Détails:
A McDonnell-Douglas DC-10-30, N39081, operating as Continental Airlines flight 60, was substantially damaged when an uncontained engine event occurred during takeoff from Newark International Airport (EWR), New Jersey. The 3-man cockpit crew, 11-person cabin crew, and 220 passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. An instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed for the flight, between Newark and Brussels Airport (BRU), Belgium.
Startup and taxi were normal, and during the taxi, the captain again briefed the cockpit crew, and included engine failures, as well as "non-reject" situations. The airplane lined up on runway 04L, and the captain applied takeoff power slowly and smoothly. At takeoff decision speed (V1), there was a loud explosion. A white "engine fail" light illuminated in front of the captain, and the number 1 engine N1 decreased by 30 percent. Number 2 and number 3 engines appeared normal.
The captain continued the takeoff, and the landing gear was raised. A red, left main landing gear warning light illuminated on the front panel. The airplane turned to a heading of 010, and slowly climbed to 3,000 feet. During the climb, an airframe vibration developed.
After level-off, the crew began to troubleshoot the emergency, and found that when the number 3 engine N1 was reduced, the vibration disappeared. Both the number 1 and the number 3 engines remained at reduced power, in relation to number 2, for the rest of the flight.
Air traffic control personnel provided vectors for a return to Newark. During the return, the crew dumped about 90,000 pounds of fuel. The crew also ran both 1-engine, and 2-engine inoperative checklists, and prepared data cards for both scenarios.
The captain flew the ILS glideslope down to a full-stop landing, on runway 04R at 20:16. After stopping on the runway, the brakes would not release, so the crew shut down the engines, and the passengers and crew disembarked through the normal deplaning doors. The airplane was later towed to a ramp.
PROBABLE CAUSE: "Stress rupture of the 2nd-stage low pressure turbine anti-rotation nozzle locks, resulting from inadequate nozzle lock design."
| Statuts: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
| Date: | mardi 25 avril 2000 |
| Heure: | 19:42 |
| Type/Sous-type: |  McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30 |
| Compagnie: | Continental Air Lines |
| Immatriculation: | N39081 |
| Numéro de série: | 47861/75 |
| Année de Fabrication: | 1973 |
| Heures de vol: | 13346 |
| Moteurs: | 3 General Electric CF6-50C2 |
| Equipage: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 14 |
| Passagers: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 220 |
| Total: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 234 |
| Dégats de l'appareil: | Substantiels |
| Conséquences: | Repaired |
| Lieu de l'accident: | Newark International Airport, NJ (EWR) ( Etats-Unis d'Amérique)
|
| Phase de vol: | Au décollage (TOF) |
| Nature: | Transport de Passagers Intern. |
| Aéroport de départ: | Newark International Airport, NJ (EWR/KEWR), Etats-Unis d'Amérique |
| Brussel-Zaventem Airport (BRU/EBBR), Belgique | |
| Numéro de vol: | CO60 |
A McDonnell-Douglas DC-10-30, N39081, operating as Continental Airlines flight 60, was substantially damaged when an uncontained engine event occurred during takeoff from Newark International Airport (EWR), New Jersey. The 3-man cockpit crew, 11-person cabin crew, and 220 passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. An instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed for the flight, between Newark and Brussels Airport (BRU), Belgium.
Startup and taxi were normal, and during the taxi, the captain again briefed the cockpit crew, and included engine failures, as well as "non-reject" situations. The airplane lined up on runway 04L, and the captain applied takeoff power slowly and smoothly. At takeoff decision speed (V1), there was a loud explosion. A white "engine fail" light illuminated in front of the captain, and the number 1 engine N1 decreased by 30 percent. Number 2 and number 3 engines appeared normal.
The captain continued the takeoff, and the landing gear was raised. A red, left main landing gear warning light illuminated on the front panel. The airplane turned to a heading of 010, and slowly climbed to 3,000 feet. During the climb, an airframe vibration developed.
After level-off, the crew began to troubleshoot the emergency, and found that when the number 3 engine N1 was reduced, the vibration disappeared. Both the number 1 and the number 3 engines remained at reduced power, in relation to number 2, for the rest of the flight.
Air traffic control personnel provided vectors for a return to Newark. During the return, the crew dumped about 90,000 pounds of fuel. The crew also ran both 1-engine, and 2-engine inoperative checklists, and prepared data cards for both scenarios.
The captain flew the ILS glideslope down to a full-stop landing, on runway 04R at 20:16. After stopping on the runway, the brakes would not release, so the crew shut down the engines, and the passengers and crew disembarked through the normal deplaning doors. The airplane was later towed to a ramp.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "Stress rupture of the 2nd-stage low pressure turbine anti-rotation nozzle locks, resulting from inadequate nozzle lock design."
Accident investigation:
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Sources:
» NTSBPhotos
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Newark International Airport, NJ et Brussel-Zaventem Airport est de 5867 km (3667 miles).
La distance entre Newark International Airport, NJ et Brussel-Zaventem Airport est de 5867 km (3667 miles).
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.
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