Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | Friday 19 December 1997 |
Time: | 16:13 |
Type: |  Boeing 737-36N |
Operator: | Silkair |
Registration: | 9V-TRF |
MSN: | 28556/2851 |
First flight: | 1997-01-27 (11 months) |
Total airframe hrs: | 2238 |
Cycles: | 1306 |
Engines: | 2 CFMI CFM56-3B2 |
Crew: | Fatalities: 7 / Occupants: 7 |
Passengers: | Fatalities: 97 / Occupants: 97 |
Total: | Fatalities: 104 / Occupants: 104 |
Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
Aircraft fate: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Location: | 56 km (35 mls) N of Palembang ( Indonesia)
|
Phase: | En route (ENR) |
Nature: | International Scheduled Passenger |
Departure airport: | Jakarta-Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (CGK/WIII), Indonesia |
Destination airport: | Singapore-Changi International Airport (SIN/WSSS), Singapore |
Flightnumber: | MI185 |
Narrative:At 15:37 Silkair flight 185 took off from Jakarta-Soekarno Hatta Airport runway 25R with the captain as the handling pilot. The flight received clearance to climb to FL350 and to head directly to Palembang. At 15:47 the aircraft passed FL245. Ten seconds later, the crew requested permission to proceed directly to PARDI. The air traffic controller instructed MI185 to standby, to continue flying directly to Palembang and to report when reaching FL350. At 15:53, MI 185 reported reaching FL350. Subsequently, the controller cleared MI185 to proceed directly to PARDI and to report when abeam Palembang. At 16:05, the cockpit voice recorder ceased recording. At 16:10 the controller informed MI185 that it was abeam Palembang. The controller instructed the aircraft to maintain FL350 and to contact Singapore Control when at PARDI. The crew acknowledged this call. At 16:11:27 the FDR ceased recording. MI 185 was still at FL350 until it started a rapid descent around 16:12:18. The aircraft broke up in flight and crashed into the Musi river delta.
Although not concluded by the Indonesian authorities, it has been suggested by a.o. the US NTSB that the captain may have committed suicide by switching off both flight recorders and intentionally putting the Boeing 737 in a dive, possibly when the first officer had left the flight deck. During 1997 the captain experienced multiple work-related difficulties, particularly during the last 6 months. Also at the time of the accident the captain was experiencing significant financial difficulties, which was disputed by the Indonesian investigators. Coincidentally the accident happened on exactly the same date in 1979 the captain was forced to withdraw from a scheduled Air Force A-4 Skyhawk jet training mission because of a mechanical problem with his aircraft. The other three aircraft continued with the training mission and collided with terrain after encountering bad weather in a mountainous area. All of the pilots on board the aircraft were killed.
Probable Cause:
FINAL REMARKS:
- The NTSC investigation into the MI 185 accident was a very extensive, exhaustive and complex investigation to find out what happened, how it happened, and why it happened. It was an extremely difficult investigation due to the degree of destruction of the aircraft resulting in highly fragmented wreckage, the difficulties presented by the accident site and the lack of information from the flight recorders during the final moments of the accident sequence.
- The NTSC accident investigation team members and participating organizations have done the investigation in a thorough manner and to the best of their conscience, knowledge and professional expertise, taking into consideration all available data and information recovered and gathered during the investigation.
- Given the limited data and information from the wreckage and flight recorders, the NTSC is unable to find the reasons for the departure of the aircraft from its cruising level of FL350 and the reasons for the stoppage of the flight recorders.
- The NTSC has to conclude that the technical investigation has yielded no evidence to explain the cause of the accident.
The US NTSB responded to the Indonesian investigation report in a letter dated December 11, 2000. The NTSB states that "when all of the investigative evidence is considered, it leads to the conclusions that: 1) no airplane-related mechanical malfunctions or failures caused or contributed to the accident, and 2) the accident can be explained by intentional pilot action. Specifically, a) the accident airplanes flight profile is consistent with sustained manual nose-down flight control inputs; b) the evidence suggests that the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was intentionally disconnected; c) recovery of the airplane was possible but not attempted; and d) it is more likely that the nose-down flight control inputs were made by the captain than by the first officer."
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | NTSC Indonesia  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 3 years | Accident number: | final report | Download report: | Final report
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Classification:
Pilot or passenger suicide
Loss of control
Follow-up / safety actions
The FAA issued an AD January 8, 1998 requiring operators of Boeing 737's (delivered after September 20, 1995) to check the horizontal stabilizers within 24h or 5 flights to make sure that all fasteners and elevator attachment fitting bolts in those structures are properly in place.
NTSC issued 6 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 14-DEC-2000 | To: manufacfurers | 9V-TRF (1) |
It is recommended that the ICAO FLIREC Panel undertake a comprehensive review and analysis of flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders systems design philosophy be undertaken by aircraft and equipment manufacturers. The purpose of the review and analysis would be to identify and rectify latent factors associated with stoppage of the recorders in flight, and if needed, to propose improvements to ensure recording until time of occurrence. |
Issued: 14-DEC-2000 | To: manufacfurers | 9V-TRF (2) |
It is recommended that, to facilitate the recovery of flight recorders after impact into water, a review of the flight recorders design philosophy be undertaken by the equipment manufacturers to ensure that the underwater locator beacons (ULB) are fitted to the flight recorders in such a manner that the ULB would not be separated from the recorders in an accident. |
Issued: 14-DEC-2000 | To: manufacfurers | 9V-TRF (3) |
It is recommended that the ICAO FLIREC Panel recommend aircraft and equipment manufacturers to include recording of actual displays as observed by pilots in particular for CRT type of display panels. |
Issued: 14-DEC-2000 | To: manufacfurers | 9V-TRF (4) |
It is recommended that a review of the flight crew training syllabi be undertaken by aircraft manufacturers to include recovery from high speed flight upsets beyond the normal flight envelope. The purpose of developing the additional training is to enhance pilot awareness on the possibility of unexpected hazardous flight situations. |
Issued: 14-DEC-2000 | To: manufacfurers | 9V-TRF (5) |
It is recommended that a review of aircraft auto-flight systems be undertaken by aircraft and equipment manufacturers to provide all passenger aircraft with auto flight systems that could prevent an aircraft from flying beyond the high speed limit of its flight envelope. It is also recommended that such auto flight systems limit the rate of descent of the aircraft to a certain value that operationally safe. |
Issued: 14-DEC-2000 | To: | 9V-TRF (6) |
It is recommended that a regional investigation framework for co-operation in aircraft accident investigations be established to enable fast mobilization of resources and coordination of activities to support those states that do not have the resources and facilities to do investigations on their own. |
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Photos

accident date:
19-12-1997type: Boeing 737-36N
registration: 9V-TRF
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Jakarta-Soekarno-Hatta International Airport to Singapore-Changi International Airport as the crow flies is 878 km (549 miles).
Accident location: Global; accuracy within tens or hundreds of kilometers.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.