Issued: 11-FEB-2000 | To: MD80 | AD 2000-03-51 |
Visual inspection of lubricating grease on jackscrew assembly and surrounding area for metal shavings and flakes. |
Issued: 28-JUL-2000 | To: MD80 | AD 2000-15-15 |
Further jackscrew inspections including presence of metallic particles in jackscrew assembly lubrication |
Issued: 01-OCT-2001 | To: FAA | A-01-41 |
Require the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group to revise the lubrication procedure for the horizontal stabilizer trim system of Douglas DC-9, McDonnell Douglas MD-80/90, and Boeing 717 series airplanes to minimize the probability of inadequate lubrication. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 01-OCT-2001 | To: FAA | A-01-42 |
Require the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group to revise the end play check procedure for the horizontal stabilizer trim system of Douglas DC-9, McDonnell Douglas MD-80/90, and Boeing 717 series airplanes to minimize the probability of measurement error and conduct a study to empirically validate the revised procedure against an appropriate physical standard of actual acme screw and acme nut wear. This study should also establish that the procedure produces a measurement that is reliable when conducted on-wing. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 01-OCT-2001 | To: FAA | A-01-43 |
Require maintenance personnel who lubricate the horizontal stabilizer trim system of Douglas DC-9, McDonnell Douglas MD-80/90, and Boeing 717 series airplanes to undergo specialized training for this task. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
Issued: 01-OCT-2001 | To: FAA | A-01-44 |
Require maintenance personnel who inspect the horizontal stabilizer trim system of Douglas DC-9, McDonnell Douglas MD-80/90, and Boeing 717 series airplanes to undergo specialized training for this task. This training should include familiarization with the selection, inspection, and proper use of the tooling to perform the end play check. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
Issued: 01-OCT-2001 | To: FAA | A-01-45 |
Before the implementation of any proposed changes in allowable lubrication applications for critical aircraft systems, require operators to supply to the FAA technical data (including performance information and test results) demonstrating that the proposed changes will not present any potential hazards and obtain approval of the proposed changes from the principal maintenance inspector and concurrence from the FAA applicable aircraft certification office. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 01-OCT-2001 | To: FAA | A-01-46 |
Issue guidance to principal maintenance inspectors to notify all operators about the potential hazards of using inappropriate grease types and mixing incompatible grease types. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 01-OCT-2001 | To: FAA | A-01-47 |
Survey all operators to identify any lubrication practices that deviate from those specified in the manufacturer\'s airplane maintenance manual, determine whether any of those deviations involve the current use of inappropriate grease types or incompatible grease mixtures on critical aircraft systems and, if so, eliminate the use of any such inappropriate grease types or incompatible mixtures. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 01-OCT-2001 | To: FAA | A-01-48 |
Within the next 120 days, convene an industrywide forum to disseminate information about and discuss issues pertaining to the lubrication of aircraft components, including the qualification, selection, application methods, performance, inspection, testing, and incompatibility of grease types used on aircraft components. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 08-JAN-2003 | To: FAA | A-02-36 |
Issue a flight standards information bulletin directing air carriers to instruct pilots that in the event of an inoperative or malfunctioning flight control system, if the airplane is controllable they should complete only the applicable checklist procedures and should not attempt any corrective actions beyond those specified. In particular, in the event of an inoperative or malfunctioning horizontal stabilizer trim control system, after a final determination has been made in accordance with the applicable checklist that both the primary and alternate trim systems are inoperative, neither the primary nor the alternate trim motor should be activated, either by engaging the autopilot or using any other trim control switch or handle. Pilots should further be instructed that if checklist procedures are not effective, they should land at the nearest suitable airport. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 08-JAN-2003 | To: FAA | A-02-37 |
Direct all certificate management offices to instruct inspectors to conduct surveillance of airline dispatch and maintenance control personnel to ensure that their training and operations directives provide appropriate dispatch support to pilots who are experiencing a malfunction threatening safety of flight and instruct them to refrain from suggesting continued flight in the interest of airline flight scheduling. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 08-JAN-2003 | To: FAA | A-02-38 |
As part of the response to Safety Recommendation A-01-41, require operators of Douglas DC-9, McDonnell Douglas MD-80/90, and Boeing 717 series airplanes to remove degraded grease from the jackscrew assembly acme screw and flush degraded grease and particulates from the acme nut before applying fresh grease. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 08-JAN-2003 | To: FAA | A-02-39 |
As part of the response to Safety Recommendation A-01-41, require operators of Douglas DC-9, McDonnell Douglas MD-80/90, and Boeing 717 series airplanes, in coordination with Boeing, to increase the size of the access panels that are used to accomplish the jackscrew assembly lubrication procedure. (Closed - Reconsidered) |
Issued: 08-JAN-2003 | To: FAA | A-02-40 |
Establish the jackscrew assembly lubrication procedure as a required inspection item that must have an inspectors signoff before the task can be considered complete. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
Issued: 08-JAN-2003 | To: FAA | A-02-41 |
Review all existing maintenance intervals for tasks that could affect critical aircraft components and identify those that have been extended without adequate engineering justification in the form of technical data and analysis demonstrating that the extended interval will not present any increased risk and require modifications of those intervals to ensure that they (1) take into account assumptions made by the original designers, (2) are supported by adequate technical data and analysis, and (3) include an appropriate safety margin that takes into account the possibility of missed or inadequate accomplishment of the maintenance task. In conducting this review, the Federal Aviation Administration should also consider original intervals recommended or established for new aircraft models that are derivatives of earlier models and, if the aircraft component and the task are substantially the same and the recommended interval for the new model is greater than that recommended for the earlier model, treat such original intervals for the derivative model as "extended" intervals. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
Issued: 08-JAN-2003 | To: FAA | A-02-42 |
Conduct a systematic industrywide evaluation and issue a report on the process by which manufacturers recommend and airlines establish and revise maintenance task intervals and make changes to the process to ensure that, in the future, intervals for each task (1) take into account assumptions made by the original designers, (2) are supported by adequate technical data and analysis, and (3) include an appropriate safety margin that takes into account the possibility of missed or inadequate accomplishment of the maintenance task. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
Issued: 08-JAN-2003 | To: FAA | A-02-43 |
Require operators to supply the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), before the implementation of any changes in maintenance tasks intervals that could affect critical aircraft components, technical data and analysis for each task demonstrating that none of the proposed changes will present any potential hazards, and obtain written approval of the proposed changes from the principal maintenance inspector and written concurrence from the appropriate FAA aircraft certification office. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
Issued: 08-JAN-2003 | To: FAA | A-02-44 |
Pending the incorporation of a fail-safe mechanism in the design of the Douglas DC-9, McDonnell Douglas MD-80/90, and Boeing 717 horizontal stabilizer jackscrew assembly, as recommended in Safety Recommendation A-02-49, establish an end play check interval that (1) accounts for the possibility of higher-than-expected wear rates and measurement error in estimating acme nut thread wear and (2) provides for at least two opportunities to detect excessive wear before a potentially catastrophic wear condition becomes possible. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 08-JAN-2003 | To: FAA | A-02-45 |
Require operators to permanently (1) track end play measures according to airplane registration number and jackscrew assembly serial number, (2) calculate and record average wear rates for each airplane based on end play measurements and flight times, and (3) develop and implement a program to analyze these data to identify and determine the cause of excessive or unexpected wear rates, trends, or anomalies. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should also require operators to report this information to the FAA for use in determining and evaluating an appropriate end play check interval. (Open - Unacceptable Response) |
Issued: 08-JAN-2003 | To: FAA | A-02-46 |
Require that maintenance facilities that overhaul jackscrew assemblies record and inform customers of an overhauled jackscrew assemblys end play measurement. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
Issued: 08-JAN-2003 | To: FAA | A-02-47 |
Require operators to measure and record the on-wing end play measurement whenever a jackscrew assembly is replaced. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 08-JAN-2003 | To: FAA | A-02-48 |
Require that maintenance facilities that overhaul Douglas DC-9, McDonnell Douglas MD-80/90, and Boeing 717 series airplanes jackscrew assemblies obtain specific authorization to perform such overhauls, predicated on demonstrating that they possess the necessary capability, documentation, and equipment for the task and that they have procedures in place to (1) perform and document the detailed steps that must be followed to properly accomplish the end play check procedure and lubrication of the jackscrew assembly, including specification of appropriate tools and grease types; (2) perform and document the appropriate steps for verifying that the proper acme screw thread surface finish has been applied; and (3) ensure that appropriate packing procedures are followed for all returned overhauled jackscrew assemblies, regardless of whether the assembly has been designated for storage or shipping. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 08-JAN-2003 | To: FAA | A-02-49 |
Conduct a systematic engineering review to (1) identify means to eliminate the catastrophic effects of total acme nut thread failure in the horizontal stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly in Douglas DC-9 (DC-9), McDonnell Douglas MD-80/90 (MD-80/90), and Boeing 717 (717) series airplanes and require, if practicable, that such fail-safe mechanisms be incorporated in the design of all existing and future DC-9, MD-80/90, and 717 series airplanes and their derivatives; (2) evaluate the horizontal stabilizer trim systems of all other transport-category airplanes to identify any designs that have a catastrophic single-point failure mode and, for any such system; (3) identify means to eliminate the catastrophic effects of that single-point failure mode and, if practicable, require that such fail-safe mechanisms be incorporated in the design of all existing and future airplanes that are equipped with such horizontal stabilizer trim systems. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 08-JAN-2003 | To: FAA | A-02-50 |
Modify the certification regulations, policies, or procedures to ensure that new horizontal stabilizer trim control system designs are not certified if they have a single-point catastrophic failure mode, regardless of whether any element of that system is considered structure rather than system or is otherwise considered exempt from certification standards for systems. (Open - Acceptable Response) |
Issued: 08-JAN-2003 | To: FAA | A-02-51 |
Review and revise aircraft certification regulations and associated guidance applicable to the certification of transport-category airplanes to ensure that wear-related failures are fully considered and addressed so that, to the maximum extent possible, they will not be catastrophic. (Open - Acceptable Response) |