines:	3 General Electric CF6-50C2
Crew:	Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 14
Passengers:	Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 240
Total:	Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 254
Aircraft damage:	Substantial
Aircraft fate:	Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Location:	Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, TX (DFW) ( United States of America)
Phase:	Takeoff (TOF)
Nature:	International Scheduled Passenger
Departure airport:	Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, TX (DFW/KDFW), United States of America
Destination airport:	Frankfurt International Airport (FRA/EDDF), Germany
Flightnumber:	AA70

Narrative:
The crew of American Flight 70 rejected the takeoff when the slat disagree light illuminated and the takeoff warning horn sounded at 166 knots (V1), but the aircraft accelerated to 178 knots ground speed before it began to decelerate. The deceleration was normal until 130 knots where an unexpected rapid decay in the deceleration occurred. The aircraft ran off the end of the runway at 95 knots, the nose gear collapsed, and the aircraft came to a stop 1,100 feet beyond the end of the runway. Eight of the ten brake sets failed. Post-accident examination of the brakes revealed that excessive brake wear occurred during the rejected takeoff. Testing showed that DC-10 worn brakes have a much greater wear rate during a rejected takeoff. The FAA did not require worn brake testing. Douglas did not use brake wear data from rto certification tests to set more conservative brake wear replacement limits. New brakes were used for those tests.

Probable Cause:

PROBABLE CAUSE:
landing gear, normal brake system .. inadequate
acft/equip,inadequate aircraft component .. manufacturer
inadequate substantiation process .. manufacturer
inadequate certification/approval, aircraft .. FAA (organization)
landing gear, normal brake system .. failure, total
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
flt control syst,wing slat system .. false indication

Classification:

Rejected takeoff
Runway excursion

Sources:

» Aviation Week & Space Technology 5.3.90 (78)
» ICAO Adrep Summary 4/90 (#26)
» NTSB/SIR-90/02 (5)

Follow-up / safety actions

NTSB issued 21 Safety Recommendations

Issued: 11-JUL-1988	To: FAA	A-88-73
Require the McDonnell Douglas aircraft corporation to immediately redefine the "maximum brake wear" limits for the dc-10-30 and -40 airplanes to ensure that the brake kinetic energy capacity ratings for wheel brake assemblies that are at the allowable "maximum brake wear" limit are not less than the kinetic energy absorption requirements that result from the critical combination of weight, true airspeed, altitude, temperature, runway slope and tail wind component for which the airplane is certified. (Superseded by A-90-26) (Closed - Acceptable Action/Superseded)
Issued: 11-JUL-1988	To: FAA	A-88-74
ISSUE A TELEGRAPHIC AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE FOR DC 10-30 AND -40 AIRPLANES TO REQUIRE THAT OPERATORS COMPLY WITH REDEFINED BRAKE WEAR LIMITS. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
Issued: 11-JUL-1988	To: FAA	A-88-75
REVISE 14 CFR 25.735(F) TO REQUIRE THAT THE BRAKE KINETIC ENERGY CAPACITY RATINGS FOR WHEEL BRAKE ASSEMBLIES THAT ARE AT THE ALLOWABLE "MAXIMUM BRAKE WEAR" LIMIT MAY NOT BE LESS THAN THE KINETIC ENERGY ABSORPTION REQUIREMENTS THAT RESULT FROM THE CRITICAL COMBINATION OF WEIGHT, TRUE AIRSPEED, ALTITUDE, TEMPERATURE, RUNWAY SLOPE AND TAIL WIND COMPONENT FOR WHICH THE AIRPLANE IS CERTIFIED. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 11-JUL-1988	To: FAA	A-88-76
Verify, by conducting tests and data analysis as necessary, that all turbojet transport category airplanes meet the requirement of 14 CFR 25.735(f) for wheel brake assemblies at the "maximum brake wear" limits. (Superseded by A-90-30) (Closed - Superseded)
Issued: 11-JUL-1988	To: FAA	A-88-77
REQUIRE THAT MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION REDESIGN THE FLAP/SLAT DISAGREE LOGIC OF THE DC-10 AIRPLANE (ALL MODELS) TAKEOFF WARNING SYSTEM AS NECESSARY TO ELIMINATE THE PROBABILITY OF A NUISANCE WARNING. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 15-MAR-1990	To: FAA	A-90-12
REQUIRE THAT MCDONNEL DOUGLAS CORPORATION REDESIGN THE FLAP/SLAT DISAGREE LOGIC OF THE DC-10 AIRPLANE (ALL MODELS) TAKEOFF WARNING SYSTEM AS NECESSARY TO REDUCE THE PROBABILITY OF A NUISANCE WARNING. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 15-MAR-1990	To: FAA	A-90-13
REVIEW AND REVISE, AS NECESSARY, TAKEOFF WARNING SYSTEM DESIGNS AND DESIGN GUIDELINES TO REDUCE THE POTENTIAL FOR NUISANCE AND NONCRITICAL ALARMS AT HIGH SPEEDS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF UNNECESSARY HIGH SPEED REJECTED TAKEOFFS OF TURBOJET TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 15-MAR-1990	To: FAA	A-90-14
ESTABLISH REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, A REPORTING SYSTEM, AND A DATA BASE ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCESSFUL HIGH ENERGY REJECTED TAKEOFFS OF TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES. (Closed - Reconsidered)
Issued: 15-MAR-1990	To: FAA	A-90-15
CONFIRM THAT THE DC-10 AIRPLANE IS FLYABLE DURING A TAKEOFF WITH ASYMMETRIC OUTBOARD LEADING EDGE SLATS; IF VALID, REQUIRE AIR CARRIER OPERATORS TO IMPLEMENT A TRAINING PROGRAM FOR ALL DC-10 PILOTS THAT EMPHASIZES THAT THE DC-10 AIRPLANE IS FLYABLE WITH ASYMMETRIC OUTBOARD LEADING EDGE SLATS. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 21-MAR-1990	To: FAA	A-90-25
REQUIRE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS TO DEMONSTRATE WITH SUFFICIENT ADDITIONAL TESTS, INCLUDING RUNWAY TESTS IF NECESSARY, THE SAFETY OF THE STEEL-ON-STEEL CONDITION THAT DEVELOPS WHEN THE DC-10-30/40 BRAKE FRICTION MATERIAL IS DEPLETED DURING A MAXIMUM KINETIC ENERGY REJECTED TAKEOFF (RTO) WITH BRAKES AT THE WEAR REPLACEMENT LIMIT BEFORE THE START OF THE RTO. FOR THE DEMONSTRATION, SIMULATE RUNWAY ROUGHNESS AND DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE AIRPLANE, LANDING GEARS, TIRES AND BRAKES. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
Issued: 21-MAR-1990	To: FAA	A-90-26
ISSUE AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE TO REDUCE THE DC-10 30/40 MAXIMUM KINETIC ENERGY TAKEOFF LIMIT TO A LIMIT THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH BRAKE ENERGY CAPACITY DEMONSTRATED FOR BRAKES WORN TO THE REPLACEMENT LIMITS WITHOUT CREDIT FOR REVERSE THRUST. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
Issued: 21-MAR-1990	To: FAA	A-90-27
REQUIRE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS TO CONDUCT TESTS AND ANALYSES TO DETERMINE THE INCREASE IN THE STOPPING DISTANCE ATTRIBUTED TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE USE OF NEW BRAKES AND THE USE OF BRAKES WORN TO THE REPLACEMENT LIMITS FOR DC 10-30/40 AIRPLANES WITHOUT CREDIT FOR THE USE OF REVERSE THRUST. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 21-MAR-1990	To: FAA	A-90-28
REQUIRE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS TO DETERMINE BY TESTS, SIMULATION, AND/OR ANALYSES THE ACCELERATE-STOP DISTANCES FOR THE DC-10-30/40 AIRPLANE AS REQUIRED BY 14 CFR 25.109 (PRE-AMENDMENT 42) USING DEMONSTRATED CERTIFICATION STOPPING PERFORMANCE DATA FROM WORN BRAKES AND CURRENT PROCEDURES PRESCRIBED FOR REJECTED TAKEOFFS. ACCOUNT FOR DEMONSTRATED PILOT REACTION TIMES AND FOR DECELERATION DEVICE REACTION TIMES, SUCH AS ENGINE SP00L-DOWN TIME AND BRAKE FORCE RAMP UP TIME, IN THE DETERMINATION OF ACCELERATE-STOP DISTANCES AND ADD A DISTANCE SAFETY MARGIN FOR IN-SERVICE VARIATIONS AS DESCRIBED IN ADVISORY CIRCULAR 25-7 (CHAPTER 2, PARAGRAPHS 11.C.12.IV AND VII) TO BE EQUIVALENT AT LEAST TO A DISTANCE TRAVELED IN 2 SECONDS AT AN APPROPRIATE BRAKE-ON SPEED OR V1 SPEED. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 21-MAR-1990	To: FAA	A-90-29
REQUIRE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS TO REVISE, AS APPROPRIATE, THE ACCELERATE-STOP DISTANCES IN THE DC-10-30/40 FAA APPROVED AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL TO INCLUDE THE INCREASE IN STOPPING DISTANCE ATTRIBUTED TO WORN BRAKES (DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-90-27) AND TO INCLUDE THE PROPER APPLICATION OF SAFETY MARGINS FOR IN-SERVICE VARIATIONS (DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-90-028). (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 21-MAR-1990	To: FAA	A-90-30
REQUIRE THE APPROPRIATE AIRPLANE AND BRAKE MANUFACTURERS TO VERIFTY, BY CONDUCTING TESTS AND ANALYSES, THAT ALL TURBOJET TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES MEET THE MAXIMUM ENERGY REQUIREMENT OF 14 CFR 25.735 (F) FOR WHEEL BRAKE ASSEMBLIES AT THE "MAXIMUM BRAKE WEAR" LIMITS; IF THE REQUIREMENT IS NOT MET, REDUCE THE MAXIMUM KINETIC ENERGY TAKEOFF LIMIT. IN CONDUCTING THIS VERIFICATION, USE DYNAMOMETER BRAKE TEST CURVES FOR DEMONSTRATING ENERGY CAPACITY THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH RUNWAY-DEMONSTRATED BRAKING FORCES DURING A MAXIMUM KINETIC ENERGY REJECTED TAKEOFF. THE TEST CURVES SHOULD REPLICATE THE BRAKE\'S HIGH ENERGY ABSORPTION RATE THAT OCCURS AT THE INITIATION OF A MAXIMUM KINETIC ENERGY REJECTED TAKEOFF. NOTE (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
Issued: 21-MAR-1990	To: FAA	A-90-31
REQUIRE AIRPLANE MANUFACTURERS TO CONDUCT TESTS AND ANALYSES TO DETERMINE THE INCREASE IN THE STOPPING DISTANCE FOR ALL TURBOJET TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES CURRENTLY IN SERVICE ATTRIBUTED TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE USE OF NEW BRAKES AND THE USE OF BRAKES WORN TO REPLACEMENT LIMITS WITHOUT CREDIT FOR THE USE OF REVERSE THRUST. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 21-MAR-1990	To: FAA	A-90-32
REQUIRE THE APPROPRIATE AIRPLANE MANUFACTURERS TO DETERMINE BY TESTS, SIMULATION, AND/OR ANALYSES THE ACCELERATE-STOP DISTANCES FOR ALL TURBOJET TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES CURRENTLY IN SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY 14 CFR 25.109 (PRE-ADMENDMENT 42) USING DEMONSRATED CERTIFICATION STOPPING PERFORMANCE DATA FROM WORN BRAKES AND CURRENT PROCEDURES PRESCRIBED FOR REJECTED TAKEOFFS. ACCOUNT FOR DEMONSTRATED PILOT REACTION TIMES AND FOR DECELERATION DEVICE REACTION TIMES, SUACH AS ENGINE SPOOL-DOWN TIME AND BRAKE FORCE RAMP-UP TIME IN THE DETERMINATION OF ACCELERATE STOP DISTANCES AND ADD A DISTANCE SAFETY MARGIN FOR IN SERVICE VARIATIONS AS DESCRIBED IN ADVISORY CIRCULAR 25-7 (CHAPTER 2, PARAGRAPHS 11.C.12.IV AND VII) TO BE EQUIVALENT TO AT LEAST A DISTANCE TRAVELED IN 2 SECONDS AT AN APPROPRIATE BRAKE-ON SPEED OR V1 SPEED. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 21-MAR-1990	To: FAA	A-90-33
REVISE, AS APPROPRIATE, THE ACCELERATE-STOP DATA IN THE APPROVED FLIGHT MANUALS OF ALL TURBOJET TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES CURRENTLY IN SERVICE TO INCLUDE THE INCREASE IN STOPPING DISTANCE ATTRIBUTED TO WORN BRAKES (DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-90-031) AND TO INCLUDE THE PROPER APPLICATION OF SAFETY MARGINS FOR IN-SERVICE VARIATIONS (DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAFETY RECOMMENDATION (A-90-032). (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 21-MAR-1990	To: FAA	A-90-34
REQUIRE THAT THE OPERATORS OF LARGE TURBOJET TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES ADD THE DISTANCE REQUIRED FOR RUNWAY TURN-ON AND TAKEOFF ALIGNMENT TO THE FIELD LENGTH DISTANCES AS DETERMINED FROM DATA IN THE APPROVED FLIGHT MANUALS. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 21-MAR-1990	To: FAA	A-90-35
REVISE 14 CFR 25.109 TO REQUIRE THAT THE STOPPING DISTANCE CAPABILITIES OF BRAKE ASSEMBLIES AT THE ALLOWABLE "MAXIMUM BRAKE WEAR" LIMIT ARE INCLUDED IN THE REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINING THE ACCELERATE-STOP DISTANCES FOR CERTIFICATION OF NEW AIRPLANES WITHOUT CREDIT FOR THE USE OF REVERSE THRUST. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 21-MAR-1990	To: FAA	A-90-36
REVISE CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR NEW AIRPLANES TO REQUIRE (Closed - Acceptable Action)

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Photos

accident date: 21-05-1988
type: McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30
registration: N136AA

Map

This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, TX to Frankfurt International Airport as the crow flies is 8203 km (5127 miles).

This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.

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DC-10

446 built
16^th loss

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