Narrative:At 06:50 Flight 1943 departed Washington for a flight to Houston. At 08:45, while descending through FL190, the first officer called for the in-range checklist. The captain referred to each of the seven items on the in-range checklist, in the correct order, except for the fourth item, "Hydraulics". The descent was continued and the flight crew were vectored for a runway 27 approach. At 0900:13, after crossing the outer marker, the first officer called for the flaps to be extended to 15deg. The first officer noted that the flaps had no extended.
At 0900:38, the first officer called "gear down," and 2 seconds later, the CVR recorded the sound of a thump. At 0900:41, the first officer called for the landing checklist and the flaps to be extended to 25deg .The gear warning horn began to sound, but the captain thought it sounded because he put the flaps to 25deg before the gear was down and locked. Approaching runway 27 at a relatively high speed, the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) sounded. At 0901:20, the captain took over control. The transfer of control from the first officer to the captain occurred as the airplane was traveling at 204 knots indicated airspeed, approximately 161 feet agl, and 12 seconds from touchdown. At 0901:32, the airplane touched down hard with the wheels up at 193 knots indicated airspeed, 3360 feet down runway 27 and slid for 6915 feet before coming to rest 140 feet left of the centerline.
The aircraft was evacuated when smoke filled the cabin. Reference touchdown speed with flaps 50deg is 121 kts.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captains decision to continue the approach contrary to COA standard operating procedures that mandate a go-around when an approach is unstabilized below 500 feet or a ground proximity warning system alert continues below 200 feet above field elevation. The following factors contributed to the accident: (1) the flight crew's failure to properly complete the in-range checklist, which resulted in a lack of hydraulic pressure to lower the landing gear and deploy the flaps; (2) the flight crew's failure to perform the landing checklist and confirm that the landing gear was extended; (3) the inadequate remedial actions by COA to ensure adherence to standard operating procedures; and (4) the Federal Aviation Administrations (FAA) inadequate oversight of COA to ensure adherence to standard operating procedures."
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | NTSB  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 1 years | Accident number: | NTSB/AAR-97-01 | Download report: | Final report
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Sources:
» Aviation Week & Space Technology 17.2.97(68)
Follow-up / safety actions
NTSB issued 8 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 18-FEB-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-10 |
AMEND FLIGHT STANDARDS HANDBOOK BULLETIN 96-02, "GUIDLINES FOR CREWMEMBER TRAINING ON AIRCRAFT TAILCONES AND APPROVAL OF TAILCONE TRAINING DEVICES," TO INCLUDE A REQUIREMENT THAT IF ANY PORTION OF A RESTRAINT SYSTEM IS ATTACHED TO THE TAILCONE ACCESS PLUG DOOR IN THE AIRCRAFT THAT MIGHT INTERFERE WITH THE OPENING OF THE DOOR, THE PLUG DOOR TRAINING DEVICE MUST BE EQUIPPED WITH THE ENTIRE RESTRAINT SYSTEM. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 18-FEB-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-3 |
REQUIRE ALL DC-9 MD-80 OPERATORS WITH THE "HI, LOW, OFF" HYDRAULIC SWITCH CONFIGURATION TO REVISE THEIR CHECKLISTS TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE "HYDRAULICS" ITEM BY PLACING IT AS THE FIRST ITEM ON THE IN-RANGE CHECKLIST (OR EQUIVALENT), & REQUIRING THAT BOTH PILOTS VERBALLY VERIFY HYDRAULIC PUMP SWITCH SETTINGS & SYSTEM PRESSURES. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 18-FEB-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-4 |
REQUIRE ALL PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTORS OF 14 CFR PART 121 OPERATORS USING DC-9 & MD-80 AIRPLANES WITH THE "HI, LOW, OFF" HYDRAULIC SWITCH CONFIGURATION TO ENSURE THAT OPERATING MANUALS & TRAINING PROGRAMS INCLUDE INFO ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF IMPROPER HYDRAULIC SYSTEM CONFIGURATION, SPECIFICALLY THAT THE FLAPS & LANDING GEAR WILL NOT FUNCTION NORMALLLY IF THE ENGINE-DRIVEN HYDRAULIC PUMPS ARE NOT TO "H." (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 18-FEB-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-5 |
REQUIRE ALL PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTORS OF 14 CFR PART 121 CARRIERS TO ENSURE THAT THE CARRIERS ESTABLISH A POLICY & MAKE IT CLEAR TO THEIR PILOTS THAT THERE WILL BE NO NEGATIVE REPERCUSSIONS FOR APPROPRIATE QUESTIONING IN ACCORDANCE WITH CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES OF ANOTHER PILOT\'S DECISION OR ACTION. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
Issued: 18-FEB-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-6 |
REQUIRE ALL PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTORS OF 14 CFR PART 121 CARRIERS TO ENSURE THAT CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS PROVIDE PILOTS WITH TRAINING IN RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR, & PRACTICE IN PRESENTING, CLEAR & UNAMBIGUOUS COMMUNICATIONS OF FLIGHT-RELATED CONCERNS. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
Issued: 18-FEB-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-7 |
REQUIRE CONTINENTAL AIRLINES TO AUDIT ITS INTERNAL OVERSIGHT PROCESS & CORRECT DEFICIENCIES IN THAT OVERSIGHT PROCESS THAT ALLOW DEVIATIONS FROM STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE & VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS TO GO UNCORRECTED, & TO DEVELOP A SPECIFIC PLAN TO REINFORCE THE IMPORTANCE OF ADHERENCE TO STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES AMONG PILOTS. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 18-FEB-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-8 |
AUDIT IT SURVEILLANCE OF CONTINENTAL AIRLINES (COA) EN ROUTE OPERATIONS TO DETERMINE IF THE SURVEILLANCE IS ADEQUATE TO IDENTIFY PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES IN COA\'S OPERATIONS. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 18-FEB-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-9 |
REQUIRE THAT PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTORS REVIEW THE CHECKLISTS OF AIR CARRIERS OPERATING UNDER 14 CFR PART 121 & 135 TO ENSURE THAT THEY COMPLY WITH THE GUIDANCE PRESENTED IN THE FAA REPORT ENTITLED "HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE & DESIGN OF AIRCRAFT CHECKLIST," & REQUIRE THAT ANY CHECKLISTS THAT DO NOT COMPLY WITH THE GUIDANCE BE REVISED ACCORDINGLY. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
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Photos

accident date:
19-02-1996type: McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32
registration: N10556
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Washington-National Airport, DC to Houston-Intercontinental Airport, TX as the crow flies is 1928 km (1205 miles).
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.