Issued: 13-DEC-1996 | To: FAA | A-96-174 |
Require the development of and implementation of design or operational changes that will preclude the operation of transport-category airplanes with explosive fuel-air mixtures in the fuel tank (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 13-DEC-1996 | To: FAA | A-96-175 |
Require the development of & implementation of design or operational changes that will preclude the operation of transport-category airplanes with explosive fuel-air mixtures in the fuel tanks (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
Issued: 13-DEC-1996 | To: FAA | A-96-176 |
Require that the B-747 flight handbooks of TWA & other operators of B-747s & other aircraft in which fuel tank temperature cannot be determined by flightcrews be immediately revised to reflect the increases in CWT fuel temperatures found by flight tests, including operational procedures to reduce the potential for exceeding CWT temperature limitations. (Closed--No Longer Applicable) |
Issued: 13-DEC-1996 | To: FAA | A-96-177 |
Require modification of the CWT of B-747 airplanes & the fuel tanks of other airplanes that are located near heat sources to incorporate temperature probes & cockpit fuel tank temperature displays to permit determination of the fuel tank temperatures. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
Issued: 21-JAN-1997 | To: B747 | AD 96-26-06 |
Requirement for a one-time inspection to detect damage of the sleeving and wire bundles of the boost pumps of the numbers 1 and 4 main fuel tanks, and of the auxiliary tank jettison pumps (if installed) on certain B747 airplanes |
Issued: 18-FEB-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-11 |
DEVELOP & IMPLEMENT PROCEDURES, INCLUDING A CHECKLIST OF SAFETY-RELATED ITEMS, FOR THE HANDLING & PLACEMENT OF EXPLOSIVE TRAINING AIDS BY K-9 EXPLOSIVES DETECTION TEAMS TO PREVENT CONTAMINATION OF AIRCRAFT & AIRPORT FACILITIES & TO ENSURE AN EFFECTIVE K-9 EXPLOSIVES DETECTION PROGRAM. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 29-DEC-1997 | To: B747 | AD 97-26-07 |
This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD 96-26-06), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, that currently requires a one-time inspection to detect damage of the sleeving and wire bundles of the boost pumps of the numbers 1 and 4 main fuel tanks, and of the auxiliary tank jettison pumps (if installed); replacement of any damaged sleeving with new sleeving; and repair or replacement of any damaged wires with new wires. For airplanes on which any burned wires are found, that AD also requires an inspection to detect damage of the conduit, and replacement of any damaged conduit with a serviceable conduit. This amendment requires repetitive inspections in lieu of the one-time inspection. This amendment also expands the applicability of the existing AD. This amendment is prompted by reports of chafing of the sleeving. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect and correct abrasion of the Teflon sleeving and wires in the bundles of the fuel boost pumps for the numbers 1 and 4 main fuel tanks and of the auxiliary tank jettison pumps (if installed), which could result in electrical arcing between the wires and the aluminum conduit and consequent fire or explosion of the fuel tank. |
Issued: 07-APR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-34 |
Issue, as soon as possible, an airworthiness directive to require a detailed inspection of fuel quantity indication system wiring in Boeing 747-100,-200 and-300 series airplane fuel tanks for damage, and the replacement or the repair of any wires found to be damaged. Wires on Honeywell series 1-3 probes and compensators should be removed for examination. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 07-APR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-35 |
Issue an airworthiness directive to require the earliest possible replacement of the Honeywell corporation series 1-3 terminal blocks used on Boeing 747 fuel probes with terminal blocks that do not have knurled surfaces or sharp edges that may damage fuel quantity indication system wiring. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 07-APR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-36 |
Conduct a survey of fuel quantity indication system probes and wires in Boeing 747s equipped with systems other than Honeywell series 1-3 probes and compensators and in other model airplanes that are used in title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 service to determine whether potential fuel tank ignition sources exist that are similar to those found in the Boeing 747. The survey should include removing wires from fuel probes and examining the wires for damage. Repair or replacement procedures for any damaged wires that are found should be developed. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 07-APR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-37 |
Require research into copper-sulfide deposits on fuel quantity indication system parts in fuel tanks to determine the levels of deposits that may be hazardous, how to inspect and clean the deposits, and when to replace the components. (Superseded by A-00-107) (Closed - Acceptable Action/Superseded) |
Issued: 07-APR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-38 |
Require in Boeing 747 airplanes, and in other airplanes with fuel quantity indication system (FQIS) wire installations that are corouted with wires that may be powered, the physical separation and electrical shielding of FQIS wires to the maximum extent possible. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 07-APR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-39 |
Require, in all applicable transport airplane fuel tanks, surge protection systems to prevent electrical power surges from entering fuel tanks\' fuel quantity indication system wires. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 19-SEP-2000 | To: FAA | A-00-105 |
Examine manufacturers\' design practices with regard to bonding of components inside tanks and require changes in those practices, as necessary, to eliminate potential ignition hazards. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 19-SEP-2000 | To: FAA | A-00-106 |
Review the design specifications for aircraft wiring systems of all U.S. -certified aircraft and (1) identify which systems are critical to safety and (2) require revisions, as necessary, to ensure that adequate separation is provided for the wiring related to those critical systems. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 19-SEP-2000 | To: FAA | A-00-107 |
Require the development and implementation of corrective actions to eliminate the ignition risk posed by silver-sulfide deposits on fuel quantity indication system components inside fuel tanks. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 19-SEP-2000 | To: FAA | A-00-108 |
Regardless of the scope of the aging transport systems rulemaking advisory committee\'s eventual recommendations, address (through rulemaking or other means) all of the issues identified in the aging transport non-structural systems plan, including (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 06-JUN-2001 | To: | SFAR 88 |
This rule requires design approval holders of certain turbine- powered transport category airplanes, and of any subsequent modifications to these airplanes, to substantiate that the design of the fuel tank system precludes the existence of ignition sources within the airplane fuel tanks. It also requires developing and implementing maintenance and inspection instructions to assure the safety of the fuel tank system. For new type designs, this rule also requires demonstrating that ignition sources cannot be present in fuel tanks when failure conditions are considered, identifying any safety-critical maintenance actions, and incorporating a means either to minimize development of flammable vapors in fuel tanks or to prevent catastrophic damage if ignition does occur. These actions are based on accident investigations and adverse service experience, which have shown that unforeseen failure modes and lack of specific maintenance procedures on certain airplane fuel tank systems may result in degradation of design safety features intended to preclude ignition of vapors within the fuel tank. |
Issued: 30-AUG-2002 | To: | SFAR 88 - update 1 |
This final rule adds a provision to the existing requirements for fuel tank system fault tolerance evaluations that allows type certificate holders to use equivalent safety provisions for demonstrating compliance. The current regulations do not provide such provisions. This rulemaking will allow current certificate holders to use the same equivalent safety provisions already available to applicants for new or changed type design approvals. |
Issued: 09-DEC-2002 | To: | SFAR 88 - update 2 |
This final rule extends the compliance deadline for supplemental type certificate holders to complete safety assessments of their fuel tank systems, and any system that may affect the fuel tank system, and to develop design changes and maintenance programs needed to correct unsafe conditions. It also extends the compliance time for the affected operators to incorporate instructions for maintenance and inspection of the fuel tank system into their maintenance or inspection programs. This action is needed to allow supplemental type certificate holders additional time to complete their compliance submittals using a newly identified method of completing their safety assessments and identifying corrective actions without acquiring information from the type certificate holders. Because the operators are dependent upon the supplemental certificate holders for showing compliance with the operating rules, this rule allows them the same time extension. |