Détails:
The co-pilot was flying the aircraft for a radar-vectored, localizer/back-course approach to runway 25 of the Ottawa/Macdonald-Cartier airport. Air traffic control requested that the crew fly the aircraft at a speed of 180 knots or better to the Ottawa NDB, which is also the final approach fix (FAF) for the approach to runway 25. At approximately eight nautical miles from the airport the aircraft was clear of cloud and the crew could see the runway. In order to conduct some instrument approach practice, the pilot, who was also the company training pilot, placed a map against the co-pilot's windscreen to temporarily restrict his forward view outside the aircraft. The approach briefing was not amended to reflect the simulated instrument conditions for the approach. The co-pilot accurately flew the aircraft on the localizer to the FAF, at which point, he began to slow the aircraft to approximately 140 knots and requested that the pilot set ½ flap, which he did. Once past the FAF, the co-pilot's workload increased, and he had difficulty flying the simulated approach. On short final to runway 25, the pilot removed the map from the co-pilot's windscreen. The co-pilot noted that the aircraft was faster and higher than normal and he tried to regain the proper approach profile. By the time the aircraft reached the threshold of the runway 25, it was approximately 500 feet above ground, and at a relatively high speed, so the pilot took control of the aircraft for the landing. The pilot attempted to descend and slow the aircraft as it proceeded down the length of the runway and stated that he had just initiated an overshoot when he heard the first sounds of impact. The propellers struck the runway about 4,590 feet from the threshold of runway 25. The aircraft came to rest about 6,770 feet from the threshold, and a fire broke out in the area of the right engine.
CAUSES ET FACTEURS CONTRIBUTIFS: "L'avion a atterri avec le train rentré parce que l'équipage n'a pas suivi les procédures d'utilisation normalisées et n'a pas commandé la sortie du train. Ont contribué au présent accident le manque de planification, de coordination et de communication chez l'équipage, ainsi que la défaillance du dispositif avertisseur du train."
accident date: 13-06-1997
type: Swearingen SA226-TC Metro II
registration: N168SW
| Statuts: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
| Date: | vendredi 13 juin 1997 |
| Heure: | 12:48 |
| Type/Sous-type: |  Swearingen SA226-TC Metro II |
| Compagnie: | North American Airlines |
| Immatriculation: | C-FEPW |
| Numéro de série: | TC-294 |
| Année de Fabrication: | 1979 |
| Moteurs: | 2 Garrett TPE331-10UA-511G |
| Equipage: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 2 |
| Passagers: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 0 |
| Total: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 2 |
| Dégats de l'appareil: | Perte Totale |
| Conséquences: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
| Lieu de l'accident: | Ottawa/Macdonald-Cartier International Airport, ON (YOW) ( Canada)
|
| Phase de vol: | A l'atterrissage (LDG) |
| Nature: | Cargo |
| Aéroport de départ: | Hamilton Airport, ON (YHM/CYHM), Canada |
| Ottawa-Macdonald-Cartier International Airport, ON (YOW/CYOW), Canada |
The co-pilot was flying the aircraft for a radar-vectored, localizer/back-course approach to runway 25 of the Ottawa/Macdonald-Cartier airport. Air traffic control requested that the crew fly the aircraft at a speed of 180 knots or better to the Ottawa NDB, which is also the final approach fix (FAF) for the approach to runway 25. At approximately eight nautical miles from the airport the aircraft was clear of cloud and the crew could see the runway. In order to conduct some instrument approach practice, the pilot, who was also the company training pilot, placed a map against the co-pilot's windscreen to temporarily restrict his forward view outside the aircraft. The approach briefing was not amended to reflect the simulated instrument conditions for the approach. The co-pilot accurately flew the aircraft on the localizer to the FAF, at which point, he began to slow the aircraft to approximately 140 knots and requested that the pilot set ½ flap, which he did. Once past the FAF, the co-pilot's workload increased, and he had difficulty flying the simulated approach. On short final to runway 25, the pilot removed the map from the co-pilot's windscreen. The co-pilot noted that the aircraft was faster and higher than normal and he tried to regain the proper approach profile. By the time the aircraft reached the threshold of the runway 25, it was approximately 500 feet above ground, and at a relatively high speed, so the pilot took control of the aircraft for the landing. The pilot attempted to descend and slow the aircraft as it proceeded down the length of the runway and stated that he had just initiated an overshoot when he heard the first sounds of impact. The propellers struck the runway about 4,590 feet from the threshold of runway 25. The aircraft came to rest about 6,770 feet from the threshold, and a fire broke out in the area of the right engine.
Probable Cause:
CAUSES ET FACTEURS CONTRIBUTIFS: "L'avion a atterri avec le train rentré parce que l'équipage n'a pas suivi les procédures d'utilisation normalisées et n'a pas commandé la sortie du train. Ont contribué au présent accident le manque de planification, de coordination et de communication chez l'équipage, ainsi que la défaillance du dispositif avertisseur du train."
Accident investigation:
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Photos
accident date: 13-06-1997
type: Swearingen SA226-TC Metro II
registration: N168SW
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Hamilton Airport, ON et Ottawa-Macdonald-Cartier International Airport, ON est de 412 km (258 miles).
La distance entre Hamilton Airport, ON et Ottawa-Macdonald-Cartier International Airport, ON est de 412 km (258 miles).
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.
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