ASN Aircraft accident McDonnell Douglas MD-88 N914DL New York-La Guardia Airport, NY (LGA)

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Last updated: 15 October 2019

Status:	Final
Date:	Saturday 19 October 1996
Time:	16:38
Type:	McDonnell Douglas MD-88
Operator:	Delta Air Lines
Registration:	N914DL
C/n / msn:	49545/1444
First flight:	1988
Total airframe hrs:	24420
Engines:	2 Pratt & Whitney JT8D-219
Crew:	Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 5
Passengers:	Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 58
Total:	Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 63
Aircraft damage:	Substantial
Aircraft fate:	Repaired
Location:	New York-La Guardia Airport, NY (LGA) ( United States of America)
Phase:	Landing (LDG)
Nature:	Domestic Scheduled Passenger
Departure airport:	Atlanta-William B. Hartsfield International Airport, GA (ATL/KATL), United States of America
Destination airport:	New York-La Guardia Airport, NY (LGA/KLGA), United States of America
Flightnumber:	DL554

Narrative:
Just before touchdown, after an ILS/DME approach to runway 13, the right wing struck approach lights.
The maingear then struck the runway end and broke off, causing the aircraft to skid down the runway for 2700 feet.
Weather at the time was 800 feet broken ceiling, 0,5 mile visibility in fog, a Runway Visual Range of 3000 feet and possible low level windshear.

Probable Cause:

PROBABLE CAUSE: "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the inability of the captain, because of his use of monovision contact lenses, to overcome his misperception of the airplane's position relative to the runway during the visual portion of the approach. This misperception occurred because of visual illusions produced by the approach over water in limited light conditions, the absence of visible ground features, the rain and fog, and the irregular spacing of the runway lights.
Contributing to the accident was the lack of instantaneous vertical speed information available to the pilot not flying, and the incomplete guidance available to optometrists, aviation medical examiners, and pilots regarding the prescription of unapproved monovision contact lenses for use by pilots." (NTSB/AAR-97/03)

Accident investigation:

Investigating agency:	NTSB
Status:	Investigation completed
Duration:	10 months
Accident number:	NTSB/AAR-97/03
Download report:	Final report

Classification:

Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) - Ground

Sources:

» Aviation Week & Space Technology 26.05.1997 (42,47)
» CNN
» NTSB Identification: NYC97MA005
» NTSB/AAR-97/03
» Scramble 210

Follow-up / safety actions

NTSB issued 13 Safety Recommendations

Issued: 29-AUG-1997	To: FAA	A-97-84
Identify Part 139 airports that have irregular runway light spacing, evaluate the potential hazards of such irregular spacing, and determine if standardizing runway light spacing is warranted. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 29-AUG-1997	To: FAA	A-97-85
Require all 14 CFR Part 121 and 135 operators to review and revise their company operations manuals to more clearly delineate flightcrew member (pilot flying/pilot not flying) duties and responsibilities for various phases of flight, and to more clearly define terms that are critical for safety of flight decisionmaking, such as "stabilized approach." (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 29-AUG-1997	To: FAA	A-97-86
Revise FAA Form 8500-8, "Application for Airman Medical Certificate," to elicit info regarding contact lens use by pilot/applicant. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 29-AUG-1997	To: FAA	A-97-87
Require the Civil Aeromedical Institute to publish and disseminate a brochure containing info about vision correction options, to include info about the potential hazards of monovision (MV) contact lens use by pilots while performing flying duties and to emphasize that MV contact lenses are not approved for use while flying. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 29-AUG-1997	To: FAA	A-97-88
Require all 121 and 135 operators to notify their pilot and medical personnel of the circumstances of this accident, and to alert them to the hazards of monovision contact lens use by flightcrew members. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 29-AUG-1997	To: FAA	A-97-89
Require all flight standards district office air safety inspectors and accident prevention specialists to inform general aviation pilots of the circumstances of this accident and to alert them to the hazards of monovision contact lens use by pilots while flying. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 29-AUG-1997	To: FAA	A-97-90
Require all 14 CFR Part 121 and 135 air carriers to make their pilots aware (through specific training, placards, or other means) of the type of vertical speed info (instantaneous/non-instantaneous) provided by the vertical speed indicators installed in their airplanes, and to make them aware of the ramifications that type of info could have on their perception of their flight situation. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 29-AUG-1997	To: FAA	A-97-91
Require all 14 CFR Part 121 and 135 operators to convert, where practical, the non-instantaneous vertical speed instrumentation on airplanes that have inertial reference units installed to provide flightcrews with instantaneous vertical speed info. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 29-AUG-1997	To: FAA	A-97-92
Expedite the development and publication specific criteria and conditions for the classification of special airports; the resultant publication should include specific remarks detailing the reason(s) an airport is determined to be a special airport, and procedures for adding and removing airports from special airport. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 29-AUG-1997	To: FAA	A-97-93
Develop criteria for special runways and/or special approaches giving consideration to the circumstances of this accident and any unique characteristics and special conditions at airport (such as those that exist for the approaches to runways 31 and 13 at LaGuardia airport) and include detailed pilot qualification requirements for designated special runways or approaches. (Closed - Reconsidered)
Issued: 29-AUG-1997	To: FAA	A-97-94
Once criteria for designating special airports and special runways and/or special approaches have been developed as recommended in recommendations A-97-92 and -93, evaluate all airports against that criteria and update special airport publications accordingly. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 29-AUG-1997	To: FAA	A-97-95
Require all 14 CFR Part 121 and 135 operators to review their flight attendant training programs and emphasize the need for flight attendants to aggressively initiate their evacuation procedures when an evacuation order has been given. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 29-AUG-1997	To: OPTOMETRIC ASSOCIATIONS	A-97-96
ISSUE A BRIEFING BULLETIN TO MEMBER OPTOMETRISTS, INFORMING THEM OF THE POTENTIAL HAZARDS OF AND PROHIBITION AGAINST MONOVISION (MV) CONTACT LENS USE BY PILOTS WHILE PERFORMING FLYING DUTIES, & URGING THEM TO ADVISE PILOT-RATED PATIENTS OF THOSE POTENTIAL HAZARDS (MV CONTACT LENS\' EFFECT ON DISTANCE JUDGEMENTS/PERCEPTIONS) . (Closed - Unacceptable Action)

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Map

This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Atlanta-William B. Hartsfield International Airport, GA to New York-La Guardia Airport, NY as the crow flies is 1216 km (760 miles).

This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.

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