Statuts: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | mercredi 26 décembre 2007 |
Heure: | 03:02 |
Type/Sous-type: |  Canadair CL-600-2B16 Challenger 604 |
Compagnie: | Jet Connection Business Flight |
Immatriculation: | D-ARWE |
Numéro de série: | 5454 |
Année de Fabrication: | 2000 |
Heures de vol: | 7882 |
Cycles: | 4556 |
Equipage: | victimes: 1 / Ã bord: 3 |
Passagers: | victimes: 0 / Ã bord: 1 |
Total: | victimes: 1 / Ã bord: 4 |
Dégats de l'appareil: | Détruit |
Conséquences: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Lieu de l'accident: | Almaty Airport (ALA) ( Kazakhstan)
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Élévation des lieux de l'accident: | 681 m (2234 feet) amsl |
Phase de vol: | Au décollage (TOF) |
Nature: | Affaires |
Aéroport de départ: | Almaty Airport (ALA/UAAA), Kazakhstan |
Aéroport de destination: | Bangkok-Suvarnabhumi International Airport (BKK/VTBS), Thaïlande |
Numéro de vol: | 826 |
Détails:The Canadair Challenger 604 corporate jet, registration D-ARWE, was conducting a charter flight LCX826 from Hannover (Germany) to Astana (Kazakhstan) and Macao (China). Apart from the crew there was one passenger on board.
At 12:10 UTC on December 25, 2007 the crew took off at Hannover Airport. During the flight the crew was informed that there was no fuel available for refueling the aircraft at Astana Airport. Due to this the crew decided to change the flight route and refuel the aircraft at Almaty International Airport, Kazakhstan. At 18:46 UTC (00:46 local time, December 26) the crew landed at Almaty Airport.
The Almaty ground services conducted refueling and anti-icing of the aircraft using Type 1 and Type 2 fluids in two steps.
By 02:43 local time the de-/anti-icing procedure was completed. On leaving the aircraft the captain made a visual and tactile inspection of the anti-icing quality. After that the PIC returned to the aircraft and the crew began the engine start-up.
At 02:51 the crew was instructed by Ground Control to expect further instructions at the holding point and contact the Tower Control. After contacting Tower Control the crew was instructed to wait on the holding point as there was an MD-83 aircraft on finals.
At 02:57, after the MD-83 landed the Tower Control cleared the CL-604 D-ARWE to line up on runway 05 and at 03:01 they were cleared for takeoff.
During the takeoff an increasing right bank started developing. As the aircraft was banking to the right it touched the right runway edge with its right wing tip. Then the aircraft, leaning on the right wing, moved to the graded airfield to the right of the runway and hit its surface with the right main landing gear and nose landing gear. During the further movement the aircraft hit the reinforced fence of the airport and slid on the ground 190 m beyond the airport before it came to rest. A fire occurred which was extinguished by the airport fire brigades.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE:
The accident involving a CL-604 aircraft registered D-ARWE was caused by the asymmetric lift loss at takeoff which led to aircraft stall right after the liftoff, collision with the ground and obstacles, aircraft destruction and ground fire.
The lift loss was most probably caused by the contamination of the wing leading edge with precipitation in the form of snow after the anti-icing which occurred as the crew did not engage the Wing Anti-Ice before the takeoff which is a mandatory requirement of the CL-604 AFM in the actual weather conditions (moderate snow, OAT minus 14° C, moisture content 92 %, dewpoint minus 15° C, dry snow on the runway, 10 mm thick).
Significant violation of the CL-604 AFM/OM limitations concerning the rate of rotation (pitch rate) when taking off with contaminated wing provided it was impossible to monitor this parameter instrumentally could have contributed to the situation.
The inefficiency of the availably stall protection system at takeoff due to the hypersensitive wing as to contamination of its leading edge cannot completely guarantee prevention of similar accidents in the future.
Accident investigation:

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Investigating agency: | MAK  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 3 years and 6 months | Accident number: | Final report | Download report: | Final report
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Sources:
»
SKYbrary » Kazinform
» General Procurator's office of republic Kazakhstan
Opérations de secours
MAK issued 5 Safety Recommendations
Transport Canada issued 4 Airworthiness Directives
Issued: -- | To: Bombardier | D-ARWE(1) |
The Bombardier Company, consider the practicability of working out more efficient recommendations for pilots to avoid stalling at takeoff due to wing contamination. |
Issued: -- | To: JetConnection Businessflight | D-ARWE(2) |
JetConnection Businessflight AG Airline, review the content of the Airline ABBRIVATED CHECKLIST in order to avoid the omissions of stipulated by the ?L-604 AFM checklist items. |
Issued: -- | To: CL-604 operators | D-ARWE(3) |
arranging of debriefings to study the causes and contributing factors to the CL-604 D-ARWE accident; |
Issued: -- | To: CL-604 operators | D-ARWE(4) |
arranging of training for the flight crews operating this aircraft type when preparing for the cold weather period operations concerning the aircraft aerodynamics highlighting the possibility of stall in case of contaminated wing with deposits of ice, snow, frost etc. as well as the de-icing/anti-icing rules and use of Wing Anti-Ice system; |
Issued: -- | To: CL-604 operators | D-ARWE(5) |
recommend captains operating ?L-604 type aircraft, in case the co-pilot has low (less than 200 hours) experience on this aircraft type conduct takeoffs and landings by themselves in case of contamination, precipitation, low braking action, and excessive crosswind component. |
Issued: 10-MAR-2008 | To: CL-600-2B19 | CF-2008-15 |
The original issue of this directive mandated the introduction of additional limitations and procedures to the AFM and required that any operatorÂ’s PilotÂ’s Checklist fully reflects these procedures. In order not to compromise the takeoff operational safety margin, strict adherence to all the AFM procedures and limitations was required. |
Issued: 10-MAR-2008 | To: CL-600 | CF-2008-16 |
Mandates the introduction of additional limitations and procedures to the AFM and requires that any operatorÂ’s Pilot\'s Checklist fully reflects these procedures. In order not to compromise the takeoff operational safety margin, strict adherence to all the AFM procedures and limitations is required. |
Issued: 03-SEP-2008 | To: CL-600-2B19 | CF-2008-15R1 |
Revision 1 of this directive mandates the amendment of the AFM by inserting Temporary revision (TR) RJ/155-5 which, in addition to retaining the limitations and procedures introduced to the AFM Limitations Section through AFM TR RJ/155-2, now also requires specific pilot training on or before 1 November 2008 with regard to enhanced take-off procedures and winter operations. |
Issued: 03-SEP-2008 | To: CL-600 | CF-2008-16R1 |
Mandates the amendment of the AFM Limitations Section which, in addition to retaining the limitations and procedures introduced at previous AFM temporary revisions, now also requires specific pilot training on or before 1 November 2008 with regard to enhanced take-off procedures and winter operations. |
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Photos

accident date:
26-12-2007type: Canadair Challenger 604
registration: D-ARWE

accident date:
26-12-2007type: Canadair Challenger 604
registration: D-ARWE
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Almaty Airport et Bangkok-Suvarnabhumi International Airport est de 3971 km (2482 miles).
Accident location: Approximate; accuracy within a few kilometers.
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.