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Last updated: 12 May 2021
Datum:Mittwoch 2 August 1989
Flugzeugtyp:Silhouette image of generic B462 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
British Aerospace BAe-146-200A
Fluggesellschaft:Atlantic Airways
Kennzeichen: OY-CRG
Werknummer: E2075
Baujahr: 1987-06-23 (2 years 1 months)
Triebwerk: 4 Lycoming ALF502R-5
Besatzung:Todesopfer: 0 / Insassen: 6
Fluggäste:Todesopfer: 0 / Insassen: 46
Gesamt:Todesopfer: 0 / Insassen: 52
Sachschaden: schwer beschädigt
Konsequenzen: Repaired
Unfallort:Faroe Islands-Vagar Airport (FA) (   Dänemark)
Flugphase: Landung (LDG)
Betriebsart:Inländischer planmäßiger Passagierflug
Flug von:Bergen-Flesland Airport (BGO/ENBR), Norwegen
Flug nach:Faroe Islands-Vagar Airport (FAE/EKVG), Dänemark
Atlantic Airways flight 453 departed Copenhagen Airport, Denmark, at 11:37 hours on a scheduled domestic passenger flight to Vagar Airport, the Faroe Islands. Approaching Vagar at approximately 14:45 hours the weather conditions were below minima (300 ft / 2 kilometres) and flight 453 had to divert to Bergen Airport, Norway, where it arrived at 15:22 hours.
Weather improved slightly but enough to be above minima. Flight 453 then departed Bergen at 17:02 hours.
At 17:46 hours the co-pilot radioed to Vagar, that they were estimating "NL" (NDB) in about 30 minutes. As they received information about the visibility being 3000 metres in rain and the ceiling being 700 ft, they replied that they would report again on final approach. At 18:05 hours the co-pilot reported that they were established inbound (runway 31) and were leaving 7000 ft on an LLZ/DME approach runway 31. Visibility and ceiling were then given as 2500 metres and 300 ft. The runway was reported clear and wet with standing water percentage 25. The wind was 240°/5 kt.
The captain has stated that a missed approach was carried out, as the aircraft's position in relation to the runway was not ideal for a landing. However the AFIS-operator's stated the missed approach was carried out due to visibility being below minima.
As the AFIS-operator at 18:17 hours informed the crew about the visibility to the east being exactly 2 kilometres, unable to see the cloud base, and visibility to the west being 3 kilometres, cloud base 400 ft, wind 05 knots, it was decided to make an approach to runway 13. The co-pilot radioed to the AFIS-operator, that they were able to take a 10 knots tailwind and was then told, that the wind at threshold 13 was 230°/11 kts and that threshold 31 was the same.
At 18:23 hours the co-pilot reported "MY " (NDB) inbound runway 13. A LLZ/DME approach was carried out with V REF being 119 knots. At 1.2 NM DME, or just before the minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 680 ft, the crew obtained visual contact with the runway lights and the approach was continued with reference to the lights and to the PAPI. During the final approach phase, the captain had his doubt about a possible overshoot of the marked touchdown zone; however, there was no doubt in his mind that the landing would be successful.
Air brakes were deployed between 100 ft and 50 ft above the runway. After threshold-passage the captain was, due to the heavy rain, so occupied by aiming at the proper touchdown point, that he did not notice the airspeed. The touchdown was according to the two pilots statements within the prescribed touchdown zone. Neither of the two pilots recall the touchdown speed.
Further to the captain's statement braking action was felt normal in the beginning of the landing run, but about 2/3 down the runway the speed remained unchanged although both pilots applied full pressure on the brakes. Coming close to the runway end, the captain realized that an overrun was inevitable and turned the aircraft to the right on to the high speed turn-off area .
The deceleration of the aircraft was not as expected and the captain turned the aircraft further to the right into rising terrain. Although there was no instructions or procedures for the use of the high speed turn-off area, the captain had expected that the wheels of the aircraft would have penetrated the surface as the brakes were fully depressed.
The passengers, who disembarked the aircraft within about 30 seconds, sustained no injuries. The aircraft was substantially damaged.

Probable Cause:

The investigation identified the following causal factors:
1. The approach to runway 13, which was never stabilized, was carried out with an excessive high indicated airspeed and without compliance with the mandatory call outs stated in the FOM.
2. The aircraft touched down on the wet runway with an indicated airspeed of 121.68 knots (15 knots above the touchdown speed estimated by the aircraft manufacturer, for the given mass) and between 430 and 450 metres from the beginning of the threshold.
3. The long touchdown distance was probably a result of two factors. One was the unstabilized approach, the other was the co-pilots overruling of the captains decision to arrest the approach and perform a go-around.

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: AIBN
Status: Investigation completed
Accident number: AAIB/DENM 4/94
Download report: Final report



This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Bergen-Flesland Airport to Faroe Islands-Vagar Airport as the crow flies is 692 km (432 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.

This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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