Statuts: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | mercredi 25 août 2010 |
Heure: | 19:47 |
Type/Sous-type: |  Antonov An-26B |
Compagnie: | EXIN |
Immatriculation: | SP-FDP |
Numéro de série: | 11903 |
Année de Fabrication: | 1982 |
Heures de vol: | 21510 |
Moteurs: | 2 Ivchenko AI-24VT |
Equipage: | victimes: 0 / Ã bord: 4 |
Passagers: | victimes: 0 / Ã bord: 0 |
Total: | victimes: 0 / Ã bord: 4 |
Dégats de l'appareil: | Substantiels |
Conséquences: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Lieu de l'accident: | Tallinn-Ülemiste Airport (TLL) ( Estonie)
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Phase de vol: | Au décollage (TOF) |
Nature: | Cargo |
Aéroport de départ: | Tallinn-Ülemiste Airport (TLL/EETN), Estonie |
Aéroport de destination: | Helsinki-Vantaa Airport (HEL/EFHK), Finlande |
Numéro de vol: | EXN3788 |
Détails:An Antonov An-26 cargo plane, registered SP-FDP, suffered a takeoff accident at Tallinn-Ülemiste Airport (TLL), Estonia. None of the four crew members were injured.
Flight EXN3788 was a scheduled cargo service to Helsinki-Vantaa Airport, Finland. The first officer was pilot flying.
The aircraft entered runway 08 from taxiway B on the West end of the runway and lined up for takeoff. The calculated V1 was 182 and Vr was 201 km/h. Ten seconds after commencing takeoff, the pilot flying started rotation without the Vr callout at 123 km/h. The aircraft pitch angle increased to 4.6° two seconds later. Sixteen seconds into the takeoff, the navigator made the V1 call-out at 160.5 km/h. One second later the flight engineer called "Retracting" in Polish. The aircraft started to pitch down and 3 seconds later it contacted the runway and continued on its belly for 1,228 m before coming to its rest position 3 m right from the runway centerline.
Probable Cause:
Cause:
1. The investigation determined the inadequate action of the flight engineer, consisting in early and uncommanded landing gear retraction, as a cause of the accident.
Contributing factors to the accident were:
1. Inadequate crew recourse management and insufficient experience in cooperation and coordination between crewmembers.
2. Start of aircraft rotation at low speed and with fast elevator movement to 17°, which resulted in:
- Lifting the aircraft sufficiently to close the WOW switch and allow the retraction of the landing gear at the speed not sufficient for the climb.
- Providing misleading information to FE about the aerodynamic status of the aircraft.
3. Inadequate adjustment of the WOW switch, which allowed the gear retraction to be activated before the aircraft was airborne.
The position of the landing gear selector on the central console is not considered as a contributing factor to the accident. However, investigation finds necessary to point it out as a safety concern, specifically in situations, where crewmembers are trained and/or used to operate the aircrafts with gear selector location according to the EASA Certification Standards CS-25. Positioning of the gear lever to the location which is compliant to EASA document CS-25, would create additional safety barrier to avoid similar occurrences, specifically in aircrafts where landing gear is operated by FE.
Accident investigation:

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Investigating agency: | ESIB  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 1 year and 5 months | Accident number: | EE170/250810 | Download report: | Final report
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Sources:
» Scramble 385
»
Reporter.ee
Opérations de secours
ESIB issued 3 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 22-JAN-2012 | To: EXIN | SP-FDP (1) |
To set up and implement the procedure to assure, that gear operations on takeoff are made in accordance with AFM. Due to the lack of visual control over the gear switch handle by captain and first officer during takeoff it is recommended to set up and implement procedure with clear verbal exchange between pilot flying and flight engineer confirming the gear operations. |
Issued: 22-JAN-2012 | To: EXIN | SP-FDP (2) |
To install QAR on the aircraft and set up and implement effective procedures to provide sufficient supervision over crew adherence to the AFM and SOP. |
Issued: 22-JAN-2012 | To: EXIN | SP-FDP (3) |
To set up and implement the procedures to increase the maintenance quality and increase the risk awareness associated with improper WOW switch regulation. |
Show all...
Photos
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Tallinn-Ülemiste Airport et Helsinki-Vantaa Airport est de 100 km (63 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.