Statuts: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | lundi 12 octobre 2009 |
Heure: | 13:10 |
Type/Sous-type: |  Embraer EMB-500 Phenom 100 |
Compagnie: | Save Comercial e Importadora Ltda. |
Immatriculation: | PP-AFM |
Numéro de série: | 50000049 |
Année de Fabrication: | 2009 |
Heures de vol: | 14 |
Moteurs: | 2 Pratt & Whitney Canada PW617F-E |
Equipage: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 2 |
Passagers: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 2 |
Total: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 4 |
Dégats de l'appareil: | Substantiels |
Conséquences: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Lieu de l'accident: | Angra dos Reis Airport, RJ ( Brésil)
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Phase de vol: | A l'atterrissage (LDG) |
Nature: | Privé |
Aéroport de départ: | São Paulo-Campo de Marte Airport, SP (SBMT), Brésil |
Aéroport de destination: | Angra dos Reis Airport, RJ (SDAG), Brésil |
Détails:The Phenom jet was damaged beyond repair when it suffered a runway excursion after landing on runway 10 at Angra dos Reis Airport, Brazil.
Probable Cause:
Contributing Factors
- Attitude - contributed
The pilot considered the operation in Angra dos Reis unsafe, but operated the aircraft at that aerodrome several times, willingly yielding to the pressures of the boss.
- Decision-making - contributed
The crew proceeded to landing with tailwind and elevated aircraft weight, without considering the possibility of rushing or even using runway 28, which demonstrated that there was not an adequate assessment of the conditions involving the landing within the limits of the runway.
- Culture of the working group - contributed
The group's culture of not performing a traffic circuit, nor landing on runway 28, especially in relation to jet-powered aircraft, reinforced the decision of the pilots to proceed to landing on the usual runway, considerably increasing the distance required to stop of the aircraft.
In addition, the common practice among executive aviation pilots to yield to the wishes of the aircraft owner or the service contractor may have contributed to the complacent behavior of the crew.
- External influences - indeterminate
The possible pressure exerted by the owner to carry out the flights, as well as the need to maintain the job or the professional image, may have contributed to the complacency behavior of the crew on the issues that lead to the operation of aircraft under conditions below acceptable safety standards.
- Organizational culture - contributed
The culture of always fully fueling the aircraft regardless of the flight to be accomplished culminated in a landing weight above that required for the aircraft to stop within the runway boundaries.
- Flight planning - contributed
The flight planning did not consider that the takeoff weight of the aircraft would result in a landing weight above that required for the aircraft to stop within the runway boundary.
- Little pilot experience - unspecified
The pilots had only a few hours of flight time in the aircraft type of the accident, which contributed to the decrease in the perception of risk in the SDAG operation under those conditions.
- Project - contributed
The extrapolation of the pedal stroke and the consequent temporary disabling of the aircraft brake system at some point during the landing run degraded the braking of the aircraft and increased the length of runway necessary for the aircraft to stop after landing, despite that the performance chart of the aircraft indicated that the length of the runway was not sufficient for landing in those aircraft's wind and weight conditions and aggravated the damage to the aircraft.
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | CENIPA  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 7 years and 1 months | Accident number: | A - 539/CENIPA/2015 | Download report: | Final report
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Sources:
»
AvCanada forum (with photos)
Photos
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre São Paulo-Campo de Marte Airport, SP et Angra dos Reis Airport, RJ est de 245 km (153 miles).
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.