Narrative:An automatic landing on runway 27 was carried out with the first officer being the pilot flying. The right main landing gear failed immediately upon touchdown. The aircraft slid along the runway and came to a halt some 1,600 metres further on, resting on its right flaps, slats and wingtip. An emergency evacuation was carried out. Examination of the aircraft showed that the right main gear strut cylinder had fractured below the attachment trunnions, releasing the wheels/axle assembly back into the flaps and wing/fuselage fairing. The lower portion of the failed cylinder remained attached only by the sidestay. A closer inspection revealed the presence of an anomaly on the forward outer surface of the cylinder fracture, which subsequent examination identified as a fatigue crack measuring approximately 3.5 mm long and 1.1 mm deep.
Probable Cause:
CAUSAL FACTORS:
1. The right main landing gear cylinder failed immediately upon touchdown due to the application of spin-up drag loads on a section of the cylinder containing a major fatigue crack 3.2 mm long and 1.0 mm deep and several other smaller cracks associated with it.
2. The origins of these fatigue cracks could not be identified but other embryonic cracks were found which were associated with surface irregularities arising from a grit-blasting process during manufacture. Abnormal loading, possibly due to an occurrence of a mode of fore-and-aft vibration known as 'gear walking' is thought to have been responsible, at some time in the aircraft's history, for propagating the cracks to a depth at which continued growth was possible under normal loading. Alternatively, some abnormal loading may have relaxed the beneficial compressive surface stresses induced by shot-peening at the critical section and allowed propagation from the same surface defects.
3. Inspection and other mandatory preventive measures taken following two similar accidents did not prevent the occurrence of this third accident. This was probably due to the small size of cracks which are required to be detected before reaching a critical dimension.
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | AAIB  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 2 years and 7 months | Accident number: | AAIB AAR 4/03 | Download report: | Final report
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Classification:
Landing gear collapse
Runway mishap
Follow-up / safety actions
AAIB issued 5 Safety Recommendations
Issued: -- | To: FAA and the Boeing | 2001-54 |
The FAA and the Boeing urgently review the continued airworthiness of the MD-83 MLG strut. In particular, the need for repeat inspection of the strut in the critical area be considered and the ability of the mandated NDE inspection to detect embryonic fatigue cracks in the material, given the small critical crack size, should be re-assessed. |
Issued: -- | To: JAA | 2003-44 |
It is recommended that the Joint Aviation Authorities amend the relevant sections of JAR-OPS 1 with a view to requiring that all aircraft fitted with a Cockpit Voice Recorder record, without interruption, the audio signals received from each boom and mask microphone in use. |
Issued: -- | To: FAA and CAA UK | 2003-45 |
It is recommended that the FAA and the CAA should promote an industry study into the possibility that beneficial residual stress fields induced by shot-peening could be relaxed under in-service conditions. |
Issued: -- | To: Boeing | 2003-47 |
It is recommended that the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group should conduct an ultimate load test on a suitable MD-80 series main landing gear cylinder in order to determine the strength of the component and to verify the figures used in both the original static strength and in the fatigue life calculations. |
Issued: -- | To: CAA UK, JAA and FAA | 2003-48 |
It is recommended that the CAA, JAA and the FAA should provide guidance as to the recommended best practice for the evacuation of infants and small children down escape slides with minimum delay. (Status - Accepted - closed) |
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Photos

accident date:
10-05-2001type: McDonnell Douglas MD-83
registration: EC-FXI
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Palma de Mallorca Airport to Liverpool International Airport as the crow flies is 1579 km (987 miles).
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.