Narrative:
The accident occurred during a touch and go at Naval Air Station Key West. During the takeoff just prior to the aircraft becoming airborne, the Loadmaster, who was seated in the rear of the cargo compartment, heard an electrical buzzing sound and observed an orange jet-like flame shoot across the cargo ramp from left to right at floor level. He then unbuckled his harness and was reaching for the fire extinguisher when an expansive orange fireball erupted, causing him to protect his head with his jacket. Once the fireball receded, he proceeded forward and alerted the crew to the fire while calling for the takeoff to be aborted.
Concurrently, the aircraft had just become airborne and reached 10 feet above the runway. With sufficient runway remaining, the Flying Pilot landed straight ahead and aggressively stopped the aircraft while the Non-Flying Pilot notified ATC. Once the engines were shut down, all nine crewmembers quickly egressed and moved upwind of the aircraft. Crash, Fire, and Rescue services responded and expeditiously extinguished the fire. The aircraft was extensively damaged and one crewmember received a minor injury during egress.
Cause Factors:
1. The fire was ignited due to an electrical arcing event that occurred between the auxiliary hydraulic system pump motor power supply wire harness and a pressurized auxiliary hydraulic stainless steel braided flex hose installed as part of modification CF-378. The stainless steel braided flex hose chafed through the electrical insulation of the wire and the subsequent electrical arcing from the wire resulted in a 2mm hole in the flex hose, leak of high pressure hydraulic fluid and ignition of the hydraulic fluid.
2. The CF-378 modification leaflet did not specify sufficient routing and clamping arrangements to maintain separation of the pressurized hydraulic lines from support structure and the hydraulic pump motor wire and the re-issued CF-378 modification leaflet was ambiguous as to the correct location of the test connection support bracket.
3. The approval process for the MPP was deficient in that it did not detect the improper location of the ground test connection bracket, did not adequately consider the effect of the redesign on routing and clamping, did not treat the revised configuration as a new modification, and did not specify the application of the MPP installed alternate parts in the amended parts list.
4. The modification approval process did not contain specific provisions to consider impacts of routing and clamping for wiring hoses IAW CFTOs C-17-010-002/ME-001, Aircraft Electrical and Electronic Wiring and for flexible hoses IAW CFTO C-12-010-040/TR-010, Part 3 Aircraft Flexible Hose Standard Manufacture, Replacement and Inspection.
5. Maintenance personnel and supervisors at all levels did not detect and/or correct deficiencies related to routing and clamping of lines and wires for modification CF-378 and the associated MPP, either during installation and/or subsequent inspections.
» CBC
» CC130342 Hercules - From the Investigator
| Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
| Date: | Tuesday 21 February 2012 |
| Time: | 08:58 |
| Type: |  Lockheed CC-130H(T) Hercules |
| Operator: | Royal Canadian Air Force - RCAF |
| Registration: | 130342 |
| MSN: | 5207 |
| First flight: | 1991 |
| Total airframe hrs: | 12839 |
| Crew: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 7 |
| Passengers: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2 |
| Total: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 9 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
| Aircraft fate: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
| Location: | Key West NAS, FL (NQX) ( United States of America)
|
| Phase: | Takeoff (TOF) |
| Nature: | Military |
| Departure airport: | Key West NAS, FL (NQX/KNQX), United States of America |
| Key West NAS, FL (NQX/KNQX), United States of America |
The accident occurred during a touch and go at Naval Air Station Key West. During the takeoff just prior to the aircraft becoming airborne, the Loadmaster, who was seated in the rear of the cargo compartment, heard an electrical buzzing sound and observed an orange jet-like flame shoot across the cargo ramp from left to right at floor level. He then unbuckled his harness and was reaching for the fire extinguisher when an expansive orange fireball erupted, causing him to protect his head with his jacket. Once the fireball receded, he proceeded forward and alerted the crew to the fire while calling for the takeoff to be aborted.
Concurrently, the aircraft had just become airborne and reached 10 feet above the runway. With sufficient runway remaining, the Flying Pilot landed straight ahead and aggressively stopped the aircraft while the Non-Flying Pilot notified ATC. Once the engines were shut down, all nine crewmembers quickly egressed and moved upwind of the aircraft. Crash, Fire, and Rescue services responded and expeditiously extinguished the fire. The aircraft was extensively damaged and one crewmember received a minor injury during egress.
Probable Cause:
Cause Factors:
1. The fire was ignited due to an electrical arcing event that occurred between the auxiliary hydraulic system pump motor power supply wire harness and a pressurized auxiliary hydraulic stainless steel braided flex hose installed as part of modification CF-378. The stainless steel braided flex hose chafed through the electrical insulation of the wire and the subsequent electrical arcing from the wire resulted in a 2mm hole in the flex hose, leak of high pressure hydraulic fluid and ignition of the hydraulic fluid.
2. The CF-378 modification leaflet did not specify sufficient routing and clamping arrangements to maintain separation of the pressurized hydraulic lines from support structure and the hydraulic pump motor wire and the re-issued CF-378 modification leaflet was ambiguous as to the correct location of the test connection support bracket.
3. The approval process for the MPP was deficient in that it did not detect the improper location of the ground test connection bracket, did not adequately consider the effect of the redesign on routing and clamping, did not treat the revised configuration as a new modification, and did not specify the application of the MPP installed alternate parts in the amended parts list.
4. The modification approval process did not contain specific provisions to consider impacts of routing and clamping for wiring hoses IAW CFTOs C-17-010-002/ME-001, Aircraft Electrical and Electronic Wiring and for flexible hoses IAW CFTO C-12-010-040/TR-010, Part 3 Aircraft Flexible Hose Standard Manufacture, Replacement and Inspection.
5. Maintenance personnel and supervisors at all levels did not detect and/or correct deficiencies related to routing and clamping of lines and wires for modification CF-378 and the associated MPP, either during installation and/or subsequent inspections.
Accident investigation:
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Sources:
» Photo of airframe stored at Abbotsford, jan 2014.» CBC
» CC130342 Hercules - From the Investigator
Photos
Map
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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