Statuts: | Enquête Officielle |
Date: | jeudi 18 décembre 2003 |
Heure: | 12:26 |
Type/Sous-type: |  McDonnell Douglas MD-10F |
Compagnie: | FedEx Express |
Immatriculation: | N364FE |
Numéro de série: | 46600/4 |
Année de Fabrication: | 1971 |
Heures de vol: | 65375 |
Cycles: | 26163 |
Moteurs: | 3 General Electric CF6-6D |
Equipage: | victimes: 0 / Ã bord: 2 |
Passagers: | victimes: 0 / Ã bord: 5 |
Total: | victimes: 0 / Ã bord: 7 |
Dégats de l'appareil: | Détruit |
Conséquences: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Lieu de l'accident: | Memphis International Airport, TN (MEM) ( Etats-Unis d'Amérique)
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Élévation des lieux de l'accident: | 104 m (341 feet) amsl |
Phase de vol: | A l'atterrissage (LDG) |
Nature: | Cargo |
Aéroport de départ: | Oakland International Airport, CA (OAK/KOAK), Etats-Unis d'Amérique |
Aéroport de destination: | Memphis International Airport, TN (MEM/KMEM), Etats-Unis d'Amérique |
Numéro de vol: | 647 |
Détails:FedEx flight 647 departed Oakland at 06:32 PST for a cargo flight to Memphis. The first officer was the pilot flying on that leg. The captain of the flight was a company check airman who was conducting a multi-leg line check for the first officer. The flight was routine until the approach to Memphis.
At 12:06 the captain contacted Memphis Approach. He was told to expect an approach to runway 36L. After listening out the ATIS, the captain advised the first officer that the winds were out of "three twenty at sixteen gusts to twenty two. Ten miles [visibility]. It's still saying wind shear."
At 12:15 Memphis Approach informed the flight that they should expect to land on runway 36R instead of 36L, as previously instructed. Six minutes later the captain radioed that they had the airport in sight. The controller cleared them for a visual approach and instructed the captain to contact Memphis Tower. The tower controller stated: "FedEx six forty seven heavy, Memphis tower, number two following a heavy Airbus two mile final caution wake turbulence runway three six right. Gain and loss of ten [knots] short final runway three six right, cleared to land."
The airplane was configured for landing and the crew discussed adding 4 knots to the Vref speed.
A single tailwind shear alert sounded about 12:23:52. Moments later the airplane descended through 1000 feet. The captain confirmed the approach was stable and the approach to land was continued.
During the 20 seconds before touchdown, the airplane's descent rate was 12.5 feet per second (fps) with +/- 2.5-fps oscillations. At 12:25:52, the airplane's left main landing gear touched down at a rate of about 12.5 fps; about 0.25 second later, the right main landing gear touched down at a rate of about 14.5 fps. The MD-10 landing gear is designed to be capable of absorbing energy that is equivalent to a maximum airplane descent rate of 12 fps.
The excessive vertical and lateral forces on the right main landing gear during the landing exceeded those design limits and resulted in the fracture of the outer cylinder and the collapse of the right main landing gear. The airplane began to bank and turn to the right. The crew were unable to steer the airplane back to the left and it skidded off the right side of the runway and came to a stop in the grass. Shortly after coming to a stop there was an explosion and a fire developed on the right side to the airplane. All seven occupants were able to successfully evacuate the airplane using the cockpit windows.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "1) the first officer’s failure to properly apply crosswind landing techniques to align the airplane with the runway centerline and to properly arrest the airplane’s descent rate (flare) before the airplane touched down; and 2) the captain’s failure to adequately monitor the first officer’s performance and command or initiate corrective action during the final approach and landing."
Accident investigation:

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Investigating agency: | NTSB  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 1 year and 5 months | Accident number: | NTSB AAR-05-01 | Download report: | Final report
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Sources:
» NTSB
Opérations de secours
NTSB issued 5 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 31-MAY-2005 | To: FAA | A-05-14 |
Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carrier operators to establish programs for flight crewmembers who have demonstrated performance deficiencies or experienced failures in the training environment that would require a review of their whole performance history at the company and administer additional oversight and training to ensure that performance deficiencies are addressed and corrected. (Open - Acceptable Response) |
Issued: 31-MAY-2005 | To: FAA | A-05-15 |
Amend the emergency exit training information contained in the flight crew and cabin crew sections in Federal Aviation Administration Order 8400.10, Air Transportation Aviation Inspectors Handbook, to make the emergency exit door/slide training described in the flight crew section as comprehensive as the cabin crew emergency training section of the principal operations inspector handbook. (Open - Unacceptable Response) |
Issued: 31-MAY-2005 | To: FAA | A-05-16 |
Verify that all 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 operators emergency door/slide trainers are configured to accurately represent the actual airplane exit door/slide and that their flight crew emergency exit door/slide training provides the intended hands-on emergency procedures training as described in 14 CFR 121.417, to include pulling the manual inflation handle. (Open - Acceptable Response) |
Issued: 31-MAY-2005 | To: FAA | A-05-17 |
Inform all air traffic control tower controllers of the circumstances of this accident, including the need to ensure that aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) vehicles are not delayed without good cause when en route to an emergency and the need to relay the number of airplane occupants to ARFF responders. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 31-MAY-2005 | To: FAA | A-05-18 |
In cooperation with the Memphis/Shelby County Airport Authority and Memphis Fire Department, modify the November 1, 2001, letter of agreement, titled, Airport Emergency .Procedures, to fully describe the protocol to be used for emergency responses, including Rural/Metro Fire Department aircraft rescue and firefighting equipment and personnel. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
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Photos

accident date:
18-12-2003type: McDonnell Douglas MD-10F
registration: N364FE

accident date:
18-12-2003type: McDonnell Douglas MD-10F
registration: N364FE

accident date:
18-12-2003type: McDonnell Douglas MD-10F
registration: N364FE

accident date:
18-12-2003type: McDonnell Douglas MD-10F
registration: N364FE

accident date:
18-12-2003type: McDonnell Douglas MD-10F
registration: N1801U
Video, social media
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Oakland International Airport, CA et Memphis International Airport, TN est de 2868 km (1793 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.