Narrative:The Challenger corporate jet was cleared for takeoff from runway 06, a 6013 ft/1833 m asphalt runway. When takeoff speed was reached the pilot tried to lift the plane off the runway but, according to his statement the control wheel was stuck. He then aborted the takeoff, but the plane skidded off the runway. It went through the perimeter fence, crossed a highway and crashed into a building. About 15 people were injured, one critically, but nobody was killed, officials said. The injured included two people in cars along the highway. Preliminary investigation results indicate that the airplane's center of gravity (CG) was well forward of the allowable limit.
On December 16, 2003 another Challenger jet aborted takeoff at Teterboro when the flightcrew was unable to rotate the airplane. The aircraft overran the runway. In this case, the NTSB determined that the plane was above the maximum gross takeoff weight, and outside the forward center-of-gravity envelope.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the flight crews failure to ensure the airplane was loaded within weight and balance limits and their attempt to take off with the center of gravity well forward of the forward takeoff limit, which prevented the airplane from rotating at the intended rotation speed.
Contributing to the accident were: 1) PJMs conduct of charter flights (using PJM pilots and airplanes) without proper FAA certification and its failure to ensure that all for-hire flights were conducted in accordance with 14 CFR Part 135 requirements; 2) Darby Aviations failure to maintain operational control over 14 CFR Part 135 flights being conducted under its certificate by PJM, which resulted in an environment conducive to the development of systemic patterns of flight crew performance deficiencies like those observed in this accident; 3) the failure of the Birmingham, Alabama, FAA Flight Standards District Office to provide adequate surveillance and oversight of operations conducted under Darbys Part 135 certificate; and 4) the FAAs tacit approval of arrangements such as that between Darby and PJM."
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | NTSB  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 1 year and 9 months | Accident number: | NTSB/AAR-06/04 | Download report: | Final report
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Classification:
Centre of Gravity outside limits
Rejected takeoff
Runway excursion
Sources:
»
SKYbrary » AP
» NTSB
Follow-up / safety actions
NTSB issued 7 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 07-NOV-2006 | To: FAA | A-06-66 |
Disseminate to all principal inspectors of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 certificate holders and to all Part 135 certificate holders guidance that includes specific procedures, such as those contained in the draft revisions to Operations Specifications A-008, that detail appropriate methods by which a certificate holder can demonstrate to the Federal Aviation Administration that it is maintaining adequate operational control over all on-demand charter flights conducted under the authority of its certificate. This guidance should address operations based at locations geographically distant from the certificate holders base, should be included in all Part 135 certificate holders operations specifications, and should be required as periodic inspection items for principal inspectors. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 07-NOV-2006 | To: FAA | A-06-67 |
Review all charter management, lease, and other agreements between 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 certificate holders and other entities to identify those agreements that permit and/or enable a loss of operational control by the certificate holder and require revisions of any such arrangements. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
Issued: 07-NOV-2006 | To: FAA | A-06-68 |
Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 certificate holders to ensure that seatbelts at all seat positions are visible and accessible to passengers before each flight. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
Issued: 07-NOV-2006 | To: FAA | A-06-69 |
Require that any cabin personnel on board 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 flights who could be perceived by passengers as equivalent to a qualified flight attendant receive basic FAA-approved safety training in at least the following areas (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
Issued: 17-JUL-2008 | To: FAA | A-08-48 |
Include language that accomplishes the intent of the European Joint Aviation Authorities Notice of Proposed Amendment 25B-335, Paragraph 10b(6)(iii)(D)(1), in the final version of Advisory Circular 25-7C. (Open - Acceptable Response) |
Issued: 17-JUL-2008 | To: FAA | A-08-49 |
Encourage operators of the Bombardier Challenger series of airplanes to provide training to their pilots that emphasizes the importance of the proper takeoff stabilizer trim setting and that informs pilots about the mistrim-takeoff characteristics of the airplane, including demonstration of these characteristics in a flight simulator. (Open - Acceptable Response) |
Issued: 17-JUL-2008 | To: Transport Canada | A-08-50 |
Encourage Bombardier Aerospace to revise its Challenger 600/601 Quick Reference Handbook to include detailed instructions for setting the takeoff stabilizer trim as described in the airplane flight manual, to ensure that the pages containing these procedures are clearly referenced on any checklist pages that direct pilots to set or check takeoff stabilizer trim, and to inform all operators of CL-600 airplanes about these changes. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
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Photos

accident date:
02-02-2005type: Canadair Challenger 600
registration: N370V

accident date:
02-02-2005type: Canadair Challenger 600
registration: N370V

accident date:
02-02-2005type: Canadair Challenger 600
registration: N370V
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Teterboro Airport, NJ to Chicago-Midway Airport, IL as the crow flies is 1139 km (712 miles).
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.